Democracy and the Beit Din

The following post is a request by me for further information. I am not trying to teach here; I am instead trying to appeal and request for someone else to teach me.

We know that in a traditional Jewish community, the rabbi was hired with a strict contract stipulating his rights and duties. We also know that a gezera or taqana is nothing unless the people accept it. We also know that the Torah is our constitution, and that we have rule-of-law in that the rabbis have no power to contradict the Torah, and that any ruling they make is null-and-void if they go against the Torah.

(Of course, it can be difficult to tell when this is. There is a fine line between a zaqen mamre who has violated the Sanhedrin's ruling and ignored its authority and must be executed, versus a hakham who has correctly pointed out the Sanhedrin's very real error and need to bring a qorban for the entire edah (Mesekhet Horayot). I sincerely hope the execution of a zagen mamre was of those threats that was never actually carried out, similar to the ben sorer u-moreh, unless it was obvious that the zaqen mamre was like Korah and was obviously trying to egregiously rebel for his own honor and not for G-d's. Because otherwise, you could have many cases of men who were honestly concerned for the honor of the Torah, being executed because they felt the Sanhedrin was wrong.)

Everything I've said is nothing but pure democracy, pure federalism. But the following is my question, for which I need answers from someone more knowledgeable than myself.

We know that the "rabbis" have the power of hefker beit din hefker, that the beit din can unilaterally declare property to be ownerless and redistribute it. Theoretically, the beit din could declare that your car now belongs to your neighbor.

But what if I don't recognize the authority or jurisdiction of the beit din? Maybe it's a Sephardi beit din and I'm Ashkenazi, or it's a Mitnagdik beit din and I'm Hasidic, etc.

The powers of the beit din assume that the people recognize its authority. According to the halakhah, any X-number of men (usually three) with the proper credentials (semikhah) can constitute a beit din, but if three men with semikhah walked into New York City, sat down, and started laying down rulings, do you think anyone would pay attention? Of course not!

In a traditional Jewish community, there was one beit din, and it was recognized by everyone who lived there. The Jewish community was a self-contained entity, in which the people, the rabbis, and the dayanim were all interrelated. For example, rabbis were hired according to strict contracts laying down their precise duties and rights.

I haven't studied this issue, but I assume that the power of the beit din was limited by the people's acceptance. I've never read anything saying this, but it just seems logical. I assume that if ever the beit din started doing things which the people didn't approve of, that the people would just stop listening. The community functioned because the people trusted the dayanim and the dayanim felt loyal to the Torah and the people they were ruling for, etc. Everyone had a contractual obligation with everyone else, whether or not an actual written contract was in existence.

So if the dayanim started abusing their power, or making rulings which the people felt were definitely and obviously not correct according to the Talmud, then I assume the people would simply reject the beit din's authority.

The Torah, which is our constitution, grants the beit din the power of hefker beit din hefker. This is a special power granted by our constitution. But I'm arguing that the beit din could not unilaterally exercise this power, unless it was sure the people would consent and not rebel. If, for example, the beit din suddenly announced that all property was publicly owned, and that Judaism was going socialistic, I bet the people would refuse to obey.

I.e., laws that are straight and explicit in the Torah, the beit din doesn't need the people's approval. Pork is treif no matter who says so, so the beit din doesn't need the people's approval to declare that pork is treif. If the people want to ignore the beit din, then fine, they're sinning and violating an explicit law of the Torah, and it's their sin before G-d.

But laws that are discretionary, like taqanot and gezerot and hefker beit din hefker, I'm betting that there's something in Jewish law or history acknowledging that the beit din's power is conditional on the people accepting it. I don't know where, but there's got to be something to that effect. Otherwise, any three people could simply join together when no one's looking and pass a serious of ridiculous and absurdly tyrannical laws, and no one would have any recourse. After all, they formed a beit din!!! I'm sure there must be something that says that no, if the people reject their basic authority, that then, their laws are null and void.

My point is that the beit din operates according to democracy as well. The beit din has a fixed legal code and constitution (the Written and Oral Torot), and it has a contractual obligation with the people. If the beit din rules against the Torah, then its rulings are null and void - that is clear. What I am further arguing, albeit without any sources, is that similarly, if the people felt the beit din was overstepping its bounds or abusing its authority, that they'd simply stop listening to it. And what are three dayanim going to do when 100 townspeople stop paying them any attention?

I'm not learned enough in Jewish history to know the precise dynamics. Furthermore, I'm sure dynamics were different in different places. But I'm sure that there must be some halakhic source somewhere which grants the people this power. I don't know where, but I'm sure that there's something, somewhere in the Talmud or Jewish history, which would support my claim. Does anyone know anything with proves or disproves me?

We know that a gezera or taqana is not binding unless the people accept this. This is an established, indisputable principle. I am betting there is something similar about other discretionary powers that the beit din holds.

*** Update: Come to think of it, however, we learn that a taqana or gezera is nothing until the people accept it. Maybe the halakhic sources do not mention the democratic nature of the beit din itself, preferring instead to discuss the democratic nature of its actual rulings? In fact, if I, Michael Makovi, make a taqana or gezera, and if the people all accepted it, then it'd become minhag ha-maqom (a locality-based custom, obligatory on all inhabitants of that locale), even though I'm not a dayan. So perhaps it isn't that the beit din itself is democratic, but rather, its rulings are, regardless of who the dayanim are. A Torah-true ruling is binding regardless of who says it, a Torah-false ruling is not binding regardless of who says it, and a taqana or gezera - i.e., a discretionary ruling not explicitly permitted or forbidden by the Torah - is binding if the people accept it, regardless of who promulgated it. The democratic nature of the beit din is not within the beit din itself or its members, but rather, it is its rulings which are bound by democracy.

***Update continued: Also, as one commenter below noted, Rambam in Hilkhot Sanhedrin 1:1 says that it is a mitzvah to appoint judges. But Rambam words this in the general, implying that every individual has such a mitzvah. Likewise, the Torah says that "you" will appoint judges, implying that the people at large, and not any one special body, appoint judges. Presumably, this means that if the community didn't appoint someone as a dayan, then he has no power; one cannot install himself tyrannically as a self-appointed dayan.

The Essence of Democracy; also, Regarding the Obligation to Obey the Sanhedrin

Professors Paul K. Ryu and Helen Silving, The Foundations of Democracy: Its Origins and Essential Ingredients (non-text-searchable PDF; text-searchable HTML is here:

Common to all these forms of government is the assumption that the basic postulate of democracy is the majority rule, where-by the majority of the people in a community makes the decisions that are to govern. On this assumption most scholars trace the origins of "democracy" to Greece. They disregard democracy's other constituent element, civil liberties.It seems to escape their attention that Socrates was sentenced to death in "democratic Athens" for teaching dissenting views.

In this essay we proceed on a more concise basic assumption, namely, that the essential of democracy is the status of the individual within society, his rights vis-à-vis the State, whereas the majority rule is but a compromise solution in a state of necessity.

Indeed, Yoram Hazony in The Jewish Origins of the Western Disobedience Tradition shows that Plato, writing about Socrates, says that one must practically worship the state and obey its every command. This is majoritarian tyranny, precisely that which Alexis de Tocqueville and the Federalist Papers, etc. wrote against!! The fact is that the United States's federal government has forces in place designed to do nothing, in fact, but to mitigate majority rule - the electoral college, for example. If the essence of democracy were Athenian majoritarianism, then this would make so sense. But in fact, the true essence of democracy is individual liberties and rights and the government's accountability and social contract, and so mitigating majoritarianism where the majority threatens the minority's liberties now makes perfect sense.

"Democracy" as we use the term, is not so much majoritarian democracy, as it is instead libertarianism. The origins of Western democracy lie especially in civil disobedience, resistance to tyranny, and the rights of the individual; and also in the rule of law. The government being a government of law and not of men (or a man), and each individual having sovereign rights irrespective of the government's policies - this is the fundamental source of democracy. Rule by majority in a modern Western democracy is simply practical and pragmatic solution to the question of how to ensure the government is responsible and accountable to the people, but in truth, it is not meant to imply that rule is to be majoritarian. Indeed, as Churchhill said, democracy (i.e. majority rule, voting, etc.) is a horrible system but the best we've come up with. Thus, libertarians emphasize things like every individual's social contract, and the fact that the government must rule by the consent of every individual, and that the government has no powers which the individuals have not delegated it, etc.

Thus, John Locke and others write about individual rights and liberties and how the government is accountable to the people and must honor these rights and liberties; Locke says nothing of voting, and according to him, even monarchy is fine and proper as long as there is consent by the governed and as long as individual rights and liberties are honored. Democracy today is meant not to be majoritarian (tyranny of the majority), but rather, individualistic and libertarian ("...we hold these truths to be self-evident that all men ... are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights ...").

So when people say that one has an obligation to obey the majority, one must surely be puzzled. I was speaking to an Israel recently about politics, and he vehemently insisted that the basis of democracy is the individual's obligation to obey the majority, and he says this is what he learned in his Israeli public-school civics classes. This is confusing and perplexing, not to mention profoundly disturbing and depressing. One must wonder: from where does this obligation to obey the majority derive? I have seen this obligation written nowhere - not in the Bible and not in the writings of secular reason-based Enlightenment philosophy. It may be wise and pragmatic and convenient to obey the majority, but how can one create an obligation to obey the majority? From where can such an obligation arise (except by a mutually and deliberately entered-into contract)?

As Professors Ryu and Silving show (op. cit.), Rousseau did hold by an obligation to obey the majority. But as they show, Rousseau required that an explicit social-contract exist to this effect - i.e, that the obligation to obey the majority be something that was mutually consented-to by all involved - and furthermore, Rousseau was speaking of a small city-state like Geneva, and he never intended that his majoritarianism be extended to something as vast as an entire nation (like France). As I've argued previously (Religious Coercion, or On John Locke and the Kehilla's Right to Assess Tzedaqa), the smaller a locale, the less libertarian and the more majoritarian it may be, because it is easier to assume that all the residents tacitly consent to everything that goes on, because they can easily leave, and because they are more clearly receiving concrete benefits and paying concrete costs to a very tangible and immanent polity, unlike with a vast nation, in which one is governed from afar by someone beyond the mountains in Rome, as it were. As an example: there is an enormous difference between the Haredim trying to impose Haredism on Meah Shearim versus their trying to do the same to all of Israel. And thus, Moshe Feiglin advocates districting Israel and allowing each district to vote on its own degree and enforcement of Jewish character. (I don't know how large or small Feiglin believes each district should be, but that's not the point.)

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Update: Below in the comments, Larry Lennhoff points to Deuteronomy 17:8-13, commanding one to "incline after the majority" and obey the majority-rulings of the Sanhedrin. My response:

That's only in a court of law, not regarding the government in general. There's a profound and enormous difference between following the majority in a legal decision, to decide the law where there is a dispute in the interpretation of a law that everyone already agrees must be obeyed, versus obeying a law that has been newly created and legislated and is not yet consented to and acknowledged by all.

For example, if we all agree that the Torah or Talmud Shulhan Arukh is binding in general, then it's reasonable to require observance of the majority interpretation of that law which is already taken for granted as binding. But it's something wholly else to require the majority to obey a law which the minority does not even recognize in the first place. The Ashkenazim were not bound to accept the Shulhan Arukh at the outset, and indeed, they rejected it until the Ramah added his own two-cents. At the very least, there's an enormous quantitative difference between the two, even if the difference is merely of degree and not of kind.

Furthermore, the Bavli (in Horayot) says that if a student knows his rabbi is wrong, that he must dispute him, and the Yerushalmi (in Horayot) says that if the Sanhedrin says left is right, one must disobey it. Even regarding the Sanhedrin, one must not follow the majority if they are clearly in error. The entire Mesekhet Horayot implies this; if the Sanhedrin errs, then..., etc.

(Rashi cites the famous Sifra, that one must follow the Sanhedrin even when it says left is right and right is left. This is the exact opposite of the language of the Yerushalmi, and it contradicts the implication of the Bavli as well. Most likely, the Sifra was speaking of what non-scholars must do, those who lack the credentials to question the Sanhedrin. Most individuals lack the scholarly credentials to second-guess the Sanhedrin, but the theoretical democratic right to question the Sanhedrin still applies to everyone, as long as he has the requisite learning. Alternately, there is a distinction between types of errors; there is a difference between when the Sanhedrin supposedly (according to one's personal opinion) makes a subtle and disputable error in the interpretation of the law, versus when the Sanhedrin made a gross and fundamental error, entirely overlooking or misinterpreting a source. Perhaps one must disobey the Sanhedrin when it makes a fundamental error, but obey it when it makes a subtle and disputable error of interpretation. This would explain why the zaqen mamre, the rebellious elder, is punished for advocating disobedience to the Sanhedrin's ruling; he is presumably learned enough to follow the Yerushalmi and dispute the Sanhedrin, but the error is subtle and disputable enough that he is to drop his case; the case is not serious enough for the Sanhedrin to have to recant and bring a sin-offering for its error (which is the subject of the entire Mesekhet Horayot. )

So even within a court of law, one must not "incline after the majority towards evil". One must follow the majority only when it is correct. And that's only in a court of law; outside the courts, the obligation to follow the majority is even less than that, as I've said above. Even if the zaqen mamre must sometimes abase himself and obey what he believes is an erroneous ruling (because the error is subtle and not fundamental), this is only regarding a law to which all otherwise agree everyone is bound and obligated to follow; but regarding a dispute outside the courts, or regarding a law which not all even believe one is obligated to follow in the first place, one is even less obligated to follow the majority.

Rabbi Yaakov Emden was asked by the Christians why he didn't convert to Christianity, since the majority of the (known) world was Christian. Rabbi Emden answered that one follows the majority only in a case of doubt. Since, however, the Jews know they are right and the Christians are wrong, he said, the principle of majority rule did not apply. I think Rabbi Emden was driving at the same point. Majority rule is a utilitarian concession required in courts of law to determine the proper interpretation of a law, but where one knew the majority was wrong, one was not obligated to follow it. Since majority rule is merely a pragmatic utility to expedite arrival at the truth, one was obligated to forgo following the majority when a better route to the truth was available.

Finally: Deuteronomy 17:8-13 is laying down a very specific law for a very specific case. This law to follow the majority is binding only in the case of the Sanhedrin, and not at any other time. This command to follow the majority is not a generally-binding principle. It is a very specific law for a very specific case, binding only because it is explicitly and expressly laid down. Similarly, the laws of kashrut are very specific and should not be extrapolated from; what is treif is treif, and everything else is kosher, and had the Torah not laid down the laws kashrut, then everything would be kosher. If I remember correctly, Sifra distinguishes between rational and non-rational laws, saying there are laws that ilu haya lo nikhtavin, haya likhtov ("had they not been written, then they should have been written" - i.e., our reason would derive them on our own), and that there are laws ilu haya lo nikhtavin, haya lo likhtov ("had they not been written, then they should not have been written" - i.e., our reason would not derive them on our own). The latter laws especially compromise the huqim, the "ritual" or "ceremonial" laws, that had G-d not given them, they wouldn't be binding. Majority-rule is one such law. Either G-d must expressly and explicitly lay it down, or humans must mutually contract amongst themselves to obey majority rule. But without some express and explicit binding contract, majority-rule is not binding; it is a non-rational law, like the laws of kashrut.

As Yoram Hazony states (The Jewish Origins of the Western Disobedience Tradition (Azure, Summer 5758/1998, pp. 17-74.), pp. 62, 20.):

Mankind has seen no end of attempts to render human laws inviolable in principle, usually on the grounds that one process or another has produced them: There have been those who claimed that the laws of the state were legitimate and binding because the earthly ruler was a god; those who claimed that the laws of the state were legitimate and binding because the ruler was appointed by God; and those who claimed that the laws of the state were legitimate and binding because the ruler was a hereditary monarch. Today it is the fashion to claim that the laws of the state are legitimate and binding because its leaders were chosen in democratic elections. And while democratic elecitons may indeed be the best steward of right that men have yet devised, this fact no more makes them the final arbiter of right than did the similar popularity of now outmoded political regimes in ages past.

...

[U]nqualified obedience to the state is the fundamentally pagan idea, the essential political teaching of the great idolatries of antiqity; ... freedom of conscience and disobedience to unjust law are the core of the biblical political teaching, which arose as a rejection of pagan statism; and ... the adoption of the Jewish obedience teaching by the West - and the victory of the biblical principle of obedience to right over the pagan principle of obedience to the state - represents the highest triumph of the Jewish political idea in history, a triumph which allowed the West, the great bearer of this idea before humanity, to defeat the pagan Nazi state, not only militarily, but on the battlefield of ideas as well.

For we follow the rule of law, not of men. Our goal is to obey the truth, not what men substitute in its place.

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Update: Below in the comments, Ya'qov Walker writes an outstanding and wonderful comment:

I would like to point out that this specific issue of a "Western-style representative democracy" (i.e., a republic) was discussed most eloquently by none less than Yosef ben Matithyahu HaKohen (Flavius Josephus) in his detailed rebuttal to the antisemtic Greco-Egyptian philosopher Apion:

[Taken from "Against Apion", Book II, Chapter 17:]

"Now there are innumerable differences in the particular customs and laws that are among all mankind, which a man may briefly reduce under the following heads: Some legislators have permitted their governments to be under monarchies, others put them under oligarchies, and others under a republican form; but our legislator had no regard to any of these forms, but he ordained our government to be what, by a strained expression, may be termed a Theocracy, by ascribing the authority and the power to God, and by persuading all the people to have a regard to him, as the author of all the good things that were enjoyed either in common by all mankind, or by each one in particular, and of all that they themselves obtained by praying to him in their greatest difficulties. He informed them that it was impossible to escape God's observation, even in any of our outward actions, or in any of our inward thoughts. Moreover, he represented God as unbegotten, and immutable, through all eternity, superior to all mortal conceptions in pulchritude; and, though known to us by his power, yet unknown to us as to his essence... But our legislator [i.e., Mosheh], who made his actions agree to his laws, did not only prevail with those that were his contemporaries to agree with these his notions, but so firmly imprinted this faith in God upon all their posterity, that it never could be removed. The reason why the constitution of this legislation was ever better directed to the utility of all than other legislations were, is this, that Moses did not make religion a part of virtue, but he saw and he ordained other virtues to be parts of religion; I mean justice, and fortitude, and temperance, and a universal agreement of the members of the community with one another; for all our actions and studies, and all our words, [in Moses's settlement,] have a reference to piety towards God; for he hath left none of these in suspense, or undetermined. For there are two ways of coining at any sort of learning and a moral conduct of life; the one is by instruction in words, the other by practical exercises. Now other lawgivers have separated these two ways in their opinions, and choosing one of those ways of instruction, or that which best pleased every one of them, neglected the other. Thus did the Lacedemonians and the Cretians teach by practical exercises, but not by words; while the Athenians, and almost all the other Grecians, made laws about what was to be done, or left undone, but had no regard to the exercising them thereto in practice."

Please note that the term "theokratia" (God-rulership; the literal translation of the Hebrew phrase 'Malkhuth HaElohim') is coined by none other than a Jewish priest, and this is the first known reference to the term. In Josephus' view (stated in bold, above), Monarchy was weak due to its reliance on one man's whims; similarly, oligarchies and republics were vulnerable to the whims of groups of people as a whole; but instead, the system in the Torah would best be called a 'Theocracy' - NOT because of a Davidic monarchy or a Levitical oligarchy, or the rulership of clergy (as it is thought of today), but because the constitution of the nation is based ultimately on the written Word of God.

Quite "modern", and seemingly "Dati Le'umi" in some ways, no?

Ya'aqov's point is incisive: for Josephus, Israel was a theocracy not because it was ruled by a monarchy with Divine backing, nor because it was ruled by a priestly oligarchy. He instead contrasts theocracy with monarchy and oligarchy; theocracy is not monarchy or oligarchy with the addition of religion; it is rather religion in lieu of monarchy or oligarchy. What made Israel was a theocracy was that it had a constitution (the Torah) which set basic guidelines for law and morality which no human could tamper with. Cf. Professors' Ryu and Silving (op. cit.) quoting Justice Rober H. Jackson (West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638(1943)) on the significance of the Bill of Rights:

The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them on legal principles to be applied by courts. One's right to life, liberty and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly,and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.

The entire purpose of constitutions is to set down certain basic principles and laws as incontrovertible and sacrosanct; the Torah filled this purpose.

The Place of Religion in a Liberal Democracy

A most formidable reproach against the argument that democracy and religion are opposed, is found in Dr. Steven Alan Samson's Christianity in Nineteen-Century American Law.

He first notes that many state governments and constitutions retained specifically and explicitly Christian elements, sometimes even official state-churches. The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution, prohibiting the establishment and providing for the free-exercise of religion, applied only to the Federal government until the passage of the 14th Amendment. Cf. Dr. Archie P. Jones, Christianity, Our Early State Constitutions, and American Federalism. See also my blog post Religion and G-d in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, quoting at length from the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, showing its explicitly Christian provisions and language.

Dr. Samson quotes Justice Joseph Story that,

The real object of the [first] amendment [guaranteeing freedom of religion] was, not to countenance, much less to advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government.

In other words, freedom of religion and the prohibition of establishment and the requirement to allow for free exercise, quite possibly took it for granted that only Christianity was protected by its provisions, with Judaism and Islam being entirely beyond the pale and not on anyone's mind. Then again, the First Amendment applied only to the Federal government, and not to state governments, and Story thus said,

the Protestant, the Calvinist and the Arminian, the Jew and the Infidel, may sit down at the common table of the national councils [emphasis added], without any inquisition into their faith, or mode of worship.

So even if the First Amendment did in fact protect non-Christians, it was only on the national level, not the state level.

Dr. Samson then shows that the common law of England, adopted by America from Blackstone's Commentaries, explicitly enshrined Christianity as natural law to which all man-made laws accountable. According to Blackstone,

This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligations to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.

Being that common law is the default law unless some newer legislation is crafted to supersede it, this means that by default, Christianity is woven throughout the fabric of American law. Cf. King Alfred's Book of Dooms (Judgments), showing that King Alfred, the "Father of English Common law", explicitly relied on G-d's authority for his laws. King Alfred even quoted the Ten Commandments and paraphrased many verses from Exodus chapters 20-23!! Cf. also The Foundation of English Common Law, where we see that according to Dr. Helen Silving, the Magna Carta relied very much on the Bible. Futhermore, we learn there that Justinian's law code, the source of Roman law for Christian Europe, was not purely Roman in fact, but was in fact Christianized since the conversion of Constantine

Dr. Samson quotes Thomas M. Cooley:

By establishment of religion is meant the setting up or recognition of a state church, or at least the conferring upon one church of special favors and advantages which are denied to others. It was never intended by the Constitution that the government should be prohibited from recognizing religion, or that religious worship should never be provided for in cases where a proper recognition of Divine Providence in the working of government might seem to require it, and where it might be done without drawing any invidious distinctions between different religious beliefs, organizations, or sects. The Christian religion was always recognized in the administration of the common law; and so far as that law continues to be the law of the land, the fundamental principles of that must continue to be recognized in the same cases and to the same extent as formerly.

In other words: the prohibition of establishment meant only that one Christian church could not be elevated above another, for the sake of that church or sect, in and of itself, for itself. But nothing was intended to prevent the government from passing laws recognizing religion where this was necessary for the good of society.

Dr. Samson quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling in Updegraph v. The Commonwealth, 11, S.&R. 384, 401 (1824) that heretical opinions in and of themselves are not to be punished. Remarkably, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found it necessary to show that Christianity itself would forbid punishment of heretical opinion! That is, rather than simply remarking that religion is outside the court's purview, the court had to seemingly go out of its way and justify its ruling according to Christianity itself!

Dr. Samson adds,

The court indicated that the only interest of temporal courts is to prevent disturbances of the public peace "likely to proceed from the removal of religious and moral restraints; this is the ground of punishment for blasphemous and criminal publications; and without any view to spiritual correction of the offender" (11S. & R. 394, 404).

In other words: the court's task is to guard the public peace, but this may certainly include religious legislation where this is relevant to the public peace. The court's ruling approvingly quotes Justice Swift:

To prohibit the open, public, and explicit denial of the popular religion of a country, is a necessary measure to preserve the tranquility of a government. Of this, no person in a Christian country can complain; for, admitting him to be an infidel, he must acknowledge that no benefit can be derived from the subversion of a religion which enforces the purest morality.

In other words: the legislators and courts may certainly punish open and explicit denial of Christianity or the Bible, for this disturbs the public peace and damages societal morality.

Dr. Samson quotes Chief Justice J.M. Clayton in States v. Chandler, 2 Harrington 553 (1837):

When human justice is rightly administered according to our common law and our constitution, it refuses all jurisdiction over crimes against God, unless they are by necessary consequence crimes against civil society, and known and defined as such by the law of man. It assumes that for sin against our Creator, vengeance is his and he will repay (2 Harrington 553, 571).

In other words: the government lacks jurisdiction in matters between man and G-d except where these matters do concern the public peace. Therefore, for example: even if the Sabbath is between man and G-d, its observance also affects the public atmosphere and decorum, and so the government may still involve itself with the public observance of the Sabbath.

Dr. Samson quotes Chief Justice Allen Thurman in Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387, 390 (1853):

We have no union of church and State, nor has our government ever been vested with authority to enforce any religious observance, simply because it is religious. Of course, it is no objection, but, on the contrary, is a high recommendation, to a legislative enactment, based upon justice or public policy, that it is found to coincide with the precepts of a true religion; but the fact is nevertheless true, that the power to make the law rests in the legislative control over things temporal and not over things spiritual. Thus the statute upon which the defendant relies, prohibiting common labor on the Sabbath, could not stand for a moment as a law of this State, if its sole foundation was the Christian duty of keeping that day holy, and its sole motive to enforce the observance of that duty. For no power over things merely spiritual, has ever been delegated to the government....(2 Ohio St. 387, 391).

In other words: it is not the government's concern to enforce religion simply because the religion prescribes or proscribes such-and-such. If, for example, Christianity demands Sabbath observance, this is insufficient grounds for the government to become involved. However, if the concern is that public Sabbath desecration would disturb the peace, then this is something that of course the government may become involved with. As Dr. Samson says,

Sunday laws, for example, were usually defended as public health measures and upheld by the courts as a legitimate exercise of the police power. Similarly, in Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854), the Supreme Court of Maine cited the maxim "salus populi suprema lex" -- the health of the people is the supreme law -- in defense of a compulsory Bible reading law that allowed the exclusion of the [Catholic] Douay version [which competed with the Protestant Geneva Bible King James Authorized Version] from the classroom.

The point is that religion is certainly a valid factor in the government's policies and laws, as long as the government is properly concerning itself with its proper sphere, viz. guarding the public peace, and not involving itself in religion solely for the sake of G-d's honor or ensuring its citizens' places in heaven.

What we see is that religion outside the courts' purview in:
(1) Matters between man and G-d
(2) Matters that do not affect the public peace
(3) Matters that are concerned with the sinner's place in heaven or hell
As John Locke shows in his A Letter Concerning [Religious] Toleration, it is not the government's concern to coerce belief, because this is not effective anyway. Furthermore, it is not the government's concern whether its citizens go to heaven or hell. But we can infer that it is in fact the government's concern to punish heretical action where this action would disturb one's fellow man or society.

This distinction is based on the notion of "sphere sovereignty", that every aspect and component of society has its proper place. According to Dr. Samson's The Covenant Origins of American Polity,

The Cambridge Platform of Church Discipline, adopted the same year by the synod of Massachusetts churches, complemented the Code of 1648 through its clear affirmation that the jurisdictions of church and state must be kept distinct. The Cambridge Platform made it "unlawful for Church-Officers to meddle with the Sword of the Magistrates" and unlawful for magistrates to "compel their subjects to become church members"

Dr. Samson further states,

According to the Bible, it is the ministry of civil officers to enforce this law and the ministries of the church and family to teach it (I Pet. 2:13-14; Matt. 28:19-20; Deut. 6:6-7). The final responsibility, however, rests with each individual, who is expected to walk by faith: that is, by the inward desire to obey God.

In Huldrych Zwingli’s (1484-1531) political theology and his legacy of resistance to tyranny, by Drs. A.W.G Raath and S.A. de Freitas, we read:

Within the city the minister and the magistrate have different tasks and functions which are to be exercised in different ways ... The basic distinction drawn by Zwingli between spiritual and civil government was also accepted by both Bullinger an[d] Calvin. ... Bullinger distinguishes between the offices of magistracy and that of pastor. To Bullinger the offices of magistracy and of the ministers of the church must not be confounded.

The magistrate and preacher were compared to body and soul, coercion and persuasion; both had the same ultimate duty, but had independent spheres. It appears, then, that separation of church and state originated as a sort of separation of powers, akin to the separation of the parliament and judiciary and executive. The point was that certain things were certainly quite important, but nevertheless were outside the jurisdiction of the civil government. Returning to Dr. Samson's "Christianity in Nineteen-Century America", he says that in a ruling acquitting a man of blasphemy,

Chief Justice J.M. Clayton similarly made it clear that it was due to a lack of jurisdiction over spiritual offenses, not to a minimizing of their seriousness, that the common law did not punish the violation of every precept of Christianity.

Justice Clayton had to make it clear that he was acquitting the man not because he was innocent, and not because religion is inherently outside the civil government's purview, but only because the civil government's sphere-sovereignty excludes involvement with matters of belief only, or purely between man and G-d, or matters involving a man's place in heaven, or matters that do not affect the public peace. Where, however, the matters are regarding action, or are between man and his fellow, or are involving his place and status in this world, or do in fact affect the public peace, government involvement might be quite legitimate.

The same sort of sphere-sovereignty is evinced by Judge John Welch in Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872), quoted by Dr. Samson:

Government is an organization for particular purposes. It is not almighty, and we are not to look to it for everything. The great bulk of human affairs and human interests is left free by any free government to individual enterprise and individual action. Religion is eminently one of these interests, lying outside the true and legitimate province of government.

Dr. Samson further says, in "The Covenant Origins of the American Polity" that,

It is this combination of ingredients that lends a peculiarly libertarian quality to American social institutions. The civil government was regarded as a constituent rather than a constitutive element of society.

In other words: the government is one part (constituent) of society, but it is not the society itself (constitutive); the government belongs to the society but does not make the society. This means that alongside the government, there will be many other constituents of society, and all of these elements, the government as well as its fellow elements, will all together constitute society. As Dr. Samson continues in "The Covenant Origins of the American Polity",

One of the great practical advantages of the covenant design is the possibility of reconciling a number of self-governing entities within a larger union or commonwealth, such as family, church, and state. ... The new federal union, in sum, has been given the authority to coordinate the political system but not to dominate it. Its overall success depends upon the continued good health of the various social institutions, such as families and churches, that also exercise powers of a governmental nature. The covenantal tradition, as ever, requires the cultivation of a politically and theologically literate citizenry. Our system of constitutional liberties and safeguards ultimately depends upon the consensus and self-restraint of its component parts: that is, upon a widespread covenantal understanding of the rights and duties of the people and their public officials.

What sphere-sovereignty means is that even though the government itself does not always concern itself with what the religion demands, that nevertheless, this does not meant the religion is not important. Belief in G-d may be essential, for example, but it may simply be outside the sphere-sovereignty of the government. (To made a simplistic example: it is also very important for a person to eat and use the restroom, but the government does not pass laws mandating this.) But also, the government may very well concern itself with religion, when religion intersects with the sphere-sovereignty of the government, viz. enforcing social justice and promoting public peace and order.

As Dr. Samson shows, Judge Perkins in Herman v. The State, 8 Ind. 490 (1855) relied on the Bible to prove that prohibition (of alcohol) was unconstitutional! In Judge Perkins's words:

It thus appears, if the inspired psalmist is entitled to credit, that man was made to laugh as well as weep, and that these stimulating beverages were created by the Almighty expressed to promote his social hilarity and enjoyment. And for this purpose has the world ever used them, they have ever given, in the language of another passage of scripture, strong drink to him that was weary and wine to those of heavy heart. The first miracle wrought by our Savior, that at Cana of Galilee, the place where he dwelt in his youth, and where he met his followers, after his resurrection, was to supply this article to increase the festivities of a joyous occasion; that the used it himself is evident from the fact that he was called by his enemies a winebibber; and paid it the distinguished honor of being the eternal memorial of his death and man's redemption (8 Ind. 490, 502).

...

It is based on the principle that a man shall not use at all for enjoyment what his neighbor may abuse, a doctrine that would, if enforced by law in general practice annihilate society, make eunuchs of all men, or drive them into the cells of the monks, and bring the human race to an end, or continue it under the direction of licensed county agents.

Such, however, is not the principle upon which the almighty governs the world. He made man a free agent, and to give him opportunity to exercise his will, to be virtuous or vicious as he should choose, he placed evil as well as good before him he put the apple into the garden of Eden, and left upon man the responsibility of his choice, made it a moral question, and left it so. He enacted as to that, a moral, not a physical prohibition. He could have easily enacted a physical prohibitory law by declaring the fatal apple a nuisance and removing it. He did not. His purpose was otherwise, and he has since declared that the tares and wheat shall grow together to the end of the world. Man cannot, by prohibitory law, be robbed of his free agency (8 Ind. 490, 503-504).

Remember that this was all just quoted from a civil judge's ruling!!

The 14th Amendment of course changed matters, by making the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution applicable to states. But before that time, it is clear that religion (specifically Christianity) was very much part and parcel of American law.

We can apply all these lessons to any other case where religion and democracy supposedly contradict. If religion and democracy could coexist in America, then why not in Israel as well?

Of course, it may still be unwise to compel religious observance in Israel. James Madison, as quoted in Philosophic Basis of the 1st Amendment, said that,

Because the policy of the bill is adverse to the diffusion of the light of Christianity. ... [I]t [viz. the bill] at once discourages those who are strangers to the light of Truth, from coming into the region of it ... Wilst we assert ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess, and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offence to God, not against man: To God, therefore, not to man, must an account of it be rendered.

In other words: any bill touching on matters of religion is liable to alienate those who are not already believers. It may be pragmatically wise to avoid coercion in matters of religion, so as to avoid alienating non-believers.

Furthermore, coercion in matters of religion, at least according to Judaism, requires that the sinner be reasonably informed and aware of his sin, and that religion be taken for granted as a basic component of the fundamental moral fabric of society. In a time when Shabbat observance is the norm, for example, its violation disturbs the peace. But where the masses are not observant, one cannot compel observance. This is not a secular principle, but rather, it is a principle held by Judaism itself. See my posts:
(1) The Death-Penalty in a Theocratic Israel
(2) The Death-Penalty in a Theocratic Israel, Part 2

John Locke, for his part, said something bearing on this subject: in his A Letter Concerning [Religious] Toleration, he argued for religious toleration, saying that it is not the government's concern whether one goes to heaven or hell, and that government coercion cannot affect belief anyway. As we indicated, however, the government is in fact concerned with action. But Locke gives another reason for tolerance: we cannot be sure which religion is correct. But of course, Locke himself was sure that some variety of Christianity was correct and true; he argued that perhaps we cannot be sure which kind of Christianity is true, but that one or another variety of Christianity is true, and that Judaism and Islam are both false, this Locke was sure of. We find that the Calvinists, from whom Locke derived many of his ideas, had exactly the same federal conception of politics and government. But the Calvinist Samuel Rutherford, who came just a short time before Locke, while he wrote many of the same political ideas as Locke, also wrote against religious tolerance. The difference between Locke and the Calvinists was not in politics, but in religion; the Calvinists were more confident in their own religion, and so they were less tolerant of others.

In Israel today, the amount of religious tolerance would depend on how much society at large accepts a certain religious view or practice. It may be, for example, that some Israelis are sure sure of or confident in Orthodox Judaism, and so Orthodox Judaism cannot be enforced. All the same, it may possibly be that all Jewish Israelis clearly and confidently recognize that Islam and Christianity are false, and so perhaps their practice would be prohibited to Jews, or at least proselytization by Christians and Muslims of Jews would be banned. This is merely offered for the sake of illustration. I'm not saying that Israeli society is in fact like what I just said; I am merely offering a hypothetical scenario. My point is that laws regarding religion in society are conditioned on the populace's acceptance or rejection of the various religions, and their degree of certainty or doubt. In my hypothetical case, the Jewish Israelis weren't sure that Orthodox Judaism is true, but they were in fact sure that Christianity and Islam are false. Democracy states that the government can secure the public peace and enforce justice and morality, but while for one society justice may include only murder and theft, for another society, it may include Shabbat and kashrut as well. The point is that the public's intellectual, moral, and religious state and opinion dictates the extent and character of the government's activities. The government must uphold the moral health of society and the public peace, but one man's peace and health is another man's totalitarian intrusion on his free will; it all depends on the time and place.

Religion and G-d in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

From the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1780):

The Preamble states,

We, therefore, the people of Massachusetts, acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the goodness of the great Legislator of the universe, in affording us, in the course of His providence, an opportunity, deliberately and peaceably, without fraud, violence or surprise, of entering into an original, explicit, and solemn compact with each other; and of forming a new constitution of civil government, for ourselves and posterity; and devoutly imploring His direction in so interesting a design, do agree upon, ordain and establish the following Declaration of Rights, and Frame of Government, as the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Article II:

It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly, and at stated seasons to worship the Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of the universe. ...

Article III:

As the happiness of a people, and the good order and preservation of civil government, essentially depend upon piety, religion and morality ... the legislature shall ... require ... the institution of the public worship of God, and for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality. ... And the people of this commonwealth have also a right to, and do, invest their legislature with authority to enjoin upon all the subjects an attendance upon the instructions of the public teachers aforesaid ... Any every denomination of Christians, demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good subjects of the commonwealth, shall be equally under the protection of the law: and no subordination of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law.

Article II of chapter II states, "no person shall be eligible to this office" of Governor "unless he shall declare himself to be of the Christian religion." Article I of chapter VI prescribes the oath for public oath, in which the candidate must swear that

I, A. B., do declare, that I believe the Christian religion, and have a firm persuasion of its truth...

Article I of section I of chapter V says

... Harvard College, in which university many persons of great eminence have, that by the blessing of God, been initiated in those arts and sciences, which qualified them for public employments, both in church and state: and whereas the encouragement of arts and sciences, and all good literature, tends to the honor of God, the advantage of the Christian religion, and the great benefit of this and the other United States of America ...

Now, there are several amendments to that constitution which have since removed all references to Christianity or Protestantism, and have removed all coercive elements. Article XI of the Amendments (1833) changed Article III to instead permit all freely-contracted religious associations, rather than mandating them as Article III did.

I also don't know the case law history of enforcement of this Constitution, whether before or after the Amendments changed it. How were Jews treated, for example? Article III conditioned the requirement to attend services on "provided there be any on whose instructions he attends"; would a Jew be exempted from Christian Church based on this? I don't know.

Furthermore, how was "Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of the universe" interpreted in the case law? Was the Jewish G-d included in this, or was only the Christian G-d intended? I don't know.

But all these questions aside, it is very clear that Massachusetts was extremely religious, one way or the other. Realize that until Article XI of the Amendments was ratified in 1833, the Constitution of Massachusetts explicitly mandated that Protestant churches and Christian denominations be established and that attendance by the masses be enforced and compulsory.

Cf. the Maryland Toleration Act:

The Maryland Toleration Act, also known as the Act Concerning Religion, was a law mandating religious tolerance for trinitarian Christians. Passed on September 21, 1649 by the assembly of the Maryland colony, it was the first law requiring religious tolerance in the British North American colonies and created the first legal limitations on hate speech in the world. Historians argue that it helped inspire later legal protections for freedom of religion in the United States. ... As the first law on religious tolerance in the British North America, it influenced related laws in other colonies and portions of it were echoed in the writing of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which enshrined religious freedom in American law. ... The Act allowed freedom of worship for all trinitarian Christians in Maryland, but sentenced to death anyone who denied the divinity of Jesus.

Now, the Maryland Toleration Act was repealed in 1654, reinstated briefly, and repealed permanently in 1692. My point is not that the Maryland Toleration Act was law in any given place (by contrast, the Constitution of the state of Massachusetts certainly was law!!). I'm just trying to indicate the general philosophical roots of America.

This is all objective historical fact.

On Male Sexuality: a Primer

Here and here, Daughter of Light posits that the laws of tzniut are designed to make women more physically attractive. In her own words, inter alia,

Also, dressing tzenua has not helped one bit in staving off the advances of men. In fact, I have only received more attention of that nature since deciding to commit to the mitzvah of tzniut. Which is why I subscribe to the school of thought that tzniut's real purpose is to eroticize reality, not prevent gazing eyes.

...

I have come to believe that women in general actually do appear more attractive when they dress tzenua. So I think Gentiles take that as some kind of cue to hit on me because I know how to dress, and seem perhaps more put together than the vast majority of jeans and running shoes wearing women out there.

You can think it's ridiculous that tzniut doesn't eroticize reality all you want, but no offense, what do you know? From what you've described you have spent much of your life in a bubble.

I have also heard in a number of shiurim given by women that it is in fact true. Torah is a system in place so people can get the most pleasure out of life, and if you can't see how dressing in a more dignified manner makes women more physically appealing, then maybe you really do have Asperger's.

I will hereby disagree. "Daughter of Light" also suggested (not quoted here) a difference between the religious and non-religious, but I will disagree with this too; I don't believe there is a great difference in sexuality between the religious and not.

It doesn't matter whether you live in a religious or non-religious community. First, males are males, and basic sexuality does not change. Second, Haredim in particular have more in common with secular perverts than they do with secular mensches. I will elaborate below, but for now, the point is that in terms of sexual ethics and responsibility, Haredim rank relatively low compared to other communities, Jewish and not.

To understand male sexuality is not difficult, and neither living in a bubble nor having Asperger's will affect this. No matter how severe one's Asperger's, no matter how difficult it is to comprehend human emotions and intentions, one can nevertheless discern anger when another is screaming at the top of his lungs, with the veins in his neck bulging. Similarly, male sexuality is about as difficult to discern and comprehend as hunger; I can tell what my stomach is empty, notwithstanding my Asperger's, and similarly, male sexuality is not difficult at all for me to understand.

Now then, I want to first note that throughout the Talmudic literature, the laws of tzniut are unambiguously designed to guard sexuality. In fact, Hazal usually speak of tzniut preventing actual sexual intercourse and forbidden sexual relationships. To describe the laws of tzniut, then, as designed to do anything else (such as increase attractiveness), lacks foundation or basis.

Now, women sometimes do appear more attractive when dressed tzenua, but this is an over-simplification. As Adam Carolla once said on an episode of the Man Show, every man dreams of a loose woman, but no man actually wants to date one. That is: when a man is fantasizing about sexuality, or when he is looking for a one-night stand, he'll naturally seek out the loose woman.

However, when the man wants a real romantic relationship, he'll steer as far from the loose woman as he can. He wants a woman he sees as wholesome and reliable; he wants to be sure she's reliable and devoted to him alone. A loose woman is exciting for a night, but is a horrible investment for anything long-term.

So you're right that tzniut can make a woman more attractive. However, this is not to say that she is physically more attractive. Rather, it makes her more attractive in a holistic, bio-psychic / psychosomatic, physio-spiritual or -emotional sense. The wholesome-appearing woman is not necessarily more physically attractive, but she is rather material for a relationship.

Similarly, a woman's personality can make her more attractive. Dennis Prager tells of a time that he did an experiment: he ranked all the women who were students in his class, according to physical attractiveness. He did the same at the end of the semester, and found that the better students had risen in physical attractiveness. I have found the same occurring in my own experience, and other men I've spoken to have confirmed this; a woman's personality can affect her perceived physical attractiveness.

So you're right that tzniut can affect physical attractiveness. But you've misunderstood the route and means this occurs. Furthermore, there is another entire possibility you've completely omitted:

Tzniut might just as well make women appear more vulnerable and innocent and "untainted" (think the old pagan fascination with virginity - virginity was seen as having actual cosmic significance and power), causing men to hit on you, thinking you're ripe and unprotected.

So whether a woman's more conservative dress makes her appear more reliable and attractive, or instead more vulnerable and ripe for corruption, depends on the nature of the man viewing her. The man's moral nature affects how he views you.

*** Update: Lan Vi adds below in the comments (here) that,

I would add that tzniut is also a state of mind. I have seen women wearing short skirts and still be more "modest" (in their gestures, their demeanor, etc.) than religious women wearing long skirts.

I'm assuming that men who are hitting on you are of the second variety, not the first. It's not that your clothing make you more attractive; it's that it made you appear vulnerable.

And this brings us to the problem of the Haredim: because they fail to educate their men in the laws and principles of tzniut, but instead expect their women to bear all the weight, therefore: the Haredim men are sexual perverts just as many secular men are, and the Haredi men also see women as hypersexual objects to be exploited, and not as humans to be valued and engaged with on a bio-psychic / psycho-somatic / physio-spiritual level. Now, the Haredi men are told to avoid intercourse, so perhaps they don't hit on women in the street; perhaps their outward signs and behaviors differ from those of secular men. But their inner mindset is the same as that of a secular pervert, as opposed to that of a secular mensch.

Those Haredim who put all the emphasis on women to dress conservatively,they are subverting the very intention of tzniut. The goal of tzniut is to humanize women, to take the focus off their anatomy and replace the focus onto their personalities. The problem is that the Haredim make a religion out of tzniut, and say that geula will come when the laws of tzniut are kept, etc. They tell boys that women are sexual objects and must be avoided, and they tell women that they themselves are nothing but sexual objects. This destroys the very intention and purpose of the laws of tzniut. See my blog post here.

My rabbi, Rabbi David Sperling, was once asked by one of his (male) students at Machon Meir for a good recommendation on the laws of tzniut. Rabbi Sperling recommended a certain book, and while I forget which it was, I do remember why he recommended that book, viz.: Rabbi Sperling said this book opens with a discussion of the laws of tzniut incumbent on a male, and only then moves to a discussion of women. Rabbi Sperling said, "Any book on tzniut that begins with a man's obligations, you know it's a good book." My other rabbi, Rabbi Dr. Marc D. Angel, also has valuable and remarkable views on tzniut; see my mention of him further below, and see also my citations of him in my essay A New Hearing for Kol Ishah.

My mother's told me that most women are gravely ignorant of male sexuality; she tells me that when she was in her teens and twenties, she'd dress relatively scantily, thinking she looked "cute". She learned only later that no, the men were looking at her sexually, as if she were a piece of meat. In eighth grade, my English teacher gave an impromptu talk about sexuality, so that the girls in her class would know how men think. (My teacher's goal was to convince the girls to dress more conservatively, not to protect the men, but rather, to protect themselves and their own dignity. I.e., if the girls knew how men thought, then, so my teacher hoped, the girls themselves would choose to protect themselves by dressing more conservatively. This contrasts with the Haredi method, of expecting women to "save" the men, expecting women to dress tzenua for the sake and convenience and safety of the men. Cf. Tamar Biala's To Teach Tsni’ut with Tsni’ut: On Educating for Tsni’ut in [Israeli] National-Religious Schools. Rabbi Dr. Marc D. Angel's Losing the Rat Race, Winning at Life has a similar explanation.) I got and spoke, and told the girls everything I've just said above. The reaction was incredible: the boys all nodded along with me in agreement, while the girls laughed and thought I was joking. Male sexuality is very simple to understand, and there's not much to it. But no matter how simple it is, no matter how explicitly it is addressed, women don't seem to want to acknowledge it.

Do I Have Asperger's Syndrome?

According to Wikipedia's article on Asperger's Syndrome,

The lack of demonstrated empathy is possibly the most dysfunctional aspect of Asperger syndrome. Individuals with AS experience difficulties in basic elements of social interaction, which may include a failure to develop friendships or to seek shared enjoyments or achievements with others (for example, showing others objects of interest), a lack of social or emotional reciprocity, and impaired nonverbal behaviors in areas such as eye contact, facial expression, posture, and gesture.

Unlike those with autism, people with AS are not usually withdrawn around others; they approach others, even if awkwardly. For example, a person with AS may engage in a one-sided, long-winded speech about a favorite topic, while misunderstanding or not recognizing the listener's feelings or reactions, such as a need for privacy or haste to leave. This social awkwardness has been called "active but odd". This failure to react appropriately to social interaction may appear as disregard for other people's feelings, and may come across as insensitive. ... Childhood desire for companionship can become numbed through a history of failed social encounters.

...

Although individuals with Asperger syndrome acquire language skills without significant general delay and their speech typically lacks significant abnormalities, language acquisition and use is often atypical. Abnormalities include verbosity, abrupt transitions, literal interpretations and miscomprehension of nuance, use of metaphor meaningful only to the speaker, auditory perception deficits, unusually pedantic, formal or idiosyncratic speech, and oddities in loudness, pitch, intonation, prosody, and rhythm ... the conversational style often includes monologues about topics that bore the listener, fails to provide context for comments, or fails to suppress internal thoughts. Individuals with AS may fail to monitor whether the listener is interested or engaged in the conversation. ...

It's like I'm reading about myself! Who's been spying on me?

Here, I said to Izgad,

You also mention your speaking in a "string of association fashion". Have you ever heard someone say something, and then that reminds you of something, and then that in turn reminds you of something, and then that reminds you of yet something else, and finally, you verbalize that last thought, and everyone looks at you like you're crazy for speaking non-sequiturs? (This whole process takes only a split second.) And then you explain to them the entire mental train of thought that lead to what you eventually said out loud?

He in turn directed me to Cambridge's Autism Research Centre's Autism-Spectrum Quotient test.

Psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen and his colleagues at Cambridge's Autism Research Centre have created the Autism-Spectrum Quotient, or AQ, as a measure of the extent of autistic traits in adults. In the first major trial using the test, the average score in the control group was 16.4. Eighty percent of those diagnosed with autism or a related disorder scored 32 or higher. The test is not a means for making a diagnosis, however, and many who score above 32 and even meet the diagnostic criteria for mild autism or Asperger's report no difficulty functioning in their everyday lives.

*** Update: Izgad has posted an interesting reply to this present post. His first paragraph is especially relevant:

From the moment I started reading Michael Makovi's blog, I suspected that he had Asperger syndrome. This was someone who wrote about theory and was willing to follow theory to its practical implications without concern with making friends. His focus on political theory, particularly within the context of the minutia of early modern history, as opposed to practical policy could not simply be a coincidence. This was someone who did not fit into the obvious political and religious categories and who clearly formulated his view of the world from reading and not from some social group. Once he started talking about his failures with women, I was convinced. So I asked him if he was familiar with Asperger syndrome and pointed him to the Simon Baron Cohen quiz. Makovi has now posted his results. Normal people usually score a sixteen. People on the spectrum usually score above thirty. Makovi scored a 37. I would like to hereby welcome him to the club. I take this as a testament to my ever increasing power to infect people with Asperger syndrome. I usually have to bite people, I guess now I can infect people through a blogospheric evil eye. Mothers lock up your children and be afraid; I am autism and I am dangerous.

Here is the quiz, with my answers:

1. I prefer to do things with others rather than on my own. --> Strongly disagree. I'm VERY individualistic.

2. I prefer to do things the same way over and over again. --> Slightly disagree. I of course prefer consistency, but I like to think I'm creative enough not to meet Einstein's definition of insanity, viz. doing the same thing over again and expecting different results.

3. If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy to create a picture in my mind. --> Strongly disagree. I'm very poor at conjuring mental images of things.

4. I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one thing that I lose sight of other things. --> YES!!! Strongly agree. This is the story of my life!

5. I often notice small sounds when others do not. --> YES!!! Again, story of my life; strongly agree.

6. I usually notice car number plates or similar strings of information. --> Strongly disagree. I've never noticed any personal inclination or predilection for things numbered.

7. Other people frequently tell me that what I've said is impolite, even though I think it is polite. ---> Strongly disagree. I've been told that I'm very polite and respectful (especially by those several decades older than me), except when I'm talking about aharonim :P.

8 When I'm reading a story, I can easily imagine what the characters might look like. ---> Are you kidding? You can give me a page-long physical description, and I still cannot imagine their appearance! Strongly disagree.

9. I am fascinated by dates. ---> Strongly disagree. When I study history, I find that I remember the events and basic trends and the basic order of progression far better than I do their precise dates.

10. In a social group, I can easily keep track of several different people's conversations. ---> Strongly agree. My family is known for having conversations with several branching tangential conversations; as soon as one branch is concluded, we backtrack to the previous branch, like in a computer science tree, until all the branches have been exhausted.

11. I find social situations easy. ---> Strongly disagree.

12. I tend to notice details that others do not. --> It depends. I notice obscure technical details and facts, but I don't notice things like people's clothing or their emotions. So I didn't know what to answer. I just chose "somewhat agree". I would have preferred, "no opinion".

13. I would rather go to a library than to a party. ---> Strongly agree.

14. I find making up stories easy. ---> Ha! I couldn't write a fiction-piece or tell a lie to save my life. Strongly disagree.

15. I find myself drawn more strongly to people than to things. ---> Strongly disagree. Give me more books!

16. I tend to have very strong interests, which I get upset about if I can't pursue. ---> Strongly agree.

17 I enjoy social chitchat. ---> Strongly disagree.

18. When I talk, it isn't always easy for others to get a word in edgewise. ---> Strongly agree.

19 I am fascinated by numbers. ---> Strongly disagree (see 6 and 9 above).

20 When I'm reading a story, I find it difficult to work out the characters' intentions. ---> Yes!!! Yes!!! I'm horrible at anything involving sensitive emotions or conspiracies. I'm too socially inept and emotionally-blind to notice the former, and too openly honest and blunt to comprehend the latter. I won't notice characters' intentions in stories unless they hit me over the head with a shillelagh. Strongly agree.

21. I don't particularly enjoy reading fiction. ---> Strongly agree.

22. I find it hard to make new friends. ---> Strongly agree.

23. I notice patterns in things all the time. ---> It depends (see 12 above). Since I answer "somewhat agree" to 12, I answered "somewhat disagree" here, to balance it out. I would have preferred to answer "no opinion" to both.

24. I would rather go to the theater than to a museum. ---> Strongly disagree.

25. It does not upset me if my daily routine is disturbed. ---> Strongly disagree.

26. I frequently find that I don't know how to keep a conversation going. ---> Strongly agree.

27. I find it easy to 'read between the lines' when someone is talking to me. ---> Strongly disagree (see 20 above).

28 I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, rather than on the small details. ---> It depends; are we talking about people's emotions, or the details of how Calvinist and Locke-ian politics converged? Cf. 12 and 23. I just answered "somewhat disagree".

29. I am not very good at remembering phone numbers. ---> Strongly agree. Again, I don't like numbers or dates.

30. I don't usually notice small changes in a situation or a person's appearance. ---> ROFL! I dated a young woman once, and she said, "Somehow, I don't think you'd ever notice what anyone is wearing, ever." Strongly agree.

31. I know how to tell if someone listening to me is getting bored. ---> Strongly disagree.

32. I find it easy to do more than one thing at once. ---> Somewhat agree. I do multitask a lot, so I guess... I'm really not sure, though.

33. When I talk on the phone, I'm not sure when it's my turn to speak. ---> Strongly agree. I cut people off all the time, because I cannot see their mouth, and so I cannot see when they're finished talking.

34. I enjoy doing things spontaneously. ---> I prefer routine, but I can be spontaneous when a sudden flash of insight hits me, at which point I'll forget about everything else, including food. I didn't know what to answer, so I just answered "somewhat agree".

35. I am often the last to understand the point of a joke. ---> Somewhat agree. I understand most jokes, but not as well as most people, especially when they rely on subtle aspects of human nature or society. Plus, sexual jokes are incomprehensible to me.

36. I find it easy to work out what someone is thinking or feeling just by looking at their face. ---> ROFL! You must be kidding! I may as well look at a brick wall, for all the good it'll do me. Strongly disagree.

37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to what I was doing very quickly. ---> Not only do I switch back quickly, but until I switch back, I get frustrated and angry. If you see me in the middle of concentration, and try talking to me, I'll snap back in anger, before I realize what's going on. Then, when I calm down and finish helping you, I'll immediately get back to what I was doing before. Strongly agree.

38. I am good at social chitchat. ---> You must be joking. Strongly disagree.

39. People often tell me that I keep going on and on about the same thing. ---> All the time!!! Story of my life! Strongly agree.

40 When I was young, I used to enjoy playing games involving pretending with other children. ---> No opinion, so I just answered, "somewhat disagree".

41. I like to collect information about categories of things (e.g., types of cars, birds, trains, plants). ---> Oh yeah. Strongly agree.

42. I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like to be someone else. ---> I can imagine wearing T-51b power armor and wielding a laser rifle, but not much beyond that. Strongly agree.

43. I like to carefully plan any activities I participate in. ---> Strongly agree. I like consistency and order and predictability.

44. I enjoy social occasions. ---> It depends, so I just answered, "somewhat disagree". If the people there are a few decades older than me, or if they are nerdy, I'll enjoy it. But if they're not older than me and if they're not nerds, then I won't enjoy it. I have very carefully phrased myself: given that "A" is "a few decades older than me" and "B" is "nerdy", then:
IF A OR B THEN YES
The negation of that (in which case the answer is no), according to computer science logic, is: NOT (IF A OR B), which in turn becomes IF NOT A AND IF NOT B. That is, the "or" must become an "and". It is very common to make a mistake in this.

45. I find it difficult to work out people's intentions. ---> Strongly agree.

46. New situations make me anxious. ---> Somewhat agree. It depends on whether I expect older people and/or nerds to be there.

47. I enjoy meeting new people. ---> Somewhat disagree; it depends on whether I expect older people and/or nerds to be there.

48. I am a good diplomat. ---> Strongly disagree.

49. I am not very good at remembering people's date of birth. ---> Strongly agree; remember, I don't like numbers.

50. I find it very easy to play games with children that involve pretending. ---> I have no idea, so I answered, "somewhat disagree".

RESULT: 37

Remember,

In the first major trial using the test, the average score in the control group was 16.4. Eighty percent of those diagnosed with autism or a related disorder scored 32 or higher.

However,

The test is not a means for making a diagnosis, however, and many who score above 32 and even meet the diagnostic criteria for mild autism or Asperger's report no difficulty functioning in their everyday lives.

Hilkhot Tzniut and Premarital Sex

> Many people subscribe to statistics that the slightest intimacy
> between (unmarried) males and females today leads to the bedroom.
>
> (Rabbi? Dr.?) Isaac Balbin, here

That's simply not true in my experience. In my own experience, having attended a public high school, those who wish to have premarital sex will have it regardless of intimacy between men and women, and those who do not wish to have premarital sex will avoid it regardless of intimacy. There are different kinds of unmarried individuals, who all have VERY different desires and expectations. In my entire circle of friends in high school, I don't know of a single person who had premarital sex, because none of us were the kinds who wanted to have it. We all had plenty of intimate social relationships with female peers, but premarital sex was simply something we weren't seeking. In my senior year, one of my friends had a girlfriend, and not long after graduation, the two were married. This friend of mine knew exactly what he had to do if he wanted to have sexual relations. Anything extramarital was not an option.

In other words: I think that today, most everyone is so habituated to sexuality, that the most important factor is not hirhur / hana'ah anymore (i.e. sexual pleasure and experience, such as seeing a woman or talking to her, having intimate physical or social contact that leads eventually to sex), but rather, your express and explicit intent and desires. My friends who avoided sex had the same hirhur / hana'ah and hergel as those who were having sex all the time. The difference between us was NOT the degree of intimacy or habituation with the opposite sex. The difference was rather, whether or not one consciously desired to have premarital sex or not. For those in my circle of friends in high school, premarital sex was simply not morally conscionable. We very consciously and deliberately eschewed premarital sex, not for lack of opportunities.

The rise in premarital sex is due NOT, I believe, to greater exposure to the opposite sex. Rather, I believe, the issue is that society has accepted premarital sex as acceptable and legitimate. It is not the hirhur / hana'ah or hergel that is to blame; instead, I believe, it is the lack of basic moral censure that is to blame.

Therefore: if we want to reduce premarital sex, I think the most important thing to do today is NOT to dress more tzenua or have fewer social relationships between men and women. This will do nothing. The solution instead, I believe, is to foster a moral environment in which people have firm moral principles against premarital sex.

Every day, a person might have plenty of desire to steal, but he refrains from stealing because it is wrong, period. The objects to steal are all in plain sight; there is no tzniut, and there is lots of hirhur / hana'ah. What stops his theft is not concealing the objects, hiding them from sight, but rather, his moral principles. Nowadays, we must approach tzniut the same way, I believe. Everything is already in sight, and we are used to it. What must be fostered is a refusal to act on the exposure of sexuality, the same way one refuses to act on the exposure of objects on store shelves.

How do we foster such an environment? First, it'd be nice if television shows didn't glorify premarital sex so much. More tzenua billboards would be nice as well. But besides that, I think children need to be taught that premarital sex is simply not a moral option, is simply not legitimate or conscionable. Parents need to have clear and absolute moral principles, and inculcate them effectively. (Easier said than done, perhaps. I'm not a parent, so what do I know?)

The Death-Penalty in a Theocratic Israel, Part 2

A sequel to my post The Death-Penalty in a Theocratic Israel.

One of my rabbis, Rabbi Netanel Frankenthal, approvingly cited the Hazon Ish[1], something to the effect that, "Today in Israel, religious coercion wouldn't work, but even if did, we wouldn't want to institute it." What the Hazon Ish understood is that religious coercion is conscionable only when the the religious law in question is taken for granted axiomatically as an integral part of the fabric of society. If, for example, Shabbat is considered a basic component of morality the same way that the prohibition of murder is, then a Shabbat-violator is a menace to society no differently than a murderer is. This is particularly so, because Shabbat and murder are both prohibited in the same set of laws, and he who violates one, will most assuredly violate the other soon enough, in such a society. My friend Gil Amminadav has told me that Rabbi Dr. Jose Faur has said something similar.

*** Update: In the comments below, "Skeptic" suggests my rabbi was citing the Hazon Ish (Y. D., Hilkhot Shekhita, Siman Bet):

ונראה דאין דין מורידין אלא בזמן שהשגחתו ית׳ גלוי׳ כמו בזמן שהיו נסים מצוין ומשמש בת קול, וצדיקי הדור תחת השגחה פרטית הנראית לעין כל. והכופרין אז הוא בנליזות מיוחדות בהטיית היצר לתאוות והפקרוח, ואז היה ביעור רשעים גדרו של עולם שהכל ידעו כי הדחת הדור מביא פורעניות לעולם ומביא דבר וחרב ורעב בעולם, אבל בזמן ההעלם שנכרתה האמונה מן דלת העם אין במעשה הורדה גדר הפרצה אלא הוספה הפרצה שיהי׳ בעיניהם כמעשה השחתה ואלמות ח״ו וכיון שכל עצמנו לתקן אין הדין נוהג בשעה שאין בו תיקון ועלינו להחזירם בעבותות אהבה ולהעמידם בקרן אורה במה שידינו מגעת

[My own free translation] And it appears that the law of punishing heretics is in effect only (ein din moridin elah) in a time when G-d's Providence is openly revealed (galuy), as in the time when there were regularly found (matzoyin) miracles and the use of bat kol [an inferior form of prophecy], and the righteous men of the generation had private individual Divine Providence apparent before the eyes of everyone (nirit l'ayin kol). In such a time, the heretics are in specific/individual nalizot[??], and their thoughts and desires are inclined towards licentiousness and abandon, and the the elimination of evildoers is the protection of the society (gidro shel olam), and everyone knows that the dismissal of the generation (?? - ha-dahat ha-dor) brings calamity to the world, and brings pestilence and the sword and famine to the world. [In such a time, the law of punishing heretics is in effect.] But today, in the "hidden time" (zeman ha-he'elem), when "faith is cut off" (nikhreta ha-emunah) from the "door of the nation" (delet ha-am), the act of punishing heretics (ma'aseh horada) does not constitute a repair of the breach (geder hafratzah), but rather it only enlarges the breach (hosafah hafratzah). For it will be in their [the heretics'] eyes but a corruption (hashhata) and muteness (?? - ilmut), G-d forbid. And since all of us ourselves to fix (?? - v'keivan she-kol atzmenu l'taken - subject missing??), the law [of punishing heretics] is not practiced (noheg) at a time when there is not rectification (tikun). It is incumbent upon us [i.e., the religious] to return them to tanglenesses (?? - avotot) of love and emplace them in the ray of light, according to what our abilities allow (b'mah she-yadenu maga'at).

But when religious observance ceases to be integral to the fabric of society, then coercion is no longer conscionable. Rabbi Ya'akov Ettlinger, followed by nearly all Orthodox rabbis save the Haredim, hold that the non-observant today are tinokot she-nishbu, equivalent to Jewish children taken captive as infants. I.e., they are b'shogeg, ignorant, and not to blame for their sins. Punishment in halakhah requires that the punished be b'meizid, deliberate sinners with complete knowledge of the character and consequences of their actions.

Something similar is implied, I believe, in the following passage from Rousas John Rushdoony, Law and Liberty (Fairfax, VA: Thoburn Press, 1977), pp. 4-5, quoted in Steven Alan Samson, The Covenant Origins Of The American Polity (Contra Mundum, No. 10, Winter 1994):

Law is good, proper, and essential in its place, but law can save no man, nor can law remake man and society. The basic function of law is to restrain (Romans 13:1-4), not to regenerate, and when the function of law is changed from the restraint of evil to the regeneration and reformation of man and society, then law itself breaks down, because an impossible burden is being placed upon it. Today, because too much is expected from law, we get less and less results from law, because law is put to improper uses.

The way I understand this passage is, laws only work in societies where the basic intent of the law is taken for granted, as well as the authority of the law's promulgators. But if the law's intent ceases to be acceptable to the governed, and/or if the authority of its promulgators ceases to be taken for granted, then the law serves no purpose. It simply cannot accomplish its task. Indeed, Samson explains Rushdoony, saying,

According to the Bible, it is the ministry of civil officers to enforce this law ... The final responsibility, however, rests with each individual, who is expected to walk by faith: that is, by the inward desire to obey God. [Emphasis added.]

Likewise, Ralph Waldo Emerson says in his Politics that,

But the wise know that foolish legislation is a rope of sand, which perishes in the twisting; that the State must follow, and not lead the character and progress of the citizen; the strongest usurper is quickly got rid of; and they only who build on Ideas, build for eternity; and that the form of government which prevails, is the expression of what cultivation exists in the population which permits it.

It is for this reason, I believe, that the Tanakh contains narratives and the Talmud contains midrashim and aggadot. Unless one believes in the revelation at Sinai, and in the various moral and theological beliefs of Judaism, then the halakhah will be burdensome if not utterly incomprehensible. If someone doubts that Sinai ever happened, then you cannot force him to keep kosher against his will. You must first offer moral and intellectual persuasion, to convince him that the laws in general are binding and that the Torah is authoritative. Only when the entire society basically takes the Torah and Talmud for granted, by virtue of moral, theological, and intellectual belief and assent, can you compel observance. Law by itself cannot take the place of belief and bear its rightful burden. If belief is lacking, then compelling the observance of the law will be of no avail.

This also explains why the Torah contains so many concessions to ancient Near-Eastern practices. For example, the Torah permits slavery, polygamy, taking a woman captive in war (yafet toar), and voluntary wars of conquest (milhemet reshut). Invariably, the Torah lets its real disapproval known, and so the rabbis eventually realized that the Torah's permission was grudging. Almost no observant Jew today is comfortable with these permissions, and indeed, the Talmud already declared that the permission to take women captive was merely a concession to the yetzer ha-ra, and Rav Kook said likewise of voluntary war (see here). But G-d, when He gave the Torah, knew He couldn't be too far ahead of the people. As Rav Kook said (Eder Hayakar, pp. 42-43:1, translation from Ben Zion Bokser, The Essential Writings of Abraham Isaac Kook (Amity House: Amity, New York, 1988.), p. 48, "Assyriology and the Bible"),

As to the similarities in teaching [between the Torah and the Code of Hammurabi], it was already made clear in the days of Maimonides, and before him in the teachings of the Talmudic sages, that prophecy reckons with man's nature, for it is its mission to raise his nature and his disposition by divine guidance, as is implied in the statement that "the commandments were only given so as to refine the nature of people" (Genesis Rabbah 44:1). Hence, whatever educational elements there were in before the giving of the Torah, which gained a following among the [Jewish] people and the world, if they only had a basis in morality and it was possible to raise them up to a high moral level - the Torah retained them.

And as Rabbi Emanuel Rackman explains in One Man's Judaism, commenting on the permission to practice slavery: where G-d could not compromise at all, whatsoever (such as with idolatry - no compromise there is conceivable), He indeed did not compromise one iota. However, the Golden Calf and the books of the Prophets show us the result: the people constantly worshiped idols despite the prohibition; G-d laid down a law and the people thumbed their noses at it.

Speaking about the Golden Calf, the Kuzari in 1:97, says,

אמר החבר: כי האמות כלם בזמן ההוא היו עובדים צורות, ואלו הוי הפילוסופים מביאים מופת על היחוד ועל האלקות, לא היו עומדים מבלי צורה שמכונים אליה ואומרים להמונם כי הצורה הזאת ידבק בה ענין אלקי, וכי היא מוחדת בדבר מפלא נכרי. (ibn Tibbon Hebrew translation from the original Arabic)

"The Rabbi said: 'In those days, every people worshiped images. Even if philosophers had been able to prove to everyone the existence of the one omnipotent God, they still would not have relinquished their images. This is because they would focus their attentions up on the image, and would profess to the masses that Divinity attaches itself to the image, and that it is unique in some supernatural way.'" (English according to the translation of Rabbi N. Daniel Korobkin, The Kuzari: In Defence of the Despised Faith (New York/Jerusalem, Feldheim: 2009) pp. 11f.)

When G-d gave the Torah, the Jews did not have blank minds; they did already have certain false pagan beliefs, and G-d had to cleanse these falsehoods away before His Torah and its laws could take root. Therefore, whenever G-d could in fact compromise, says Rabbi Rackman, He in fact did do so. G-d, says Rabbi Rackman, preferred a slow, patient route, in which He made unwilling and grudging concessions, compromising on the ideal law, so that the people would at least observe what He did lay down. As Rushdoony and Emerson show, the law cannot be too far ahead of the people.

In fact, the Kuzari just said far more than is immediately apparent. He said,

In those days, every people worshiped images. Even if philosophers had been able to prove to everyone the existence of the one omnipotent God, they still would not have relinquished their images.

This is simple enough to understand. But he said more:

This is because they would focus their attentions up on the image, and would profess to the masses that Divinity attaches itself to the image, and that it is unique in some supernatural way.

This is remarkable. Rabbis S. R. Hirsch (commentary to Psalm 115:4-7 - Feldheim, 1997, pp. 302f.) and Jose Faur (The Biblical Idea of Idolatry, JQR 69:1, July 1978) adduce Psalms 115:5 and 135:16 ("They have eyes but see not, ears but hear not, etc.") as being literally intended; the Psalmist is polemicizing against a belief that was actually held as literally true. As Rabbi Faur says,

Its purpose was to shatter the common notion that the idols were capable of sensory perception, movement, and other activities peculiar to living beings.

As Rav Hirsch says,

...[P]aganism had a dual conception of its idols. The common people worshiped the images made by human hands, because they believed that a deity actually dwelt within these images. The statements here [in Psalms] and in the above-quoted passage from the Book of Deuteronomy apply to them quite in the literal sense. ... Heathen folly endows the statues with that represent its idols with a mouth, eyes, and ears, thus indicating the belief that these idols actually command and posses the faculty of intellectual perception. But this is deception, either deliberate or unwitting.

Rabbi Faur further cites Rabbi Eliyahu Benamozegh's commentary to the Torah, where Rabbi Benamozegh claims that "molten calf" actually means "anointed calf". According to the Talmudic laws of Avodah Zara, says Rabbi Faur, an idol becomes a real idol only when it is anointed, because, according to the pagans, it is only when an idol is anointed that the divine indwelling takes root within the physical idol. Thus, according to Rabbi Benamozegh, the Torah indicates this fact in its account of the Golden Calf, saying it was not "molten", but rather "annointed". Psalms and the Kuzari further testify that the Biblical Jews themselves believed in this.

According to the Kuzari, and the reading of Psalms by Rabbis Hirsch and Faur, the Biblical Jews believed in a very specific and peculiar pagan belief. When G-d gave the Torah, the Jews did not have blank minds; they did already have certain false pagan beliefs, and G-d had to cleanse these falsehoods away before His Torah and its laws could take root. The Torah's laws of idolatry were ignored by the people as long as they held false pagan beliefs.

You cannot rule by fiat, even if you are G-d. So who are we humans to try to do what G-d Himself is incapable of?

When the Haredim try to compel Shabbat observance, for example, they betray a fundamental lack of Jewish character, a fundamental misunderstanding of just what is halakhah. A Haredi theocracy in Israel might be many things, but a Jewish Torah theocracy it would most certainly not be. A Jewish Torah theocracy would be cognizant of the tinok she-nishba thesis of Rabbi Ya'akov Ettlinger, and it would be aware of the respective roles of law and belief in Judaism. When G-d offered the Torah to the Jews, He waited until they freely accepted the Torah upon themselves, saying na'aseh v'nishma ("We will do and we will hear"). Furthermore, as I said, punishment according to the halakhah is possible only when the sin was premeditated, and the sinner knew exactly what he was doing and its consequences. The Haredim enjoy advocating punishment and coercion of non-observant Jews, which shows that the Haredim have rejected this explicit and indisputable principle of halakhah. In contrast to a Haredi theocracy (which rejects halakhah and rules on principles the Haredim have invented), a Jewish Torah theocracy would rely on Jewish Torah principles, in formulating the policies and laws of its theocratic rule.

[1] My original post said "Hatam Sofer", and "Samson" in the comments corrected me. This was merely a typo; rest assured, I know the difference between the Hatam Sofer and the Hazon Ish, the same as I know the difference between the Rambam and the Ramah. I think I have some sort of dyslexia or some such, that results in my sometimes typing not the word I want but instead a word that sounds similar, such as "artillery" instead of "auxillary", i.e. words that have nothing in common in meaning but have a similar sound.