Zionist Settlements on State-owned Land

Uri deYoung notes (inter alia),

The "law and order" fanatics in Israel accuse the settlers of the "crime" of building on "state land." But how did the land become "state land"? Simple: the Israeli government unilaterally gave itself title after the Six Day War. But, this is merely a modern version of the "divine right of kings to be the sole owners of all land in the realm" doctorine above. This doctorine, when applied to royalty, is utterly rejected today by the entire civilized world -- including Judaism (correct me if I'm wrong). But, when we resurrect this false belief and couch it in modern terms -- replacing the king with "the majority" or "the people" -- the concept of "state land" begins to sound reasonable to many of us.

I replied there

You're absolutely correct. Rabbi Emanuel Rackman, in his One Man's Judaism, discusses this issue.

He notes that whereas "dina d'malkhuta dina" (the law of the land is law) obligates Jews in gentile lands to do almost whatever the king demands, this is because, he says - citing Rabbi Nissim of Gerona, 14th century Spain, Drashot ha-Ran - the gentile king has permitted the Jews to settle there, the Jews being aliens and foreigners. But in Israel, he says, dina d'malkhuta dina doesn't apply, since the land belongs to all Jews equally.

Additionally, he notes, the Torah permits the establishment of a kingship in Israel only AFTER the ENTIRE land of Israel was conquered under Joshua. Why? So that the king couldn't make a feudalistic claim that the land is his; he was made king only subsequent to the conquest and partition of the land.

Furthermore, he says: there is an interesting legal technicality used in the laws of sales. According to halakhah, only land can be sold by money; to sell moveable property, the buyer must actually physically lift the property. But how does one reconcile this with modern economic need, where we must sell remotely? Simple, Rabbi Rackman says. For centuries, Jews utilized the method of "kinyan agav", where a bit of land is sold along with the moveable property. That way, when the land is sold remotely via money with no physically lifting of the property, the moveable property is sold along with it. But what if one has no land to sell? Simple: every Jew owns some land in Israel, and no one was concerned by whether one might sell all of his land via repeated uses of "kinyan agav". For centuries, then, Jews sold again and again and again via "kinyan agav", using this hypothetical undepletable bit of land that every Jew owns in Israel.

Uri further said

Do the Arabs or the State of Israel have any justification for expelling Jews from homes built on unoccupied hilltops?

First of all, Arab claims to property on barren, unused hilltops are simply spurious.

How do the Arabs think that they acquired title to the land? Do they think that they may claim title merely because their ancestors once grazed sheep on it? Or did they actually build something there, cultivate it, or fence it in? If so, where is the evidence?

Perhaps they claim that their grandfathers were Arab notables who once received land grants from the Ottoman Empire -- like William Penn who received "rights" to all of Pennsylvania from King James? But, this claim rests upon the assumption that the king is the sole owner of all the land in his kingdom, and that he may transfer ownership of large tracts as he sees fit.

...

In truth, neither nomads' grazing habits, nor imperial Ottoman land grants, nor the State of Israel's land-grabs can establish justifiable property rights. The fact is that UNUSED, UNALTERED land is UNOWNED land; and Jewish homesteaders have every right to settle it.

I replied,

I myself make two chief claims:

1) The early Zionist pioneers bought their land from absentee Arab landlors, fair and square.

2) For centuries, ever since the Roman era, Jews never gave up their claim to Israel. Several times a day, in our prayers, we'd reiterate this claim. So what if Arabs came and conquered the land? As Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook used to say, "If squatters seize land, after how long does the owner lose that land to the squatters?". Now, this doesn't preclude our going beyond the letter of the law and paying the Arab "squatters" for the land, full price. After all, the Torah commands us that if a gentile living in Israel owns a Jewish slave, all Jews are obligated to pay full price to buy this Jewish slave from the gentile. The Torah could have said of the gentile, living in Israel, owning a Jewish slave, that the Jews should bust in and steal the Jewish slave away. But no, the Torah commanded us to pay the gentile slavemaster full price. But in the end of the day, the Jew belongs to us, and the Jewish land belongs to us. We'll pay full price if need be, but one way or another, the land is ours, and we'll take it back.

On the other hand: if one says the land of Israel does belong to the Arabs, by dint of conquest in 600-700 CE, then why shouldn't Jewish conquest be legitimate? If Arabs can gain ownership and land title via military conquest, then so can Jews. You cannot have your cake and eat it too.

I'm very reluctant to unilaterally confiscate any land from Arabs, even if we do believe that we own we own it. Even if, as Uri claims, the Ottoman land titles are illegitimate, in that they hold that the king owns all, nevertheless, I'd be very reluctant to punish contemporary Arabs today for the illegitimate political notions of their ancestors. Therefore, I - like Rabbi Meir Kahane - advocate paying the Arabs fair and square, full price, for their land. But the land remains ours in the end.

Something else I added there

One thing I wish to study is the roots of democratic social-contract theory - Locke, Hobbes. After all, many of these thinkers were profoundly influenced by the Hebrew Bible. (See my Judaism/Torah and Democracy: My Reading List.)

For example:

-- The king is bound by the Torah, the same law as all Jews, and his commands are legitimate only when they are sanctioned by the Torah.

-- The king can be emplaced only with the popular will of the people.

-- The institution of a king is a concession (Deuteronomy and Samuel both make this clear, even though some authorities disagree with this interpretation), and the Torah prefers that each tribe be independently ruled by is own elders.

-- When rabbis pass Rabbinical decrees, these decrees are legitimate only if the people accept them. The only hierarchical legal institution in Jewish law is the Sanhedrin, and even it conditioned its own decrees on popular acceptance. According to Jewish law, if popular acceptance of a Rabbinical decree lapses - by those who are otherwise generally observant of Jewish law, however - then the decree is null and void (Rambam, Kesef Mishnah, Rabbi Haim Hirschensohn, Rav Kook). In the exile as well, each local Jewish community required the sanction of both the majority of men (okay, so they weren't feminist yet) and of the rabbi (his veto was limited to whether or not he confirmed that the measure did or didn't violate Jewish law in its strict narrow sense; otherwise, he had only one vote like the rest of the men) before most any measure could be passed. If the measure was purely and totally a question of technical Jewish law, a black and white question of law, such as the kashrut of the ritual slaughterer, then the rabbi had unilateral power, both to pass new decrees and annul old ones. But if the measure was some sort of communal ordinance that was tempered by Jewish law but not strictly required by it, such as a new tax for the poor, which is of course in consonance with Judaism but not strictly demanded by it, then the community's consent was demanded, and the rabbi could veto the ordinance only if it violated Jewish law considered narrowly. The community would often appoint officers (parnasim) to execute its will, but these officers had only the powers given them by the community, and they could be removed from power as soon as they ceased to keep the community's will properly.

Continuing the vein of democratic theory, I added,

See Rabbi Marc Angel's The Jews of Rhodes for an interesting discussion of the dynamics of communal ordinances in one specific Jewish community.

An interesting parallel to the question of majority tyranny (cf. the Federalist Papers) arises in Rabbi Angel's book. Rabbi Angel shows a distinction Rhodesian Jewry made between decrees made for the community as a whole, and those made regarding specific narrow sectors. For community-wide decrees, a simple majority of all the men was necessary, with the rabbi's approval as noted above. But if a specific narrow sector was singled out in the decree, then that specific sector in and of itself too had to approve the decree. For example, in the history of Rhodesian Jewry, many times, the community attempted to increase taxes on the rich alone in order to support the poor, but this was effected only if the rich themselves consented. Only once was this violated, when the rabbi unilaterally leveled a new tax on the rich for the sake of the poor, but as Rabbi Angel shows, the poor at that specific time were in especially desperate straits.

The solution was very different than that in the Federalist Papers - the Rhodesian Jews assumed a certain level of social consciousness by which they could expect the rich would often consent to taxes being raised on them for the sake of the poor, and no contingency was made for when the rich might refuse to consent to support the poor - but the basic fear - viz. tyranny by the majority - was the same.

On Questionable Jewish Messianic Belief

Regarding a Jew's believing in Jesus's messianic status. This issue came up with a friend of mine, and two questions arose:
(1) Do Jews and Christians believe in the same G-d?
(2) Is it sinful for a Jew to believe Jesus is the messiah?

I have too many things to say to say them all now. But I'll lay out a few headlines now, and hopefully I'll be elaborate to elaborate more fully later:

(1) One could make a strong case that Christians and Jews indeed worship the same G-d. According to Maimonidean philosophy, Jews and Christians worship different gods, but according to that same Maimonidean philosophy, Jews and Kabbalists also worship different gods (see Professor Marc Shapiro's The Limits of Orthodox Theology, chapter on Divine unity). Rabbi Judah de Modena recognized this, and so he attacked Christianity not based on the Trinity - since he recognized the Sefirot are not less problematic - but rather, he criticized Christianity for having a corporeal god. As Professor Marc Shapiro says (here),

With this in mind, let me now say something that I know will make many people uncomfortable, but which I have felt for a long time. Throughout Jewish literature one can find any number of explanations as to how the notion of the Trinity is in direct opposition to Jewish teachings, since Judaism demands a simple, unified God. There is no doubt that for much of our history this was the standard view. However, once the doctrine of the sefirot arises on the scene, matters change. Many of the arguments put forth by kabbalists to explain why the belief in the sefirot does not detract from God's essential unity could also be used to justify the Trinity, a fact recognized by the opponents of the sefirotic doctrine. Since the doctrine of the sefirot has become part and parcel of Judaism, we must now acknowledge that Judaism does not require a simple Maimonidean-like, divine unity.

In fact, without any reference to the sefirot, R. Judah Aryeh Modena was able to conclude that one could indeed justify the notion of the Trinity so that it did not stand in opposition to basic Jewish beliefs about God's unity. As Modena points out in his anti-Christian polemic, Magen va-Herev, the real Jewish objection to the Christian godhead is not found in any notion of a Triune God, but in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. (See Daniel J. Lasker, Jewish Philosophical Polemics Against Christianity in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 2007), pp. 81-82.) The idea that God assumed human form, i.e., that a human is also God, is regarded by us as way over the line. This is not only because it deifies a human, but also because there is a great difference between a spiritual God divided into different "parts," and an actual physical division in God. The latter is certainly in violation of God's unity even according to the most extreme sefirotic formulations. (It would not, however, appear to be in violation of R. Moses Taku's understanding of God, since he posits that God can assume form in this world at the same time that He is in the heavens. For Taku, Christianity's heresy would thus be seen only in their worship of a human, which is avodah zarah.)

Rabbi Eliyahu Benamozeh, himself an Orthodox rabbi and a Kabbalist, said (see here) the only difference between the Trinity and the Sefirot is seven - ten minus three.

For Jews who condescend to Trinitarian doctrine as an impure variant on monotheism, Benamozegh points out that Judaism is not nearly so absolute in its monotheism as such Jews want to claim. Not only hasidic varieties but all varieties of rabbinic Judaism are pervaded by mystical doctrines and practices and liturgical features that depend on belief in divine midot (aspects) or sefirot (emanations); many of the rabbis whose teachings appear in the Talmud were themselves mystics of this kind. Benamozegh shows, in his brave, unworried tone, that the principal difference between Jewish and Christian monotheisms is that the Jews believe in many more sefirot (Christians believe in just three).

As Rabbi Dr. Alan Brill says (here), rejecting Maimonidean philosophy on this matter:

It is worth restating one of the underlying assumptions of all the sources quoted above, a principle that is crucial to reaching the conclusion of commonality: God is real! All Jewish theological positions assume we pray to a living God. Conversely, God is not just a concept, so different languages or conceptions applied to God are not creating different deities. They are at most disputing aspects of God; more likely, they are pointing to different perceptions of a Unity that is too great to be contained by any one observer. This theological premise differs from the academic premise, where one can distinguish between the God of the Zohar and the God of Maimonides – a distinction that in real life both the philosopher and the kabbalist would reject.

Actually, I think Rambam would argue that the Kabbalists and Zohar are idolaters. Rambam argued that if one misconstrues and misunderstands G-d's attributes, then one has not merely erred on G-d's attributes, but rather, one is describing someone besides G-d! Rambam, being an Aristotellian philosopher, held ideas per se to be more important than almost anything else; for him, there is nothing more severe than an intellectual error. But we are not Maimonideans. We will rather say that while Jews disagree on G-d's attributes - indeed, we disagree very much, make no mistake! - nevertheless, we worship the same G-d.

Brill (ibid.) shows that Rabbis S. R. Hirsch and Yaakov Emden believe Christians worship the Jewish G-d. Hirsch says "... They [viz. Christians] profess their belief in the God of heaven and earth as proclaimed in the bible ...", and Emden says " ... the rise of Christianity ... served to spread among the nations ... the knowledge that there is One God ...".

Here, there is an essay by Rabbi Soloveitchik about Jewish-Christian interfaith dialogue, and a series of replies to that essay. See Rabbi Korn's essay (here),last two footnotes (46 and 47). In particular, Korn says,

Maimonides is well known to have ruled that Christian trinitarianism is beyond the pale of legitimate theology, but given R. Soloveitchik’s statements about positive relations with Christians and his appearances at Christian institutions, it is likely that he agreed with other rabbinic authorities who reject Maimonides’ position.

In other words: according to Rabbi Soloveitchik, Jews and Christians worship the same G-d.

Moreover, there is a popular and important notion that Jews are held more liable than non-Jews for mistaken theological notions regarding monotheism. It may be that Christians are allowed to misunderstand G-d's attributes, but Jews are not given this privilege. This involves an involved and controversial discussion of Tosafot's shittuf notion (alluded to by Korn's footnotes, op. cit.), and I don't want to get involved in that debate.

But see here, beginning with the citation of Shemot/Exodus Rabbah, Abarbanel, and Akedat Yitzhak, regarding whether gentiles are forbidden to believe in polytheism. According to the afformentioned sources (one of which is Hazalic, realize!), gentiles are not forbidden to believe in avoda zara.

In that article of Professor Shapiro's he quotes Rabbi Dr. J. H. Hertz as adumbrating the thesis of Rabbi Dr. Jonathan Sacks's The Dignity of Difference. Let me bring a few more quotations of Rabbi Hertz bearing on this point:

In Rabbi Dr. J. H. Hertz's Early and Late (Soncino Press, 1943), we read, ("A Vindication of Religion", p. 197),

An essential element in that [religious] vision is God's holiness. And the Holy God can only be sanctified through righteousness, Isaiah has for all time declared. That is, moral conduct is the beginning and end of religion, and men and nations are to be judged purely by their moral life. 'The righteous of all nations are heirs of immortality', is an unchallenged dogma of the Synagogue.

Rabbi Hertz makes similar remarks in his essay on the Shema in the back of the Hertz Pentateuch. One should not miss the far-reaching statements that Hertz has just made. "We are accustomed to viewing holiness, the experience of the numinous, as the very acme of religion" (Rabbi Howard I. Levine, "Enduring and Transitory Elements in the Philosophy of Samson Raphael Hirsch" (Tradition 5:2, Spring 1963), following Kuzari and Messilat Yesharim, etc., criticing Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's religious humanism), for "an essential element in that [religious] vision is God's holiness" (Hertz). But if so, if God's holiness is really the essential element and acme of religion, then, according to Isaiah, "the Holy God can only be sanctified [ - made holy - ] through righteousness". And therefore, "moral conduct is the beginning and end of religion" (Hertz). Moreover, "men and nations are to be judged purely by their moral life". This is an amazing statement. According to Rabbi Dr. Isidore Epstein (Judaism: A Historical Presentation. Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1959 and numerous reprintings thereafter. p. 14),

Belief in the one and only God was not demanded [of the non-Jew], provided there is no idolatry, which Judaism condemns not so much because it is false religion, but because it is false morality; the Son of Noah is not charged the confess the one and only God of the son of Israel. He may be a dualist or a trinitarian, as he wishes. This conception of the Noah laws reveals the real significance of the theocratic constitution of Israel: it rested not on the unity of the state and religion but on the unity of the state and morality.

Apparently, the first Noachide command would not mandate strict monotheism of the Jewish sort, but rather, would prohibit gross heathenistic worship. In like wise, Hertz says (The Pentateuch, p. 759, on Deuteronomy 4:19),

[I]dolatry was for them [viz. the Jews] an unpardonable offense; and everything that might seduce them from that Divine Revelation was to be ruthlessly destroyed. Hence the amazing tolerance shown by Judaism of all ages towards the followers of all other cults, so long as these were not steeped in immorality and crime. [Emphasis in original.]

Similarly, Hertz says (ibid., p. 833, on Deuteronomy 20:10-18),

It is seen that the Canaanites were put under the ban, not for false belief, but for vile action; because of the savage cruelty and foul immorality of their gruesome cults.

(These passages are also found, with some minor but noticeable variations, in Rabbi Hertz's Sermons, Addresses, and Studies, London: Soncino, 1938. Vol 3. Pp. 215 and 219, under "Religious Tolerance"; and Affirmations of Judaism, London: Soncino, 1975. Pp. 183 and 186, under "Religious Tolerance".) In like wise, Rabbi Dr. Eugene Korn in "One God: Many Faiths: A Jewish Theology of Covenantal Pluralism"notes that

Idolatry [in its appearance in the Seven Noahide Laws] according to some rabbinic opinions[note 5 – see below] is any ideology that rejects the above moral obligations, which are the foundations of any civil society. Importantly, there is no explicit requirement in the Noahide covenant to believe in God. The Noahide covenant is thus primarily moral, devoid of explicit theological doctrine. Even if it were to require belief in a generic creator who implanted a moral order into the cosmos and who ensures punishment for those violating that order,[note 6 – see below] at most Noahites would have to believe only that "God is" and that His moral authority is supreme—but no specific theology or a specific way to worship God.

[5] Rabbi Menachem Ha-Meiri (13th century France) and those later rabbinic authorities who accepted his conceptualization of idolatry.
[6] Meiri believed that one could not lead a coherent moral life without a belief in a Creator of heaven and earth who punished the guilty and rewarded the innocent. Like other pre-moderns, a secular ethic was untenable.

This argument that "men and nations are to be judged purely by their moral life" (Hertz), that there is an "amazing tolerance shown by Judaism of all ages towards the followers of all other cults, so long as these were not steeped in immorality and crime" (Hertz), that "It is seen that the Canaanites were put under the ban, not for false belief, but for vile action; because of the savage cruelty and foul immorality of their gruesome cults" (Hertz), that "Judaism condemns [idolatry] not so much because it is false religion, but because it is false morality" (Epstein), that "[i]dolatry … is any ideology that rejects the above moral obligations, which are the foundations of any civil society[; i]mportantly, there is no explicit requirement in the Noahide covenant to believe in God[; t]he Noahide covenant is thus primarily moral, devoid of explicit theological doctrine" (Korn) – this argument would parallel one by Rabbi Ahron Soloveichik, brought by Rabbi Dr. David Berger ("Jews, Gentiles, and the Modern Egalitarian Ethos: Some Tentative Thoughts", in Formulating Responses in an Egalitarian Age, ed. Marc Stern, Lanham, 2005, pp. 83-108.):

This position is spelled out more rigorously in his [Rabbi Ahron Soloveichik's] novellae to Sefer ha-Madda. Here he maintains that the discriminatory laws against non-Jews result only from their status as evildoers (their shem rasha). Non-Jews who behave righteously by following the six Noahide laws other than the prohibition against avodah zarah are not considered evil as long as their theological error was inherited, as the Talmud suggests about pagans in the diaspora, from their parents and is thus considered inadvertent or even a result of compulsion.

Elsewhere, Berger remarks (Alex Ozar, "An Interview With Rabbi Dr. David Berger", YU Commentator, issued December 17, 2007),

And this raises larger issues about whether in order to get into olam haba a non-Jew has to get a hundred on his exam. Does he need a perfect score on the sheva mitzvos in order to have a helek la-olam haba? Now I suppose that a straightforward reading of most discussions of this matter would be yes. You have to observe all of the sheva mitzvos, not six out of seven. However, there is a teshuva of Rav Yaakov Emden, and you get a similar impression from a piece by the elder Rav Henkin, and this appears to be Rav Ahron Soloveichik’s position, that indicates that the observance of the moral commandments is sufficient and that mistakes with respect to the understanding of God would not keep you out. Sinners, Jews and gentiles, are not punished forever but rather achieve a restored state.

To summarize: if the essential element and acme of religion is God's holiness (Levine), then God is made holy only through righteousness (Hertz citing Isaiah), and all men are judged only by their moral conduct (Hertz, Epstein, Soloveichik, Emden).

(An aside: in that article, Professor Shapiro references an article by Rabbi Korn which Professor Shapiro says resembles Rabbi Jonathan Sack's thesis in The Dignity of Difference. However, the URL Professor Shapiro gives is erroneous; the correct URL is here.)

Now that we've established that Jews and Christians worship the same G-d (or that frankly, it doesn't matter), we must still realize that Jews and Christians disagree on many aspects of G-d's attributes! We can have tolerance for Christian opinions, but this doesn't mean that - G-d forbid! - we should forget that we do have important disagreements with them!

(2) Regarding Jesus's being the messiah:

Even if one is not a heretic for believing in certain notions about Jesus, these notions still go against normative Jewish tradition, and I'd be very reluctant to rely on these notions.

It is very difficult to prove that it is heretical to regard Jesus as the Messiah, as long as one understands Mesiah in the Jewish sense (of a prophet who teaches Torah), as opposed to in the Christian sense (of a semi-Divine intermediary who vicariously atones for sins). Nevertheless, even if one is not a heretic for believing Jesus is the Jewish (not Christian) sense of the word "Messiah", nevertheless, this goes against normative Jewish tradition, and it is a very dangerous belief.

Rabbi Dr. David Berger describes why he does not refer to Habad messianists as heretics, even though they regard the Rebbe very similarly to how early Christians regarded Jesus: "Must a Jew Believe Anything? by Menachem Kellner" (book review) by Rabbi Dr. David Berger, Tradition 33:4, 1999:

And I agree that the "limits of historical Jewish consensus" are sometimes no less important than "heresy" as a criterion of acceptabilty; such a standard enables us to exclude a particular position from the community without declaring that its adherents are prime candidates for perdition. [I.e. one can be beyond the pale of historical Judaism, and yet also not be a heretic per se. This allows us to condemn these people as erring and going against Jewish tradition, without damning them as full-blown heretics.] ... It is for this reason that I have avoided the use of the term "heresy" in my campaign to delegitimate Lubavitch messianism and to treat its adherents as non-Orthodox Jews. It may well be that the abolition [by Habad messianists] of the classic criteria for the identification of the Messiah so distorts one of the ikkarei haemunah [principles of faith] that the term ["heretic"] is appropriate, and I do not quarrel with those who use it. If the only alternative [to calling Habad messianists heretics] were legitimation, I would use it [viz. the label of "heresy"] myself. Still, we should be able to recognize that this belief [in Habad messianism] is a profound and intolerable betrayal of our faith without resorting to a category [viz. heresy] that carries all the terrible consequences of minut [heresy].

(3) It may be of interest Rabbi Yaakov Emden's view of Jesus. I don't know enough about the Christian Bible to determine whether Rabbi Emden is correct in his interpretation. As far as I know, Jesus could very well have been an Essene, and I'd be very reluctant to rely on his teachings, even if we could remove all post-Jesus interpolations and obscurations of Jesus's own original intent. But I'll let one judge Rabbi Emden's words for himself:

For it is recognized that also the Nazarene and his disciples, especially Paul, warned concerning the Torah of the Israelites, to which all the circumcised are tied. ... But truly even according to the writers of the Gospels, a Jew is not permitted to leave his Torah, for Paul wrote in his letter to the Galatians (Gal. 5) ...

Emden's letter on this subject is quite long, so see the full source (here) for his full thesis, with proofs and source-texts.

It seems to me, in the end, however, that we have two choices:
(1) Jesus was a kosher rabbi, but he said little that other rabbis haven't said, so there's little value in learning him. More importantly, Christian redactors of the Christian Bible obscured his words and destroyed his original teachings beyond recovery.
OR
(2) Jesus was a heretic.

Either way, I see little value in studying Jesus's words or putting value in them.

(4) The friend to whom this entire blog post is a reply, further said, "Why can't people just agree to disagree about the minor details and return the focus on the worship of Hashem, the G-d of Israel, who demands absolute loyalty and exclusive devotion?" Those who agree with her might enjoy the chapter on heresy in Rabbi Emanuel Rackman's One Man's Judaism; Rabbi Rackman goes through a myriad of example issues, and shows how Judaism is far more open and less dogmatic than most realize. For most any opinion, as long as that opinion truly and sincerely desires to know G-d's will and follow Jewish tradition rather than break with Jewish tradition and rebel against G-d, there is probably a traditional source to rely on for this new view, and this new view thus cannot heresy. If one is really audacious, and wants to really sink his or her teeth into some in-depth scholarship, see Professor Marc Shapiro's book The Limits of Orthodox Theology, Professor Menachem Kellner's book Must a Jew Believe Anything, and Professor Kellner's review of Professor Shapiro's book (here), and Rabbi Dr. David Berger's review of Professor Kellner's book (cited earlier in this blog post). I also think the traditional Sephardi Judeo-Spanish view of heresy is important. See what Daniel Elazar says, here and here.

The Essence of Jewish Identity: Why I am Orthodox Today

This afternoon at lunch, one of my yeshiva's rabbis (Rabbi David Silverstein) was discussing the essence of Jewish identity. The essence of his argument was that if you've studied Judaism and rejected it, then all and well, but if you haven't studied it yet, you have an obligation to first find out what you're rejecting. Being Jewish and being descended from Jewish ancestors gives one some sort of moral obligation to first investigate that Jewish heritage. I piped up that Benjamin Cardozo made a similar argument and convinced Shearith Israel to remain Orthodox and not become Conservative, but I added that Rabbi Dr. Daniel Gordis's analysis of the Conservative movement points out flaws in this historical reasoning (cf. my Positive Historical Judaism Exhausted - R' Dr. Daniel Gordis).

But be all that as it may. Rabbi Silverstein then proceeded to cite - me! He cited my application essay to Yeshivat Petah Tiqwa, and my interpretation of Jeremiah therein, as the quintessential explanation of Jewish identity! In short, you can love or hate Judaism, or even do both, but one way or another, a Jew must grapple with Judaism and relate to it one way or another; he can accept it or reject it, and even be engaged in a dialectic struggle between acceptance and rejection - but ignorance and absence of relationship at all is not an option.

I hadn't realized that I had said anything particularly noteworthy in this essay of mine, but Rabbi Silverstein thought what I said was so profound that when he received it, he quoted it to the rosh yeshiva, Rabbi Yuval Cherlow, and then he quoted it again today at the lunch table. If so, then perhaps my words in this essay are worth more than I realized.

Thus, without further ado, I quote my application essay to Yeshivat Petah Tiqwa. The question was, with which Biblical character do you identify, and why?:

When I first became observant, my view of Orthodoxy was that gained primarily from Rabbis Hirsch and J. H. Hertz, along with a few miscellaneous Modern Orthodox writers, such as Rabbi Joseph Telushkin and Rev. Abraham Cohen (Everyman's Talmud). Therefore, my Orthodoxy was chiefly a German/British Neo-Orthodox one. In fact, the view of Judaism in general, evinced therein, was in starking agreement with that which I was taught growing up from my non-Orthodox mother. Save additional ritual observances, and a firmer knowledge of what exactly I was doing and why, the general aim and ethos of Judaism remained the same as it had been before my becoming observant.

It was only after spending some time at yeshiva in Israel that I began to truly realize how my vision of Orthodoxy had almost no correspondence with what most Orthodox Jews believed, and even practiced (insofar as humrot and occupation with mundane life are concerned).

The more I've learned, the more disheartened I've become. As time progresses, I become only more aware of how far my vision of Orthodoxy really is from practical reality. I am quite confident that, had I known at the time of my becoming observant what I know now, I would never have become observant. Time only deepens my disatisfaction and dismay, nay, profound disgust, with what Orthodoxy is today.

I like to quip that Haredism has quenched my eish dat. However, I could never now cease observance anymore. I said that I never would have become observant initially, but those initial days are far past. I am now far too possessed by my Orthodoxy, minority and unrepresentative of normative Orthodoxy though it may be. The Torah burns within my bones, however illogical it may now be, much as Jeremiah could not ignore the prophecy in his bones when he tried in all earnestness to give it no
voice.

Judaism/Torah and Democracy: My Reading List

So, after reading Moshe Feiglin's Where There are No Men, I decided I should learn more about the political theory underlying democracy. So far, all I know is what I haven't forgotten from 10th grade AP United States Government and Politics in 2003-2004.

Now, some background: according to:

“Judaism and the Modern State”, Yoram Hazony, Azure 5675/2005;
“The Jewish Roots of Western Freedom”, Fania Oz-Salzberger, Azure Summer 5762 / 2002; and
“The Jewish Origins of the Western Disobedience Tradition”, Yoram Hazony, Azure Summer 5758/1998

the political thinkers of social contract theory, the Framers of the Constitution, etc., were highly indebted to the Tanakh. So it would appear to me that it would be valuable to study these works of non-Jewish Hebraic political theorists, in order to learn whatever I might about the Tanakh's own views. Of course, in the end, where I feel there is a disagreement, I will rather side with the Tanakh, but perhaps these Hebraic thinkers will have insights into the Tanakh that I lack.

So here's the list I've compiled of books to buy in the future (bz"h), as found on my Amazon.com Wish List: Democratic Political Theory:

For the basics, we have

The Constitution of the United States of America, with the Bill of Rights and all of the Amendments; The Declaration of Independence; and the Articles of Confederation by Thomas Jefferson

The Federalist Papers (Signet Classics) by Alexander Hamilton

The Anti-Federalist​ Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates (Signet Classics) by Ralph Ketcham

Democracy in America by Alexis de Tocqueville

Rights of Man, Common Sense, and Other Political Writings (Oxford World's Classics) by Thomas Paine (Author), Mark Philp (Editor)

Locke: Political Essays (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought) by John Locke (Author), Mark Goldie (Editor)

Leviathan (Norton Critical Editions) by Thomas Hobbes

Basic Political Writings by Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Harrington: 'The Commonwealth of Oceana' and 'A System of Politics' (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought) by James Harrington (Author), J. G. A. Pocock (Editor)

The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the 'Two Treatises of Government' by John Dunn

The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution by Bernard Bailyn

And for how all this relates to Judaism and Torah, we have

The Hebrew Republic by Petrus Cunaeus

Democracy and the Halakhah by Eliezer Schweid

Jewish Statesmanship: Lest Israel Fall by Paul Eidelberg

Created Equal: How the Bible Broke with Ancient Political Thought by Joshua A Berman

Political Hebraism: Judaic Sources in Early Modern Political Thought by Gordon Schochet (Editor), et al.

Additionally, this Rosh Hashana that just ended, I read several of Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's essays on education. Thanks to that, I've finally decided that it's high time I bought a bunch of books on ancient Near Eastern and classical Greco-Roman religion and culture, so that I can understand the background of Prophetic and Rabbinic polemic. As Dayan Grunfeld says about Rabbi Hirsch (Rabbi Hirsch says almost the exact same himself, but I'm quoting Dayan Grunfeld because I already had this quote available electronically),

How, asked Samson Raphael Hirsch, can we understand the sublime word pictures of world history painted by the prophets without an adequate knowledge of contemporary secular history? The Jewish youth who knows from his historical studies the contempt for human life shown by the ancient Egyptians, the social oppression and moral degeneration in Rome of old, the oppression and licentiousness of ancient Greek society, understands and appreciates a thousand times better the sublime and divine character of the Sinaitic law. And as to the study of nature which is so necessary for the understanding of Jewish religious thought and practical religious life, the Talmud reproaches those who fail to undertake it with the words of Isaiah (5:12): "And the doing of God they do not contemplate and the work of His hands they do not see" (Shabbath 75a).

But I'm contacting some professors of history to get a reading list on this, because off the top of my head, I don't know which books I ought to read. The reading list for democracy was easier for me to compile, because I still remembered the list of key names (Locke, Paines, etc.) and books (Constitution, Leviathan, etc.) from AP United States Government and Politics. But whereas I'll be content to read primary sources for politics, I'm not about to start reading the Code of Hammurabi and the Hittite Code and the Egyptian Book of the Dead in the (translated) original! So in lieu of reading primary sources, I'm asking some professors for a reading list of secondary sources. Stay tuned.

Also, the works of Rabbi Dr. Jose Faur should be added to this list. To quote :

The Naked Crowd: The Jewish Alternative to Cunning Humanity. In this book, the hakham articulates the political dimension of Judaism, the essence of the Jewish alternative to the cunning societies of world history. As the hakham describes, thousands of years ago, the Jewish nation became what Nobel laureate Elias Canetti called a "naked crowd"; a society built on transparency and inclusiveness, impervious to the attempts of would-be tyrants to control the "crowd" through mind-games, linguistic manipulation, and mass hysteria. While the Jewish people have, over the course of history, occasionally lost touch with this foundation of their society, they have never lost the dream of a truly free society for all. This book serves as a comprehensive introduction to Judaism from the perspective of the Western political tradition. The last section examines Pauline Christianity and its origins in Greek and Roman pagan thought and culture.

The Horizontal Society: Understanding the Covenant and Alphabetic Judaism (Volume 1) (Volume 2). This book is the hakham's magnum opus, a restatement of the basic ideas of the rabbinic mesora in contemporary terms. Summarizing and interweaving much of the hakham's earlier work, each section of this book addresses a different aspect of the our tradition: The God of Israel describes the Jewish theology of God, the "divine Author"; The Books of Israel describes the foundations of Jewish nationalism, a literary society originating in the voluntary, bilateral covenant compacted at Sinai; The Governance of Israel describes the Jewish socio-political theory, identifying horizontal social organization as (thus far) a uniquely Jewish phenomenon[emphasis added]; The Memory of Israel describes the origins, development, and purpose of the "Oral Tora" (otherwise known as National Memory); and lastly, The Folly Israel describes the manner in which our abandonment of all of the foregoing in favor of foreign values and ideas has understandably resulted in the tribulations which have afflicted us throughout our history in exile. A multifaceted work, this book addresses key issues facing the Jewish people today - the constraints of prescriptive (and descriptive) theology, the displacement of the Tanakh from the heart of our culture, the abandonment of the Law due to the influence of deceptive ideologues, and our inability to hold our leaders accountable to the standards of the Law due to widespread and popular ignorance of the Law and its mechanics. The hakham also offers compelling expository refutations of the foundations of "biblical criticism," Christianity, and pseudo-Kabbalah, a tremendous boon to skeptical and questioning readers of all backgrounds who are dissatisfied with the (often) anti-intellectual status quo.

Yossi Sarid's Polemic Against Feiglin, Betraying Close-mindedness and Primitive Powers of Logical Reasoning

I just read Yossi Sarid's Feiglin, his cronies are fascists by any definition", and though perhaps my response is belated, I wish to take this opportunity to point out some basic flaws of reasoning and logic in Mr. Yossi Sarid's piece.

With all due respect to Mr. Sarid, his diatribe about Mr. Moshe Feiglin betrays no small degree of ignorance and primitive powers of reasoning and logic on his part.

For example: Feiglin's point about the lack of nation-states among the Palestinians and Africans is basic history, even if Feiglin could have offered further historical substantiation and expanded his scope beyond only the Palestinians and Africa. The entire concept of the nation-state originated in Europe, approximately around the time of the Enlightenment. It was only in the 18th century and onwards that European nations began to form. In fact, Italy only unified into one nation in the 1860s, and Germany in 1871. Before all this, the concept of the nation-state simply didn't exist. Rather, there were empires that presided over many territories and peoples, and in return for taxes and military recruits, the empires were mostly content to let the individual peoples govern themselves, a concept known frequently as tax-farming. Now, some variations of this phenomenon exist; the Japanese, prior to the Meiji Restoration, had multiple shogunates, each of them self-governing. Other nations had local petty kingdoms, which were conquered by empires or subject to suzerainty from time to time; think being Israel or Moab or Edom in a world dominated by Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, or Persia. In other locations, multiple city-states were the norm; Classical Greece and pre-empire Babylon are famous examples. But the point is that it was rare for one people or one culture or one ethnicity to rule united over an entire region. Much of China's history, for example, is characterized by lengthy spans of a hundred years or more of multiple Chinese empires, all culturally quite alike, contending for rule over China, until finally one power would prevail. (However, one should not overestimate the cultural unity of the Chinese. The entire reason why the Chinese use logograms rather than an alphabet - i.e., their symbols stand for whole words rather than for discrete syllables or sounds - is that different Chinese peoples spoke different dialects, and they could not understand one another's spoken tongue. But by using logograms, in which one symbol represents a whole word, the pronunciation of the word became utterly irrelevant where writing was concerned, and different Chinese peoples who spoke different dialects could all have one common system of writing, and understand each other thereby. But this is not the place to become bogged down in minute details of history not related to my central thesis.)

Therefore, when Feiglin says that the Arabs and Africans have no nationalism, he is only speaking words that any competent history professor would - as far as my ignorance extends - endorse, although perhaps with some caveats that I am not aware of, by virtue of my being no expert in history. Pray tell, why did the Arabs only become nationalist Palestinians after 1967; why were they quite content and satisfied - at least by all appearances - to be Jordanians before that, and became proud Palestinians only after Israel conquered them? If the Palestinians were an independent people with a unique culture, and with ardent and well-developed desires for national self-determination, one would have expected them to agitate under the Jordanians no less than under the Israelis, but history does not bear this out. Alternatively, if the Palestinians did in fact have their own unique nationalism prior to 1967, then this can only mean that the Jordanians ruthlessly and fascistically quashed and dispelled all expressions of nationalism, and only after 1967, with the coming of a more benign Israeli regime, were the Palestinians finally free to vent and express that which they were unable to express under the Jordanians. I am only trying to raise a basic desideratum for study, however, and I am not trying to make any definitive statements regarding the present Israeli-Arab conflict. If one wishes to question my assertion regarding the Palestinians, I am welcome to such a challenge, if it be please conducted on a respectable intellectual field, without petty and immature vitriol and ad hominem attacks. My point here was only to clarify Feiglin's intent, to explain the basic and incontrovertible historical facts regarding nationaism that underlie his assertions regarding specific Palestinian nationalism, and not to say that Feiglin has successfully extrapolated a nuanced and accurate analysis - an analysis fit for execution in political reality, no less! - from these basic incontrovertible historical facts.

As for Feiglin's words about Hitler, saying that Hitler was a military and political genius surrounded by subordinates who were quite learned in science and classical culture, a praise by Feiglin about which Sarid says, "The time has come to break free from the shackles of politically correct speech and call these people - Feiglin and his cronies - by their explicit name. They are not 'radicals' but fascists by any acceptable definition. And had they not been born - through no fault of their own - to Jewish mothers, they would have been damn anti-Semites to boot.": everything Feiglin says about Hitler is objectively true from a historical standpoint. One can speak highly of Hitler's military and political genius without speaking well of his character. In fact, a religious individual, especially one following the philosophy of Rabbi Kook (m'hadesh et ha-yashan u'm'qadesh et ha-hadash) would lament the fact that such talents and genius as Hitler had were not put to more holy and moral use. Imagine, had Hitler used his abilities to revitalize Germany to be a moral superpower, imagine the good he could have brought the world! So there is nothing wrong with seeing the good qualities in an evil man, as long as one does not lose sight of his evil. It is basic Jewish philosophy to love the man even as one detests any wickedness in him. Sarid has failed to show that Feiglin endorsed any of Hitler's evil; all we see from Sarid is that Feiglin admired and praised Hitler's theoretical talents, and his success at revitalizing Germany, which is something quite aside from what Hitler proceeded to do with said revitalized Germany. Sarid shows an unfortunate inability to distinguish between nuances and subtlety, a failure to distinguish between different kinds of facts, measurements, and appraisals.

In fact, such a nuanced understanding, of distinguishing between person and deed, between talents and abilities and application thereof, is what permits any ideologically-motivated individual to be able to tolerate individuals of other ideologies. That is, he understands that from his own ideological perspective, the other person qua person is distinguished and separate from any deeds which, from a narrow ideological perspective, are to be counted as sins or demerits. Thus, the ideologically-motivated person is able to love the other person as a person, as a person with intrinsic and infinite moral worth, even as the ideologically-motivated individual silently thinks to himself that not all of the deeds or beliefs of the other individual are proper, from a narrow ideological perspective. But were Sarid - as one unable to understand such nuances - to reign materially or ideologically, religious and ideological intolerance would gain ascendance. I should thus shudder to imagine the damage and human suffering that would result were more people to have such narrowness and pettiness of view and understanding as is Sarid's. Such thinking as Sarid exhibits is directly responsible for what we see in both the far-Left and the far-religious-right, both the socialistic Israeli left-wing elite and in the far-religious-right Haredim. After all, the Left holds by a religion themselves, no less than the Haredim do, even if the Left's religion is atheistic. From an ideological standpoint, both the Left and the Haredim are equally religious, if one may permissibly denude the word "religion" of theological and deistic content, and use it to speak of ideology in general. For surely, the Left hold by their beliefs no less than do the Haredim, but I should hope that both the Haredim and the Left come to have more nuanced and sophisticated understandings, understandings that could permit tolerance and love of fellow man even amidst the other's difference and unlike-ness.

As for racism: Feiglin is quite right in saying that Judaism is racist, if racism means merely distinguishing between races. In fact, the word "discriminate" means only to distinguish and to choose, which is why someone can have a discriminating palate or a discriminating fashion sense. Often, "discriminate" is used to discriminate unfairly, but one can discriminate positively as well, such as university admissions officer discriminating against applicants with poor academic records, or a chef discriminating against substandard and unfit food. Racism, in the sense that Feiglin uses it, means only to discriminate between - not against, G-d forbid - races. A Jew is a Jew and wears a kippah; a Christian is a Christian and wears a cross, etc. This is discrimination, for one is telling the difference between two different species or kinds, but there is nothing objectionable in such discrimination. Discrimination and racism are objectionable only when they are performed using improper criteria. For example, sexism is quite proper and fine if one discriminates against women regarding tasks that the women in question lack the requisite physical strength to perform properly! Sexism is improper only when the women are discriminated against regarding a job or function they can perform just as well as men, including most any intellectual, academic, or scholarly task. Racism is fine if one discriminates against blacks regarding a theater role that demands a white, but racism is sinful and wicked when one discriminates against blacks regarding a task that blacks are just as fit as whites to perform (which is almost anything and everything, save the afforementioned theater role). It is unfortunate that Sarid does not appreciate these nuances and subtleties in denotation and connotation. Similarly, then, after Feiglin speaks about African tribes, Sarid muses, "One is left to wonder under which tribe Feiglin classifies the Obama household." Apparently, Sarid is not aware of the fact that Obama - as the Hawaiian-born product of a Kenyan father and mother of English descent - is not African, and so Sarid's question is irrelevant. In fact, even were both of Obama's parents to be black, and even more, even if they both were from Africa, Obama himself would not be African himself, since he was was born in America - but one wonders whether Sarid is aware of this, whether Sarid realizes that Africa is a continent, a geographic entity, a landmass, and neither a cultural nor an ethnic category. I should shudder to think if Sarid would ever rise to power in gender or racial issues, in which we might very well find ourselves in a new Dark Age.

In short, Sarid's narrowness of mind and intolerance are quite lamentable, and they induce not a small amount of fear in the present author. It is my hope that this short piece illustrates how knowledge - in this case, of history, of terminology, and of the ability to draw nuanced and educated distinctions between different species and kinds - can serve to increase both tolerance and practical effectiveness - that is, efficaceous endeavor and deed - in the temporal world which we have the privilege to inhabit. But when such critical thinking is absent - as with Sarid - intolerance increases and man's practical ability to effectively control his environment in a rational manner is stultified.

As an aside: for those Israelis who are desirous of learning from the United States's achievements and culture, please do take note of that which I have said. Most everything I say above is directly attributable to that which I learned in the educational institutions of Silver Spring, MD, in the suburbs of the United State's nation's capital, in Montgomery County, one of the most affluent counties of the entire United States. A past Israeli Minister of Education whose identity escapes me said something to the effect that, "We [i.e. Israel] have no culture of our own; our culture is yours [i.e. America's], from television and videogames to blue jeans and pop stars." If the Israeli people have repudiated this belief, then well and good - much more deserves to be said on Israel's cultural and moral abdication to the West, but here is not the place - but if not, if Israelis have not repudiated this former Minister of Education's words, then, for the sake of intellectual honesty, my words above should not be brushed aside dismissively or summarily. One can accept for reject my words, but I should hope that intellectual honesty permits one to perspicaciously pursue the full course to its logical conclusion, and not engage in compartmentalization.

The First Hispanic Supreme Court Justice: On the History of Spain, Portugal, and the Sephardim

Last month, I discussed my reply to Aliza Hausman (Memoirs of a Jewminica)'s discussion of whether Carodozo or Sotomayer should be the considered the first Hispanic Supreme Court Justice. My reply basically noted that whatever Cardozo's origins, he was primarily a Spanish Jew, and not a Spaniard, and given that he'd have more in common with an Ashkenazi Jew than with a Catholic Spaniard, it is not proper to consider his Hispanic; culture is no less important, if not more important, than ethnicity and geographic origin.

The following is a sequel to that reply of mine. Paul there replied, saying,

Benjamin Cardozo is a Portuguese Jew(very rare by the way). Cardozo is a Portuguese name. How he is even considered of being Hispanic, is beyond me. Portugal and Spain are two totally different countries in every aspect. All these two countries have in common are that of being neighbors. France also neighbors Spain and i doubt people are confusing the French of being Hispanics. Such ignorance! I am Portuguese/American, and would be furious if someone confused me with being Hispanic.

But with all due respect to Paul, some investigation of historical facts will belie his argument. As we will see, Cardozo's family being Portuguese as opposed to Spanish will prove to be of no significance. Paul is quite correct, of course, that Cardozo is not Hispanic. But the reason is not because he is Portuguese, but rather because he is Jewish, and not a South American or Spanish Catholic. Whatever his historical geographic origins, Cardozo is simply not culturally Hispanic. He'd have more in common with an Ashkenazi Jew than with a Catholic Spaniard or Hispanic.

Now then, why is Cardozo's being Portuguese of no special import here? The answer is that Cardozo's family left Portugal during the Inquisition, and settled in Holland. The family then moved to America before the American Revolution.

This is crucial for a few reasons:

(1) Cardozo's family's last physical connection with Portugal was severed in 1492. This was long before Spain and Portugal had established histories as two independent and separate nation-states. Until then, the Iberian Pensinula was either Moorish Al-Andalus, or was a patchwork of small Christian kingdoms. The Inquisition came only a few years after the end of the Reconquista, before there had yet been enough time to solidify two well-established separate "Spanish" and "Portuguese" identities, ethnicities, and nationalities. And since Cardozo's family left in 1492, they left while the division between Spain and Portugal was far from well-established.

(2) We should realize that culturally speaking, there is very little distinction between Jews of Spain, Portugal, Holland, England (before Ashkenazim came), Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. In all of these countries, the Jews were Judeo-Spanish Sephardim - not to be confused with Mizrahim from North Africa and Iraq and Iran - and all the Judeo-Spanish Jews were quite similar culturally. We might divide Judeo-Spanish Jews into three groups: (1) Conversos from Spain and Portugal, who had to hide their Jewish identities underground, until they could migrate to one of the following two groups; (2) Judeo-Spanish Jews of Western European nations, viz. England, Holland, and Italy; (3) Judeo-Spanish Jews of Balkan nations, viz. Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Now, as I said, culturally, all were quite similar. The defining factors of them are: (1) The Spanish and Portuguese conversos, having to hide their Jewishness, were often Jewishly illiterate, and had to make due with a paucity of Jewish practices, and Catholicization of their children, until they could relocate; (2) Dutch, English, and Italian Jews were secularly educated; (3) Balkan Jews retained the pre-Expulsion ethos of Spanish Jewry, including their attitudes towards gentiles and non-Jewish secular learning, even as they practically speaking had very little contact with either until the Tanzimat Reforms in Turkey and the Italian conquest of Greece. But in terms of general cultural outlook, all form one group, notwithstanding that their host nations - Spain, Portugal, Holland, England, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey - were far from culturally similar. We are speaking of the Judeo-Spanish Jews, and not the non-Jewish hosts, and so we are concerned not with how similar English and Turkish non-Jews are (not very), but rather, we are concerned with how similar English and Turkish Jews are to each other, and the answer is that they are very similar.

For these two reasons, it is irrelevant that Cardozo is Portuguese and not Spanish. (In fact, if anything, Cardozo might very well be more Dutch or American than he is either Spanish or Portuguese.) The fact is that Cardozo's family came from Portugal before Portugal and Spain were fully distinct, and his family settled in Holland which, for Jewish purposes, is almost identical with Spain, Portugal, England, Italy, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia, except for the afformentioned nuances (whether Jews must hide their Jewishness as conversos, and how much secular learning and contact with non-Jews there is).

I agree, of course, that Cardozo is not Hispanic, because this is not because he is Portuguese, but rather, because he is Jewish, and not a South American or Spanish Catholic. Whatever his physical origins, Cardozo is simply not culturally Hispanic. He'd have more in common with an Ashkenazi Jew than with a non-Jewish Spaniard.

Moshe Feiglin - Where There are No Men - The Totalitarian Fascist Nature of Israel

I just read Feiglin's Where There are No Men.

This book is actually a better summation of the fifty years of the reborn state of Israel than all the albums prescribed by the ministry of education and the gauleiters of the mass media." - Hillel Weiss, Professor of Hebrew literature.

The appendix by Lecturer Re'aya Epstein shows how Israeli "democracy" is more indebted to Soviet totalitarianism than it is to the West. She notes how Israeli politicians use the word "democracy" as a justification to quash popular dissent. In other words, she says, Israeli Leftist leadership is still true to its pre-state socialistic roots, even as it has coopted Western democratic terminology for its own purposes.

Parts of Feiglin's book were actually pretty hilarious, in a sardonic way. For example:

1) Feiglin was charged with sedition for his mass rallying for civil disobedience, such as blocking traffic and the like. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared that he didn't care about the public's dissent with his policies (!), that he wasn't impressed with the public's disapproval with his actions (!).

2) Rabin demanded that Feiglin's civil disobedience be quashed in the name of democracy (!). At the sedition trial, the prosecuting attorney claimed that civil disobedience was appropriate only "unsavory regimes", and certainly not in democratic Israel; civil disobedience, according to the prosecution, was appropriate only in totalitarian non-democratic dictatorships (!).

3) Throughout the entire affair, the General Security Service (GSS), the Attorney General's office, and the media all worked very closely with each other. In fact, when Feiglin was charged with sedition, he didn't find out until two weeks after the media had all been given full details, including the detailed list of charges, which Feiglin himself hadn't received yet! Every single appropriate office of the government, it was clear to Feiglin, was in cahouts, all towards a very political end, and not an impartial judicial one. At one point, the court's judge held Feiglin's trial ten hours after his arrest - Israeli law requires 48 hours, so that the accused can gather evidence, witnesses, and an attorney - and yet the very same judge, a few years later, let an Arab terrorist go free without trial on the grounds that his trial was held too soon, before the 48 hours had yet elapsed since arrest! If that weren't enough, Avishai Raviv of the GSS is responsible for deliberately inciting Yigal Amir to murder Rabin (in order to incite the Left against the Right, as were his official GSS orders), and when a prominent journalist revealed this fact, he later regretted performing his journalistic duty and revealing this truth, because this fact was a potent tool in the hands of the Right against the Left; this journalist felt it was more important to strengthen the Left than to reveal the truth, by his own explicit admission.

4) When Feiglin's partner Shmuel Sackett was brought to the trial as a witness, he testified regarding his personal experience with civil disobedience in America, when he protested for Soviet Jewry. (Ironically, at one point in Israel, Sackett was jailed with Dr. Yosef Begun, who had once been imprisoned by the Soviets.) There in America, said Sackett, the police went to each and every single protester individually, one-by-one, and read them each their rights thrice, three times!, before arresting. By contrast, with Feiglin, said Sacket, the Israeli police used batons and brass knuckles on unarmed protestors who had already handcuffed their hands behind their backs themselves. At one point, the police chased after fleeing Israelis and beat them as the Israelis tried to escape. Women pushing baby carriages and elderly men of seventy years of age weren't beyond being beaten, and neither were the babies in the carriages! All this is without the police reading off a single right, or issuing a single warning. They just came on the scene and started bashing heads, literally (the X-rays were available as evidence).

5) Feiglin noted that Rabin is responsible for the murders on the Altalena, and the court took this as evidence of Feiglin's inciting Amir to murder Rabin. But whereas only right-wing fringe extremists with no prominence whatsoever ever actually advocate and voice support for Rabin's murder, by contrast, notes Feiglin, prominent and well-known Leftist journalists - and we're talking public journalistic pronouncements on television and in the newspaper - included explicit calls to murder Sharon and use guns on the "settlers". One prominent professor referred to all IDF soldiers as Nazis, and another referred to them as Hitler youth, and yet another referred to the settlers as collaborators with Hamas (??). (That collaborators with Hamas" accusation deserves attention. Rabin and his Labour party, before their election to government office, illegally met in Egypt, to talk with the PLO, and pre-arrange the Oslo conditions, and Rabin indeed later shook Arafat's hand. And yet, he's not a collaborator with Hamas. On the other hand, the right-wing "settlers", those who support annexing the West Bank, they, they are the collaborators with Hamas??!!) And yet, none of these Leftists - i.e. who explicitly called for the murder of Sharon and the "settlers" - were charged with incitement to murder. But all Feiglin has to do is cite an objective historical fact - viz. that Rabin, by his own proud admission, was directly responsible for murdering innocent passengers of the Altalena - and he was charged with incitement to murder. In other words: the people of the Right don't have the same civil rights as the people of the Left.

Much of Feiglin's book is thus devoted to two central topics:
1) How the entire government, as well as the media, is a Leftist propanda machine, regardless of who holds the actual reigns of power. Feiglin details how government officials and the media put all objectivity and judicial equity aside when it came to dealing with the right;
2) How the concept of democracy is foreign to the Israeli Left, how they beat unarmed civil protestors without provocation, and then claim that this quashing of free speech was necessary for the sake of democracy, and how civil disobedience has no place in Israel, but only in unsavory totalitarian regimes. (Feiglin sarcastically noted in his trial that apparently, the United States (MLK, Jr.), Britain (Ghandi), and France (freeing Algeria) were all unsavory totalitarian regimes justifying civil disobedience, but that good free Israel is far more democratic than fascist America!)

Missing the Forest for the Trees: Ad-hoc Solutions to Racism in the Talmud, or A Global Solution to Judaism's Attitude Towards Non-Jews

My response to Is Halakha Insensitive to Non-Jews? The Case of Fraud, by Rabbi Gidon Rothstein.

There, "DF" commented,

You’re missing the forest for the trees. The issue is not fraud per se, but how the whole of current halacha treats non-Jews in the entirety. As far as halacha as currently practiced goes, non Jews have not advanced an iota in the past 2000 years. As far as current halacha goes, pious Christians are no better than the godless pagans of past millenia. It’s not just fraud – they cant touch our wine; they are suspected of secretly plotting to “treif up” our food; their bread is suspect. Public sermons draw lessons from the Chanukah story to contemporary life. Basically, we willfully ignore 2000 years of history, and still treat our neighbors as idol worshippers “which we neither raise up or lower down”, etc.

With that mindset, is it any wonder the issue of fraud is what it is? You’re not going to change that mindset until you change our stance vis a vis goyim generally. You might have to put Kedem and Kesser out of business to do so.

In like wise, "Modern Orthodox" commented,

The “forest” would also have to include not returning a lost object to them, not pointing out when they made a counting mistake to their detriment, not paying when our oxen gored theirs, no punishment for our killing them, etc.
Mr. [sic] Rothstein, isn’t it possible that the Torah Temimah didn’t use your “drei” and instead differentiated between goyim of former times and today because only such a “global” solution can deal with the problem?

My reply:

I support the earlier comments about forests and trees, global solutions regarding gentiles. The individual ad-hoc responses that Rabbi Rothstein offers may even be true, but we cannot make an individual ad-hoc response to each and every single apparently racist law in the Talmud. And even if we do succeed in producing a thousand ad-hoc responses, won't Occam's Razor be on the side of those suspicious of us?

Thus, it is clear to me that the only real solution is the Meiri.

For an enlightening explanation of the Meiri's shita, in and of itself, with no attempt to determine whether his shita is "correct", see Professor Moshe Halbertal, "'Ones Possessed of Religion': Religious Tolerance in the Teachings of the Me'iri", the Edah Journal vol. 1:1.

For a survey of how Meiri is not "correct", how every commentator on the Shulhan Arukh (save Be'er ha-Golah)disagreed with Meiri, see David Goldstein, "A Lonely Champion of Tolerance: R. Menachem ha-Meiri's Attitude Towards Non-Jews", Talk Reason.

For a discussion on how Meiri is not "correct", how every commentator disagreed with him, and yet how the preeminent "Modern Orthodox" poseqim all pasqened by him (even though they did know that Meiri is a da'at yahid), see Rabbi Dr. David Berger, "Jews, Gentiles, and the Modern Egalitarian Ethos: Some Tentative Thoughts.", in Formulating Responses in an Egalitarian Age, ed. by Marc Stern, Lanham, 2005, pp. 83-108.

Berger notes that, among the figures who pasqened Meiri were Rav Hirsch, Rabbi Ahron Soloveichik, and Rabbi Yehiel Weinberg. Regarding Rav Hirsch, see Rabbi Hirsch's essay Talmudic Judaism and Society, and his son's Humanism and Judaism, and Rabbi D. Z. Hoffman's Problems of the Diaspora in the Shulchan Aruch. Regarding Rabbi Ahron Soloveichik, see an excerpt from his Logic of the Heart, Logic of the Mind (pp. 61-68). Regarding Rabbi Weinberg, see Professor Marc Shapiro's publication of Rabbi Weinberg's letters to Professor Samuel Atlas, Scholars and Friends: R' Yechiel Ya'akov Weinberg and Prof. Samuel Atlas.

I'd like to add another source: In Rabbi Yom Tov Schwarz's Eyes to See: Recovering Ethical Torah Principles Lost in the Holocaust, we read (p. 17),

The distinctions that are found in the Talmud are between a Jew and an akum (heathen), whose societal standards, ethics and morality were so low as to be almost non-existent, and in no way has any bearing on the non-Jews our our time, as has already been noted by the Gedolei Ho'Acharonim (great halachic authorities of the recent past).

See also Rabbi Dr. Yehuda (Leo) Levi's עם ישראל ואומות העולם:

ובס' חסידים כתב (סי' שנח): 'נכרי הזריז בז' מצוות שנצטוו לבני נח, הזהר מטעותן שטעותן אסור, ותשיב לו אבידה, ואל תזלזלהו, אלא תכבדהו יותר מישראל שאינו עוסק בתורה.

[My translation: Rabbi Dr. Yehuda Leo Levi's book The Nation of Israel and the Nations of the World, saying, "And in Sefer Hasidim, par. 358: 'A gentile who is punctilious in the Seven Noahide Laws, be careful [not to benefit from] his mistakes, for [benefiting from] his mistakes is forbidden. Return his lost objects to him, and do not scorn him, but rather honor him more than [you do] a Jew who does not keep the Torah.'"]

Also, further in R' Leo Levi (ibid.), we find, after a discussion of Rambam/Shulhan Arukh vs. Meiri/Be'er haGolah, the following:

ועי' בתורה תמימה (דברים כ"ב ג' ס"ק כ"ב ופרק ל"ג ס"ק ג') שכתב: "כל המפרשים כתבו בכלל הדין הזה [היתר אבידת הגוי] דאיירי בעובדי אלילים הפראיים" ומצא מקור לדבר בגמרא (ב"ק ל"ח.): "ראה הקב"ה שאין האומות מקיימות ז' מצוות, עמד והתיר ממונן... אבל אלה המקיימים ז' מצוות, והם רוב האומות שבזה"ז ובכל המדינות הנאורות (!) נעלה על כל ספק שדינם שוה בכל לישראל", - אבל כל זה לא מובא בשו"ע.

[My translation: And see Torah Temimah, Devarim {{I am unfamiliar with the notation for the location}}, who wrote: "In general, this law [that benefitting from a gentile's lost object is permitted] is regarding unruly idolaters", and he found a source in the Gemara (Baba Qama 38): "G-d saw that the nations of the world did not keep the Noahide laws, and so He permitted their money [to Jews]...", [quoting Torah Temimah again) "but those who keep the Noahide laws, and they are the majority of the nations in our own time, in all the enlightened nations, there is no doubt that there law is equal to that of a Jew." - [now Rabbi Levi parenthetically adds] but all this is not brought in the Shulhan Arukh.]

And see Rabbi Levi again, ibid.:

וברמב"ם (הל' נזקי ממון ח, ה) פירש יותר: "לפי שאין הגויים מחייבין את האדם על בהמתו שהזיקה, והרי אנו דנין להם כדיניהן. ושור של נכרי שנגח שור של ישראל, בין תם בין מועד, משלם נזק שלם. קנס הוא זה לגוים לפי שאינן זהירים במצוות ואינן מסלקין הזיקן, ואם לא תחייב אותם על נזקי בהמתן אין משמרין אותה ומפסידין ממון הבריות". והמאירי הביא דברים אלה כאילו הם דוקא, וז"ל: "כל ששבע מצוות בידם, דינן אצלנו כדיננו אצלם, ואין נושאין פנים בדין לעצמנו" (ב"ק לז:). אבל לא ראיתי שדבריו מקובלים להלכה.

[My translation: And in Rambam (Laws of Damages 9:5), he [Rambam] further explains: "Since the gentiles don't obligate anyone [to compensate others] for his own beasts of burden that damage [others], behold we judge them by their own laws [i.e. we don't compensate the gentile at all, just as he wouldn't ever compensate us if the reverse occurred]. And a gentile's ox that gores a Jew's ox, whether an ox that has gored previously or an ox that has never gored before, [the gentile] pays fully [whereas a Jew pays another Jew half for a goring ox, and a Jew pays a gentile nothing for a goring ox]. This is a penalty for gentiles, since they aren't careful in keeping mitzvot and don't pay for their damages. And if we don't obligate them for [damages caused by] their beasts, they will not guard them, and they will cause loss to others." The Meiri brings these words as being exact (davka), saying, "Everyone who keeps the Noahide laws, their law by us [i.e. how we treat them] is like our law by them [i.e. how they treat us], and we don't favorably treat anyone in judicial proceedings (to Baba Qama 37)." [Rabbi Levi continues] But I have not seen that his words are accepted in halakha.]

I am presently writing an essay on the Meiri, which I hope will be published in YCT's Meorot, as soon as I fulfill the Meorot editor's request that I add de rigour citations of Jacob Katz. In the meantime, for a sample of what I'll be writing, see The Acme of Religiosity: Is Judaism a Theology or an Anthropology?.

BEST DISCUSSION EVER

Talking to "Rachel" via IM. After I told her about a discussion I had with Professor Menachem Kellner, the following dialogue transpired:

Rachel: Anyway, what's up?

Me: ROFL. For me, writing to Professor Kellner IS what's up. For me, whatever book I'm reading is what's up; everything else is incidental. LOL

Rachel: lol So what are you reading?

Me: Right now, a book of sermons by Rabbi Dr. J. H. Hertz. Fascinating stuff. I just found some terrific ammunition for my attempt to say that true Religion is morality and not theosophy. See The Acme of Religiosity: Is Judaism a Theology or an Anthropology? And for the purposes of studying modern Jewish history, his constant conflation of "positive historical" ( = Conservative) and "Orthodox" is fascinating. It teaches us how dangerous sectarianism and labels are.

Rachel, responding to what I said about religion and morality: You may actually be a little too radical for me. [We've previously discussed how much we have in common with each other as far as critical thinking and independent-minded philosophy of Orthodoxy goes.]

Me: No, no, no, I keep mitzvot! I'm like Rambam in Shemonah Peraqim, kind of. I just mean that, like Rav Hirsch, the ritual mitzvot serve as auxiliaries to the moral mitzvot, philosophically speaking. But practically, there's no nafqa mina. Except when morality and ritual contradict, like Agriprocessors. Rav Hirsch used to say, "Glatt kosher?? Glatt yoshor!!"

[And here comes the truly delicious part, the reason I've brought this entire dialogue:]

Rachel: I expect a 40 page essay on the proof of that from the text of Tanach.

Me: I already wrote a 30 page essay. It's already online. Let me give you the URL

Me: The Kuzari as Contrasted With Rabbi S. R. Hirsch's Conception of Tiqun Olam - The Place of Universalism and Morality in Judaism

The Acme of Religiosity: Is Judaism a Theology or an Anthropology?

The Acme of Religiosity: Is Judaism a Theology or an Anthropology? Is Judaism "God in search of man", or "man in search of God"? Is Judaism "God's thoughts about man", or "man's thoughts about God"?

A few months ago, in Re: [Avodah] Tiqun Olam, I cited and discussed Howard I. Levine's "Enduring and Transitory Elements in the Philosophy of Samson Raphael Hirsch" (Spring 1963).

Inter alia, Levine says,

In line with this approach, Hirsch reverses the traditional view of the highest goal of religious life: holiness. We are accustomed to viewing holiness, the experience of the numinous, as the very acme of religion. For Hirsch, however, holiness is but a means of preparing us for the end purpose which is the life of service to mankind. ... Rabbi Moses Chaim Luzzato provides a sharp antithesis to the Hirschian view. ...

The following is an excerpt from an essay I am writing on this subject, comparing Rav Hirsch to the Kuzari on the subject of morality and tiqun olam. I am writing another essay on the Meiri which covers almost exactly the same ground as what I'm about to write. (YCT's Meorot told me that as soon as I include the de rigour citations of Jacob Katz, they would like to publish my essay on the Meiri.)

To excerpt my essay on Rav Hirsch and the Kuzari:

But we might wish to note that if "we are accustomed to viewing holiness, the experience of the numinous, as the very acme of religion", then we should realize that not only Rav Hirsch, but further the Prophetic mind in general will disagree with the Mesilat Yesharim. In Rabbi Dr. J. H. Hertz's Early and Late (Soncino Press, 1943), we read, ("A Vindication of Religion", p. 197),

An essential element in that [religious] vision is God's holiness. And the Holy God can only be sanctified through righteousness, Isaiah has for all time declared. That is, moral conduct is the beginning and end of religion, and men and nations are to be judged purely by their moral life. 'The righteous of all nations are heirs of immorality', is an unchallenged dogma of the Synagogue.

One should not miss the far-reaching statements that Hertz has just made. "We are accustomed to viewing holiness, the experience of the numinous, as the very acme of religion" (Levine), for "an essential element in that [religious] vision is God's holiness" (Hertz). But if so, if God's holiness is really the essential element and acme of religion, then, according to Isaiah, "the Holy God can only be sanctified [ - made holy - ] through righteousness". And therefore, "moral conduct is the beginning and end of religion" (Hertz). Moreover, "men and nations are to be judged purely by their moral life". This is an amazing statement. According to Rabbi Dr. Isidore Epstein (Judaism: A Historical Presentation. Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1959 and numerous reprintings thereafter. p. 14),

Belief in the one and only God was not demanded [of the non-Jew], provided there is no idolatry, which Judaism condemns not so much because it is false religion, but because it is false morality; the Son of Noah is not charged the confess the one and only God of the son of Israel. He may be a dualist or a trinitarian, as he wishes. This conception of the Noah laws reveals the real significance of the theocratic constitution of Israel: it rested not on the unity of the state and religion but on the unity of the state and morality.

Apparently, the first Noachide command would not mandate strict monotheism of the Jewish sort, but rather, would prohibit gross heathenistic worship. In like wise, Hertz says (The Pentateuch, p. 759, on Deuteronomy 4:19),

[I]dolatry was for them [viz. the Jews] an unpardonable offense; and everything that might seduce them from that Divine Revelation was to be ruthlessly destroyed. Hence the amazing tolerance shown by Judaism of all ages towards the followers of all other cults, so long as these were not steeped in immorality and crime. [Emphasis in original.]

Similarly, Hertz says (ibid., p. 833, on Deuteronomy 20:10-18),

It is seen that the Canaanites were put under the ban, not for false belief, but for vile action; because of the savage cruelty and foul immorality of their gruesome cults.

(These passages are also found, with some minor but noticeable variations, in Rabbi Hertz's Sermons, Addresses, and Studies, London: Soncino, 1938. Vol 3. Pp. 215 and 219, under "Religious Tolerance"; and Affirmations of Judaism, London: Soncino, 1975. Pp. 183 and 186, under "Religious Tolerance".)

This argument by Hertz and Epstein - that "men and nations are to be judged purely by their moral life" (Hertz), that there is an "amazing tolerance shown by Judaism of all ages towards the followers of all other cults, so long as these were not steeped in immorality and crime" (Hertz), that "It is seen that the Canaanites were put under the ban, not for false belief, but for vile action; because of the savage cruelty and foul immorality of their gruesome cults" (Hertz), that "Judaism condemns [idolatry] not so much because it is false religion, but because it is false morality" (Epstein) – this argument would parallel one by Rabbi Ahron Soloveichk, brought by Rabbi Dr. David Berger ("Jews, Gentiles, and the Modern Egalitarian Ethos: Some Tentative Thoughts", in Formulating Responses in an Egalitarian Age, ed. Marc Stern, Lanham, 2005, pp. 83-108.):

This position is spelled out more rigorously in his [Rabbi Ahron Soloveichik's] novellae to Sefer ha-Madda. Here he maintains that the discriminatory laws against non-Jews result only from their status as evildoers (their shem rasha). Non-Jews who behave righteously by following the six Noahide laws other than the prohibition against avodah zarah are not considered evil as long as their theological error was inherited, as the Talmud suggests about pagans in the diaspora, from their parents and is thus considered inadvertent or even a result of compulsion.

Elsewhere, Berger remarks (Alex Ozar, "An Interview With Rabbi Dr. David Berger", YU Commentator, issued December 17, 2007),

And this raises larger issues about whether in order to get into olam haba a non-Jew has to get a hundred on his exam. Does he need a perfect score on the sheva mitzvos in order to have a helek la-olam haba? Now I suppose that a straightforward reading of most discussions of this matter would be yes. You have to observe all of the sheva mitzvos, not six out of seven. However, there is a teshuva of Rav Yaakov Emden, and you get a similar impression from a piece by the elder Rav Henkin, and this appears to be Rav Ahron Soloveichik’s position, that indicates that the observance of the moral commandments is sufficient and that mistakes with respect to the understanding of God would not keep you out. Sinners, Jews and gentiles, are not punished forever but rather achieve a restored state.

To summarize: if the essential element and acme of religion is God's holiness (Levine), then God is made holy only through righteousness (Hertz citing Isaiah), and all men are judged only by their moral conduct (Hertz, Epstein, Soloveichik, Emden).

And that's the excerpt from my essay on Rav Hirsch and the Kuzari, and that's a sample also of what is to be seen in my someday-to-be-published-with-God's-help essay on the Meiri.

Deception in Kiruv: Do the Ends Justify the Means?

Rabbi Harry Maryles discusses the use of deception in Ultra-Orthodox kiruv: The Kiruv Con.

I agree almost totally with what he says, but I wish to make a minor quibble on one remark of his. His thesis is summarized when he says, "The ends [viz. kiruv] do not justify the means [viz. deception]."

I just finished Rabbi Emanuel Rackman's One Man's Judaism, so I'll have to disagree. Rabbi Rackman makes the point that the ends always justify the means. Only, what are your ends? For Machiavelli, the only end was the preservation of the state, and so any means justified it, because that end had no competition from other ends. But for others, providing justifice and safety and security and happiness to all people is also an end, and that end takes precedence over the end of the state's preservation. Whether the end justifies the means depends on whether you have another end that contradicts the present end.

Here in the case of kiruv as well, I think. Is one's end simply to get kosher-eating tefillin-laying conformist robots who tout the Dahs Toyruh party-line? If so, then of course deception is valid, since in the end, it works!

But if one's goal is to create intelligent, critically-thinking, sensitive and aware Orthodox Jews who seek to apply the Torah to all of human knowledge, experience, and civilization, then deception undermines the very attempt - you cannot create critically-thinking individuals by brainwashing them! The very attempt will fail, by definition.

There may very well be a fundamental moral issue of whether deception is conscionable, but I don't think that this issue is the crux in our case. Rather, it all depends on what one's goal is. Ohr Somayach has taken the first route; we will take the second.

Modern Orthodoxy's Allies: Hareidim or the Non-Orthodox Movements?

My response to Modern Orthodoxy's Allies: Hareidim or the Non-Orthodox Movements? by Rabbi Marc Angel (the thesis of that article being the question, "Does Modern Orthodoxy have more in common with the Hareidi world, or with the non-Orthodox movements?"):

I've been saying something like this for some time now. Rabbi Yehiel Weinberg, summarizing Rav Hirsch's philosophy of Torah im Derekh Eretz, says that Torah is the form (in the Aristotelian sense), and that derekh eretz (i.e. the material world, culture, secular learning, etc.) is the matter. In other words, the world and all its fullness is the raw material to be shaped in accordance with the Torah's values and imperatives.

Now then, we know that according to Greek philosophy, neither form nor matter can exist without the other. So anyone who discards on or the other has either which way ended up with zero. The Reformers discarded the Torah/form, and turned Judaism into zero - this much we all know. But have not the Haredim discard the derekh eretz/matter? Do they not also possess a Judaism reduced to zero? The Haredim and the Modern Orthodox might agree that Torah is to be kept, but they have such diametrically-opposed and antithetical conceptions of that Torah, of its purpose, that this agreement means very little. The Haredim believe the Torah is to be kept by itself in exclusion to all else, while the Modern Orthodox believe the Torah's purpose is to be impressed upon all aspects of life and the world. Truly, what do we both really agree on, in essence?

In fact, I'd wager that the Modern Orthodox have more in common with the Reformers. Rav Hirsch and Rabbi Benzion Uziel both say that the Jew knows that all the righteous of the world are working with him for the good of mankind, and that therefore, the Jew may respect and honor the non-Jews and their contributions, notwithstanding their differences. If they can say this of Christians and Muslims, why cannot we say this of non-Orthodox Jews? On the other hand, we cannot say this of the Haredim; we are not working for the same goal. Verily, I'd say that if anything, Modern Orthodox Jews have more in common with modern Christians than with Haredim. Externally, Modern Orthodox Jews and Haredim are following the code, but towards an entirely separate end. By contrast, non-Orthodox Jews and non-Jews may follow different codes, but often, at least their goal is the same; with them, there is at least something to talk about, some possibility of cooperation and trading of ideas.

Moreover, without overly establishing the truth of the following point - I will simply laconically make hereby a reference to the Tanakh, to Rav Hirsch's Nineteen Letters, and to Rabbi Yom Tov Schwarz's Eyes to See - it is clear that in Judaism, the mitzvot bein adam l'havero take precedence over the mitzvot bein adam la-maqom. The Prophets say, "He has told you, oh man, what is good..." and "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, ... but let he who glories glory in that ...". Hazal say that one is unkind or unmerciful is not truly a Jew, but never do they say this of one who violates kashrut or Shabbat. The purpose of Judaism is l'taqen olam b'malkhut shakai, for iqar shekhina b'tahtonim. Basing themselves on Jeremiah, the Yerushalmi cries in G-d's name that even if we had abandoned G-d, if only we had kept His Torah...! (If one abandons G-d, putting on tefillin and keeping kosher means absolutely nothing. By contrast, the ethical mitzvot are still rational, according to Rabbi Saadia Gaon, and so one can speak of keeping the ethical mitzvot even as one abandons G-d. Clearly, the Yerushalmi is crying in G-d's name for us to keep one set of mitzvot even if we abandon the others.) I don't want to belabor this point, as it deserves a treatise, but briefly said, we have more in common with Reformers who have abandoned G-d than we do with Haredim who have abandoned mankind and human-ness.