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Thursday, April 30, 2009

Tzniut: Married Orthodox Woman Covering Her Hair (or Not)

I have added an update to my previous post, Tzniut: Married Orthodox Woman Covering Her Hair (or Not).

See there, in the section labeled

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Update
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for my remarks.

Reply to R' Adlerstein Re: R' Angel's View of Conversion

In my previous post (Laundry List of Sources Related to Giyur), "Skeptic" provided links to two articles by Rabbi Yitzchok Adlerstein, against Rabbi Angel.

("Skeptic", thank you.)

The articles are Halacha is Not a Chinese Menu and Conversion – Response to Rabbi Angel.

In between those two, Rabbi Angel replies, in Conversion Standards - Rabbi Angel’s Response.

Rabbi Adlerstein's arguments can be summarized as follows:
--- Rabbi Angel claims to be relying on the Rambam and Shulhan Arukh for his view, but surely, his opponents are as well! Thus, this claim by Rabbi Angel is of no avail.
--- Rabbi Angel relies on Rabbi Benzion Uziel, but Rabbi Uziel, says Rabbi Adlerstein, is but one opinion among many, and we cannot cherrypick. Rabbi Yitzhak Shmelkes, the rabbi whose opinion prevails today, contra Rabbi Uziel's, is a more prominent and authoritative rabbi than Rabbi Uziel, with all due respect.

My reply to Rabbi Adlerstein, then, will follow two basic routes:
1) Rabbi Angel is not relying only on Rabbi Uziel; he has other authorities as well, and so it is not merely Rabbi Uziel versus Rabbi Shmelkes, even if Rabbi Shmelkes is indeed greater than Rabbi Uziel.
2) While Rabbi Shmelkes is indeed trying to rely on Rambam and Shulhan Arukh, it is apparent from many sources that Rabbi Shmelkes's attempt, while sincere, is difficult.

Another comment: I have only been Orthodox for the past four to five years of my life, and so one can imagine how much yeshivishe learning I've been able to accrue in that time. I hope, however, that readers will humor me and grant me the benefit of the doubt, and listen to my words, and accept anything I say that may be true, despite my ignorance. More importantly, I hope Rabbi Adlerstein will forgive my impudence in writing this reply, and I hope he will realize that I can write only that which I believe is true, regardless of who I am writing against, regardless of how much greater he is than me. (At least, know that it is nothing personal; I try to be completely unbiased in my beliefs, regardless of with whom I am disagreeing. I love Rav Hirsch, for example, more than words can express, but with my personal views on women covering their hair (Tzniut: Married Orthodox Woman Covering Her Hair (or Not), I wonder if Rav Hirsch would ever let me into his house, given what happened with Graetz. But nevertheless, I cannot retract my opinions.)

A final comment: I have no affiliation with Rabbi Angel, and I did not consult him on the following. All errors are mine and mine alone.

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Rabbi Adlerstein,

With all due respect, I do not believe you are fully understanding Rabbi Angel's stance.

First, we must establish one thing. You say, "It is crucial for people to realize that many people write responsa. Sometimes the only thing they have in common is a beard." With all due respect, Rabbi Adlerstein, but this is out of bounds; Rabbi Angel is not picking out no-name rabbis to uphold his opinion. Many of the rabbis relied upon by Rabbi Angel, who you are impeaching here, were among the Sephardi gedolim. As Professor Zvi Zohar has noted in his review of Rabbi Angel's book about Rabbi Uziel (link,
However, this conventional view of Sephardic Judaism in general and of Sephardic rabbinic learning in particular is disturbingly misguided, the product of a deadly combination of ignorance and internal Orientalism. Indeed, in these respects Sephardic aharonim had (and have) a clear advantage over their Ashkenazic peers: All major and most minor Sephardic aharonim were well acquainted with the works of European Jewish poseqim and held Ashkenazic Torah learning to be no less valuable than their own. Rabbi Yosef Hayyim of Baghdad, Rabbi Hayyim Palache of Izmir, Rabbi David HaCohen-Scali of Oran, Rabbi Khalfon Moshe HaCohen of Jerba and Rabbi Ovadiah Hedaya of Jerusalem are several who readily come to mind. Each of them routinely and casually cites numerous Ashkenazic aharonim in the course of his teshuvot and/or other Torah writings - but of which Ashkenazic poseqim can the converse be said?
One must surely have the most severe and profound revulsion after reading what is brought by Professor Marc B. Shapiro (link):
Yet in a recent haredi work that discusses this episode, R. Yosef is referred to as "Ovadiah," without even putting a resh (for Rabbi) before his name. He is also derided as one who will "rely on a responsum, even if it from a book that is not accepted such as some author from Egypt or something similar." I [Professor Shapiro] would merely add that for most haredim, no author from Egypt in the last few hundred years would qualify as "accepted," as their perspective is entirely Ashkenazic-centered. Standard works of the Sefardic halakhic tradition, such as Erekh ha-Shulhan, Petah ha-Devir, Yafeh la-Lev, and the numerous books of R. Chaim Palache, as well as many less important Sefardic halakhic writings, are not regarded with any significance by the typical haredi poseq and are hardly ever quoted.
Surely these Haredi rabbis are guilty of insulting talmidei hachamim, which, according to the Gemara, qualifies one as an apikorus. I am being only slightly facetious. Rabbi Adlerstein, with all due respect, although your words were far from this egregious and despicable, nevertheless, I feel you have unintentionally besmirched many Sephardic gedolim who are less less in stature than the Ashkenazim with whom you are more familiar. Rabbi Angel is not relying on rabbis of low stature.

Now then, as for Rabbi Angel's reliance on Rabbi Uziel: Rabbi Adlerstein, you say
I am personally unaware of "great rabbinic voices" who embraced a different conclusion, other than the single voice cited by Rabbi Angel – Rabbi Benzion Uziel zt"l.
To be sure, Rabbi Angel quotes Rabbi Uziel preponderantly. In fact, Rabbi Angel's own childhood rav was a student of Rabbi Uziel himself, and Rabbi Angel later attached himself to Rav Haim David Halevi, also a student of Rabbi Uziel's. But we mustn't confuse a preponderance of quotations from Rav Uziel, with a sole reliance on Rav Uziel. There are plenty of sources who could be quoted in Rabbi Uziel's stead, were Rabbi Angel so inclined. As Rabbi Angel himself says,
Prof Shmuel Shilo, in his article "Halakhic Leniency in Modern Respnsa Regarding Conversion", Israel Law Review, 1988, discusses views akin to Rabbi Uziel’s held by 13 great poskim–Sephardic and Ashkenazic–and others could also be adduced easily enough. Rabbi Uziel is certainly not a daat yahid.
I will personally add Professor Zvi Zohar's article, "Halakhic conversion of non-religious candidates" (see my bibliography). Students of Rabbi Soloveitchik will quote "The Rav", those such as myself will usually cite German Neo-Orthodox authorities, while Rabbi Angel will rely on Rabbi Uziel; to each his own, but this does not mean those citing do not have other authorities they could have cited had they so desired.

However, Rabbi Adlerstein, I will confess, that Rabbi Angel's popular writings in the newspapers (such as the piece you are replying to, from the Forward), do have a serious pitfall. While Rabbi Angel has written many works on this subject, seriously analyzing the halakhic basis, nevertheless, his popular writings rarely if ever note his very real halakhic sources. Perhaps this is necessary for the comprehension of his audience, but the result is that few have read Rabbi Angel's more serious writings on the subject, in which he cites his myriads of sources in full. Only yesterday, I wrote to Rabbi Angel a letter saying, inter alia,
...I appreciate the reference in your recent Hakira article, and in your conversion book, to Bekhorot 30b. I believe it important for you to, when appropriate, cite every source which will support your shita or which your opposition is liable to cite. If you neglect to cite this passage, then people are liable to cite this passage against you, and conclude that you are wrong and missed this crucial source. ...

...

I mentioned people using against you sources which you have omitted. A major problem, I believe, with Modern Orthodoxy in general, based on my vast and storied experiences with Orthodox Jews (I'm being sarcastic), is that the laymen do not realize how solid of a basis their rabbis really have, and so they are overawed by the Haredim; we need to make our sources transparent, and make it clear how much of a basis we have, and that we are not making an uncomfortable and untraditional concession to modernity without basis in the sources. At least for me personally, for example, your ideological justification for easing giyur is of little benefit; it doesn't take much to convince me that a more tolerant or more lenient opinion of any given issue is desirable. However, without textual sources, all I have are my feelings. Similarly, if someone argued that it'd be wonderful if kohanim could marry anyone they want, or if someone argued that it'd be wonderful to eat a certain food, I'd support the sentiment and agree that this is great; however, without halakhic justification, this doesn't mean anything. You yourself cite Rabbi Uziel (in Loving Truth and Peace) that compassion alone is of no avail in deciding halakha; we take compassion and mercy into account, but in the end, there must be a solid halakhic source. So when you argue that people are suffering and that we need to make giyur easier, my reaction, until you halakhically prove your case, is for me to say, "I agree that I'd love to make giyur easier, but the halakhah says what it says, so what can we do?".
Thus, to Rabbi Angel himself, I candidly pointed out a serious problem with many of his writings: while Rabbi Angel certainly has a myriad of strong sources, he often neglects to cite them, rather relying on his emotional and ideological arguments, accompanied by a brief notice that the regnant and accepted opinion of today is that of Rabbi Shmelkes alone, but without crucial analysis of the Rambam and Shulhan Arukh showing that Rabbi Shmelkes's opinion is innovative. That is, Rabbi Angel does notify the reader that there is another opinion on conversion besides Rabbi Shmelkes's, but he does not usually offer the reader access to the arguments and sources behind this assertion, though he does offer precisely this in his more scholarly works. Now, while emotional and ideological arguments are certainly important (one may provide technical justification for a lenient opinion, but only ideology can justify why we'd want to follow that opinion), they cannot replace the rigorous technical arguments. (I will note that I greatly revere Rabbi Angel; again, then, one will see that I do not let my affiliations get in the way of what I feel the truth is.)

So then, what are Rabbi Angel's other sources? As Rabbi Angel himself indicates, he also relies on the Gemara, Rambam, and Shulhan Arukh. Now, Rabbi Adlerstein, you object that Rabbi Yitzhak Shmelkes also relies on the same sources. And of course, you are correct!

But we must realize that in truth, some authorities do understand the sources better than others, and we sometimes, we must admit when one authority, with all due respect, has understood the sources in an untenable manner. For example, the Maharal, in his unprecedented stance that denial of an aggadah is heretical, claims to rely on the Gaonim and Rishonim. Surely, no one will accuse the Maharal of lying. But anyone who has seen the Gaonim and Rishonim today, will surely have to admit that Rabbi Azaryah de Rossi and Rav Hirsch were more correct in this matter. The Gaonim and Rishonim said the aggadot are "umdana", and that since they are but "umdana", one is not obligated to trust in them. The Maharal tries to understand the word "umdana" differently, but with all due respect to him, his words are difficult to reconcile with the Gaonim and Rishonim. I wrote about this, with my sources fully indicated, in my Midrash Aggadah: Its Method and Authority. Especially see there, the second section, s.v. "Now, its authority: does someone have the permission to disagree with a Hazalic midrash?".

You say,
Neither, for that matter, could I imagine too many going for R. Uziel, כבודו במקומו מונח, over the Bais Yitzchok.
However, Rabbi Angel is among the last on earth who would ever appeal to charisma; he is not advocating Rabbi Uziel over Rabbi Shmelkes by virtue of popular appeal. Rather, Rabbi Angel is asserting that Rabbi Uziel's approach has a stronger foundation in the sources, for everyone to see.

So let us briefly summarize Rabbi Angel's sources and arguments, which usually (but not exclusively) follow Rabbi Uziel. I am basing the following on my having read almost everything Rabbi Angel has said on this subject; see my bibliography at Laundry List of Sources Relating to Giyur. One will see from my introduction there that I am being rather audacious and brazen in my assertions and declarations, but one may skip the introduction and go straight to my list of sources.

First, there is the sugya in Yevamot 47a-b that speaks of the procedure for giyur. There, we read that the rabbis ask the candidate why he wishes to expose himself to antisemitism, and we teach him some of the major and minor commandments. Rabbi Angel wishes to derive that there is no requirement a committment from the candidate to be observant, but only that we teach him some of what being Jewish means, and we let him make the choice of whether to convert and whether to be observant. Now, personally, this actually does not convince me any more than it convinces Rabbi Adlerstein; perhaps the Gemara is taking it for granted that the candidate has so committed to being observant. On the other hand, Rabbi Angel may be correct; perhaps teaching the commandments is all that is required, and the candidate does not actually have to promise to keep them. Teiku, we must keep this question in abeyance for a moment. One will realize that I am actually granting credence to what Rabbi Adlerstein says, when he says,
Rabbi Angel’s position is the argument from silence. Because the Talmud, Rambam, and Shulchan Aruch do not explicitly mention that the potential convert must, lechatchila, accept all mitvos, Rabbi Angel believes them to hold that there is no such requirement.
In fact, perhaps Rabbi Adlerstein is correct, but let us move on, and see further sources.

Yevamot 24b explicitly says that giyur for the sake of marriage is valid. In that sugya we read (according to Rabbi Angel's translation):
Mishnah: If a man is suspected of [intercourse]...with a heathen who subsequently became a proselyte, he must not marry her. If, however, he did marry her, they need not be separated.

Gemara: This implies that she may become a proper proselyte. But against this a contradiction is raised: "Both a man who became a proselyte for the sake of a woman and a woman who became a proselyte for the sake of a man...are not proper proselytes." These are the words of Rabbi Nehemiah, for Rabbi Nehemiah used to say: "Neither lion-proselytes nor dream proselytes nor the proselytes of Mordecai and Esther are proper proselytes unless they become converted as at the present time..." Surely concerning this it was stated that Rabbi Isaac bar Samuel bar Martha said in the name of Rab: "The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of him who maintained that they are all proper proselytes."
Now, Rabbi Yitzhak Shmelkes, following the Hagahot Mordechai (who explicitly said his opinion goes against that of his teachers, and that his opinion should not be relied on; see Rabbi Dr. Isaac Sassoon's "Let No Ger Spend the Night Outdoors", in my bibliography) reinterprets this Gemara; I also saw that Rav Kook similarly reinterprets this Gemara, and presumably, many Ashkenazi poskim follow Rabbi Shmelkes did the same. Now, what is their reinterpretation? They say that although the woman is converting for marriage, this was only her initial motive; subsequently (though the Gemara never says this), she surely gained a second, religiously sincere motivation. But surely this is strained; if later she came to convert for the sake of Heaven, why did the Gemara see fit to indicate that once upon a time, she wanted to marry for marriage? What's the hava amina (i.e., why would we have thought otherwise)? Since a year ago she wanted to convert for marriage, but today she wants to marry for Heaven, we'll think (initially, as the hava amina) that perhaps she should be rejected, because of what she believed once but not anymore? This is very difficult. Moreover, it makes Rabbi Nehemiah into an absolute buffoon; according to this whole line of thinking, Rabbi Nehemiah considers this woman to be an invalid convert, despite her religious and for-the-sake-of-Heaven motives, simply because once in the past (but not any longer) she had non-religious motives. Is it not an insult to attribute such a ridiculous view to Rabbi Nehemiah? Therefore, we must understand this Gemara as everyone besides Hagahot Mordechai and Rabbi Shmelkes do: this woman is really really truly converting for marriage, nothing more, nothing less, as the plain sense of the Gemara's words indicate. Thus, Rabbi Nehemiah quite reasonably believes she is invalid as a convert (as do Hagahot Mordechai and Rabbi Shmelkes), whereas the conclusion is that even though Rabbi Nehemiah's view is a legitimate and reasonable hava amina, the halakha is nevertheless that she is a valid convert.

Rambam in Issurei Biah strengthens this understanding. We shall be understanding the Rambam according to the Bach (see Rabbi Henkin's article in my bibliography) and Professor Zvi Zohar ("Retroactive Annulment of Giyur?" in the bibliography) and according to the Gra's commentary on the Shulhan Arukh (Rabbi Henkin, ibid.). The Rambam says that when the Tanakh says that King Shlomo married gentiles, this is not really true. Rather, says Rambam, King Shlomo took some idolatrous woman and converted them, even though King Shlomo knew they still believed in idols. (It is apparent from the Rambam's words, and the Gra's as well, that this was not a secret to King Shlomo. It is not clear whether the wives ever told King Shlomo that they intended to worship idols, but even if they did not tell him this, it is apparent that he still knew their "secret" anyway. The Gra explicitly says that their secret was known.) Now then, says Rambam, since these woman were still idolaters, their conversion was very shady, and so the Tanakh called them "gentiles". But really, says Rambam, they were actually bona-fide Jews.

Rambam is basing himself on a Gemara that says that if a ger arises from the mikvah and immediately joins a troupe of idolaters, he is still a valid ger. Rambam, however, apparently with the approval of all the authorities who came after him, has extended this to say that even if prior the mikvah it was clear that the ger would worship idols, the conversion is still valid.

Now, do not err: Rambam says that we must be suspicious of a ger until we ascertain his religiosity, and many err in believing that Rambam holds that the ger is not proven to be a kosher ger until we so determine his religiosity. But since Rambam has already said explicitly that this individual is a kosher ger, this cannot be the correct understanding of Rambam. Moreover, if this understanding were true, then King Shlomo's wives would be gentiles, and Rambam would have failed to save King Shlomo. Rather, then, Rambam must mean that we must be suspicious of whether the new ger is a good Jew. A Jew he most assuredly is, but is he a kosher witness, can you eat what he serves at his table, etc.? All this must be held in abeyance, but in the meantime, the new ger is without a doubt a fully-fledged Jew.

Now, to be sure, Rambam says that all done by King Shlomo was forbidden. Nevertheless, Rambam holds the conversion was valid after the fact. A conversion's being forbidden in the first place, does not necessarily make it unkosher after the fact. Indeed, when King Shlomo forbade the acceptance of converts during his reign, for fear that they were converting for materialistic motives, the Gemara assumes that when ad-hoc batei din converted people behind King Shlomo's back, while this was forbidden, the conversions were still valid. We shall return to this topic.

Rabbi Henkin further adduces Rabbi Shlomo Kluger as saying that ensuring the convert will be observant is merely a makhshir, a litmus test, and that it is only mi'd'rabanan. That is, bediavad, after the fact, if the convert is not observant, the conversion is still valid mi'd'oraita. Dr. Eliezer Berkovits, in Crisis and Faith, says similarly; he says that conversion requires observance, but that bediavad, it is valid even without observance. What is most intriguing, however, is that Dr. Berkovits felt this notion was self-evident, and he saw no need to adduce proof, even though he never neglects to cite textual proof on other occasions when he feels it is necessary.

But what about kabbalat mitzvot? Surely, the poskim say there must be kabbalat mitzvot! In fact, the Shulhan Arukh explicitly demands kabbalat mitzvot for a valid conversion! Rabbi Angel adduces the RambaN and other rishonim to show, and Professor Zvi Zohar ("Halakhic conversion of non-religious candidates") also shows, that before Rabbi Shmelkes, kabbalat mitzvot NEVER meant that the convert had to be observant. Rather, the rishonim said this meant either that the candidate accepted the validity of the conversion ritual qua transformative ritual, and that he or she accepted that he or she would be Jewish per se (observant or not, but that he or she would be joining the Jewish people). Alternatively, kabbalat mitzvot meant that the candidate accepted the beit din's jurisdiction to punish transgression, accepting that in theory, Jewish law is binding. In all this, the candidate never once claimed that he or she would be observant; rather, he or she only accepted that he or she is becoming Jewish, and entering into the beit din's jurisdiction, and that he or she is no longer a gentile.

Now, there is a sugya in Bekhorot 30b that says that if a candidate rejects even one mitzvah, he is not accepted:
Our rabbis taught: "If a heathen is prepared to accept the Torah except one religious law, we must not receive him." R. Jose son of R. Judah says: "even [if the exception be] one point of the special minutiae of the Scribes' enactments."
However, Rabbi Angel notes that neither Rambam nor the Shulhan Arukh codified this as halakha, so it is meaningless for us, no matter what the passage's intent. Moreover, he notes that even if it were halakha (which it is not), some authorities have interpreted this sugya in a way that would still permit non-observant candidates. Personally (I have seen no one say this), I would say that perhaps, it is only l'hatchila (before the fact) that we do not accept someone who rejects a mitzvah; perhaps bediavad (after the fact), if someone (sinfully even) accepted such a candidate, it is a kosher conversion; for the Gemara says, "we do not accept", meaning that once someone does accept, it may be valid after the fact.

Based on all this, Rabbi Henkin explicitly says that Rabbi Shmelkes's opinion is a da'at yahid, against that of the majority of authorities. Professor Marc B. Shapiro (see bibliography) also explicitly says that Rabbi Uziel's opinion is the majority and normative opinion.

Now, so far, we have not argued whether we should convert non-observant candidates; we have only said that we can, or at least, that if someone sinfully performs these conversions, they are still valid. (Even the last, that a sinful conversion is still valid, is enough to invalidate the attempt to retroactively annul conversions.) Now, Rabbi Uziel said that we actually should, in order to prevent the sin of intermarriage, and in order to "save" the children of Jewish father and non-Jewish mothers. But this issue is not our focus. Rabbi Yitzhak Herzog argued against Rabbi Uziel, saying we should only convert people who will be observant. However, even Rabbi Herzog agreed that once a person was converted, even a non-observant person, the conversion is valid bediavad (after the fact), contra Rabbi Shmelkes. Rabbi Angel himself has said that once the rabbis admit what the technical halakhah is (viz. that all Orthodox conversions are valid bediavad), it is up to the individual local rabbi to decide who should and who should not be admitted; Rabbi Herzog (et. al.) has his valid prerogative to decide subjectively not to accept someone. But, we must realize that once a person has converted, no one may annul his conversion; all Orthodox conversions are valid bediavad, as long as kosher witnesses and a kosher mikvah, etc. were present.

(Reform and Conservative conversions are thus not valid, even according to Rabbi Angel, as he repeatedly and forcefully notes in his book, Choosing to Be Jewish. Dr. Eliezer Berkovits similarly said that Reform and Conservative conversions are invalid, and therefore, he argued that Orthodox rabbis, with kosher witnesses and mikva'ot, should convert the R/C candidates. Even if one disagrees with Dr. Berkovits's suggestion, my point is that one should not take these authorities to an ad absurdum, and claim they are legitimizing non-Orthodox conversions; they are not, and they admitted that R/C candidates are kosher only if an Orthodox beit din oversees their conversion.)

Our focus, in the end, is not whether we should do these conversions; it is only that we can, or, again, that if someone does do them, they are completely valid, even if regrettable. The Israeli Rabbinut needs to recognize that Rabbi Shmelkes is a da'at yahid, as has been shown by Rabbis Angel and Henkin, and that in the end, all conversions by Orthodox rabbis are valid, even if the candidate should not have ever been admitted in the first place.

Now, as Rabbi Angel has indicated, every local rabbi still has the right to reject whom he sees fit to reject. But we must recognize that this rejection is a personal and subjective policy, not a halakha. Rabbi Alan Yuter ("The Abortion Rhetoric Within Orthodox Judaism: Consensus, Conviction, Covenant", http://www.jewishideas.org/articles/abortion-rhetoric-within-orthodox-judaism-consensus, and see my reply at http://michaelmakovi.blogspot.com/2009/03/abortion-rhetoric-within-orthodox.html) has emphasized persuasively the need to distinguish between the two; a rabbi may personally decide to be strict, but he must recognize what the actual binding halakha is. In Rabbi Yuter's case, it is that while rabbis may personally decide to forbid abortions, they must recognize that according to halakha, many forbidden abortions are actually completely permitted; see there.

Another comment, this one my own personal opinion: in areas such as giyur, in which many are affected, and in which one community's pesak affects another (because one community may or may not accept the other's giyur), it is vital for us to have one standard, to go for the lowest common denominator. Clearly, that one common standard would be Rabbi Uziel's. For Rabbi Adlerstein himself admits that students of Rabbi Uziel have a right to follow Rabbi Uziel's opinion, even if Rabbi Uziel is a minority opinion. But Rabbi Adlerstein, if Rabbi Uziel's students may rightfully follow Rabbi Uziel's pesak here, and perform conversions, but then the Israeli Rabbinut rejects the conversions, where is the fairness? Surely, if Rabbi Uziel's students are allowed to follow Rabbi Uziel, then surely, the Rabbinut has an obligation to honor these Rabbi Uziel-ian conversions! Therefore, it is apparent that the lowest common denominator among all opinions is Rabbi Uziel's, and that for the sake of having one common standard, everyone must follow Rabbi Uziel's opinion, at least bediavad. Now, again, every rabbi has the right to himself reject those candidates whom he feels the need to do so, as per Rabbi Herzog. Rather, what I am saying is that every rabbi has the obligation to honor other rabbis' conversions, even if he himself would not have performed that conversion. I am sure that when Rabbi Uziel performed conversions of non-observant candidates, Rabbi Herzog recognized those conversions as valid, even if Rabbi Herzog himself never would have performed them. If one rabbi wishes to personally follow the opinion that only observant candidates may be converted, that it is his prerogative, but when another rabbi follows the lenient opinion and converts a non-observant candidate, the strict rabbi has an obligation to, bediavad, honor the lenient rabbi's opinion.

One final note: Rabbi Adlerstein, you quote Rabbi Uziel, Mishpetai Uziel vol.2, Yoreh Deah #66, as saying, "Pro forma conversion, which contains nothing more than a change in label, is unacceptable and has no force in turning the “convert” into a Jew for any purpose whatsoever." You further say that Rabbi Uziel's opinion was "predicated upon taking the convert’s declaration of fidelity to the Torah at face value, predicting that even if he did not mean it at the moment, it will transition into something more substantive." Rabbi Adlerstein, I believe, with all due respect, that you have taken Rabbi Uziel out of context, and that your own statement is not entirely accurate. I will admit that I have not read this teshuva of Rabbi Uziel's yet, but given that your interpretation contradicts everything else that Rabbi Uziel said (i.e., Rabbi Uziel explicitly and repeatedly called for the conversions of gentile spouses of Jews, even if the spouse would never become observant), it seems apparent that until I have a chance to read Rabbi Uziel inside, I will have to speculatively reinterpret him here. I believe that Rabbi Uziel meant, as Rabbi Angel has said to me personally, that Rabbi Uziel would not perform a conversion unless the conversion had some sort of life-changing religious element to it. That is, even if the candidate will not be observant, he or she must still see the conversion ritual as transformative, must see it as something efficacious; the convert must see him or herself as having changed in status. Rabbi Angel, in fact, says the same at length in the conclusion his book on conversion; he says we absolutely cannot blithely perform conversion for marriage, without the convert at least having some sort of belief in his or her becoming a member of the Jewish people. Actually, according to RambaN, this is the definition of kabbalat mitzvot, viz. the convert's accepting his or her entrance into membership in the Jeish people. As for your own statement, that Rabbi Uziel depended on the assumption that all converts would one day become observant, I do not believe Rabbi Uziel held this. Rather, he hoped this would happen, but he did not predicate conversions on this. He himself explicitly said that if a convert never becomes observant, the conversion is valid, and the convert will bear his or her sin for not following the Torah's mitzvot.

---------- Postscript ----------
I wrote the following elsewhere, in my Vexing of Converts, but I feel it is highly relevant, and to my surprise, no one, as far as I know, has cited the following Gemara regarding the conversion situation today. I quote in full my piece, from there:

I recently read Rabbi Yom Tov Schwarz's masterpiece, Eyes to See (Urim Publications: product page). Truly, this is a work of lofty grandeur; 502 pages long, it is already on page 17 that we read,
The distinctions that are found in the Talmud are between a Jew and an akum (heathen), whose societal standards, ethics and morality were so low as to be almost non-existent, and in no way has any bearing on the non-Jews our our time, as has already been noted by the Gedolei Ho'Ahcaronim (great halachic authorities of the recent past).
Imagine how much wealth is to be found in the almost 500 pages that follow this passage!

The recent giyur issue added additional poignancy to the following passage, found on pp. 271f. Discussing the greatness of kiddush hashem, especially when before a non-Jewish audience, Rabbi Schwarz says (square brackets are Rabbi Schwarz's; curly braces are mine),
...the Talmudic lesson in Yevamos (79a) concerning the public hanging of seven descendants of King Saul to avenge his "killing of the Givonites," as related in II Samuel, Chapter 21. Verse 10 states: "Ritzpah daughter of Aiah took a sackcloth and spread it for herself over a rock, from the beginning of the harvest until water fell down on [the corpses] from heaven; she did not allow the birds of the heaven to descend upon them by day, nor the beasts of the field by night." Commenting on this, the Gemara asks:
Is it not written (Deut. 21:23), "His body shall not remain for the night upon the tree"? {Footnote 14: When a person is administered the death penalty by hanging, the Torah commands that the body not remain exposed; it must be removed and buried before nightfall. However, the bodies of King Saul's descendants were left out for many months, because King David commanded that the bodies not be removed until the rains began to fall.} Rabbi Yochanan taught in the name of R. Shimon ben Y'hotzodok: It is preferable to uproot one letter (i.e. one commandment) of the Torah, so that G-d's name will be publicly sanctified. For the passerby would say, "What is the nature of these corpses?" "These are the sons of kings!" "But what did they do?" "They acted against self-declared converts." {Footnote 15: The Givonites sought to convert to Judaism after Joshua's victories in Israel. Because they did not do so out of religious conviction, they were not accepted as authentic converts. They just voluntarily began to live as Jews.} [The passerby] then said, "No other nation is as worthy of becoming attached to as this one. For if the sons of royalty are held liable in this manner [and there is no favoritism], then this is certainly true all the more so for ordinary people. And if self-declared converts [are avenged] in this manner, then how much more so is this true for the Jews themselves!" Immediately, 150,000 converts joined the ranks of Israel.


We may quibble with footnote 15. Now, surely the Givonites indeed were less than exemplary converts, given that they converted via subterfuge, deceiving Joshua and hiding their true identity. Nevertheless, as Rabbi Schwarz himself notes elsewhere in the same book, the Givonites, for their cruel demand that the sons of King Saul be executed (for King Saul's killing the priests of Nob and depriving the Givonites of their livelihood), rather than accepting King David's monetary compensation, were punished by King David's declaration that henceforth, no one may marry a Givonite, for their cruelty was unbecoming of a Jew. (As Rabbi Schwarz notes several times in the book, the Talmud questions the Abrahamic ancestry of a cruel or unkind Jew who lacks compassion, but never is the ancestry of a Jew who violates Shabbat or kashrut questioned. This has ramifications both for where Orthodox Jews ought to invest their efforts and energies, and also for how Orthodox Jews perceive and treat non-observant Jews.) Apparently, previously, one could marry a Givonite, meaning they were fully-fledged Jews, even though their conversion lacked acceptance of mitzvah observance, and was moreover entered into via shady means. This would be in keeping with what has been written by Rabbi Marc Angel (see articles all over http://www.jewishideas.org, Rabbi Yehuda Herzl Henkin (in Hakira vol. 7), Professor Zvi Zohar (at Jewish Ideas, ibid.), and others, following the Talmud and Rambam, that though conversion for non-religious reasons is surely less than ideal, such a conversion is still valid, as long as the convert satisfies kabbalat mitzvot (variously explained as acceptance of the beit din's authority to punish transgression, or acceptance of Jewish peoplehood, or some similar acceptance that falls far short of a declaration to actually be an observant law-abiding Jew; more or less, as long as the would-be-convert accepts his or her becoming a Jew qua Jew, the conversion is valid, even if one should not have performed the conversion in the first place).

On the other hand, I'm not learned in the history and halachot surrounding the Givonites; I'm only assuming they were valid converts, based on the articles I've read about contemporary converts. I'll admit that I'm not learned in why the Samaritans are considered invalid converts; how could their conversions be annulled? The Soncino Talmud, regarding the status of the Givonites, says,
[H] lit., 'dragged in'; proselytes who have not been admitted into the congregation, [or, 'self-made proselytes', a class of converts who Judaize in mass under the impulsion of fear. V. Moore, G. F. Judaism I, 337].
I've been meaning to acquire for myself a copy of Moore, which I have seen cited and quoted often by the authorities whom I follow (chiefly the British ones), but in the meantime, I've only yet gotten Schechter's Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology and Urbach's The Sages, so I regrettably cannot check Moore here for what he says. So I'm assuming the Givonites were valid converts, but I may be incorrect; I am not learned in this specific subject.

But be that as it may; whether the Givonites were true converts (albeit for less than ideal motives, and achieved by shady means), or only impostor and inauthentic converts (as per Rabbi Schwarz), either way, see how swift and uncompromising the punishment was of those who oppressed them! In fact, King Saul only indirectly hurt the Givonites, killing only those who employed them (viz. the priests of Nob); King Saul never actually laid a finger on the Givonites themselves. Moreover, it is not entirely clear what role King Saul's sons played in this entire series of events, and yet they were the ones executed. And as we have seen, the Givonites were not the best of converts, if they were converts at all. On top of all this, the Givonites were considered to be cruel and heartless people, for King David declared no one was permitted anymore to marry the Givonites, on account of their cruel and vindictive demand that King Saul's sons be executed, rather than accepting the generous monetary compensation offered by King David. But despite all this, witness the great punishment of those who were associated with vexing and troubling them: a Torah commandment (viz. not to let an executed criminal's body stay out overnight) was violated in order to vindicate them!

Now, those in Israel who recently invalidated conversions, they claim that the conversions they invalidated were never valid in the first place. Now, this claim is patently false according to the halachah, but let us suppose their claim is actually valid. Nevertheless, according to Rabbi Schwarz's opinion that legitimate and authentic converts must be practically observant (this opinion is shared by those who recently invalidated conversions, following the 19th century innovation of Rabbi Yitzhak Shmelkes, that conversion without observance is an invalid conversion), and that therefore the Givonites were not really Jewish at all, whatsoever, nevertheless, even so, the events in this Gemara occurred to those who caused pain and frustration and loss to them. So even if the rabbis who invalidated converts were halachically correct (viz., in their claim that a convert who is not observant is not really a convert at all), nevertheless, they'd fall under the aegis of this Gemara's implicit censure! Needless to say, given that the converts whose conversions were (supposedly) invalidated are actually true bona-fide converts according to the halachah, all the more are the rabbis who vexed them are subject to the Gemara's implicit censure.

Instructive indeed is this Gemara passage.

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Laundry List of Sources Relating to Giyur

What is ironic is that the rabbis being strict on conversion, are violating halakhah as egregiously as those who permit pork consumption or flagrant Shabbat violation. One wonders why these rabbis are even considered Orthodox in the first place.

Yevamot 24b explicitly rules that conversion for marriage, even withou acceptance of being observant is valid. Only two authorities have ever reinterpreted this Gemara: Hagahot Mordechai (who himself said his opinion is contrary to that received from his teachers, and that his opinion should not be relied on), and Rabbi Yitzhak Shmelkes (in the 1870s, who explicitly says that he is ignoring Hagahot Mordechai's instructions not to rely on him).

Every other halakhic opinion in history, and I mean every single other one (except those relying on Rabbi Shmelkes), including Rambam, Shulhan Arukh, etc., said that while we may have standards for who gets to convert, ultimately, once a person converts, the conversion is valid.

For example, King Solomon forbade conversion, because people were converting for ulterior motives. But guess what? Those who found ad-hoc batei din to convert them, their conversions were valid. Heck, according to Rambam (Issurei Biah), King Solomon's ostensibly gentile wives were actually women who simply got ad-hoc batei din to convert them, without asking them to stop believing in idolatry. Since they violated the gezera against conversion, and moreover, they continued to believe in idols, the Tanakh, says Rambam, continued to call them gentiles, as an insult, even though really, in truth, they were actually Jews, and King Solomon did not intermarry.

Try reconciling that ruling of Rambam (which is seconded by the Shulhan Arukh) with what rabbis are doing today.

My sources:

Rabbi Dr. Marc D. Angel, "Conversion to Judaism: Halakha, Hashkafa, and Historic Challenge", Hakira volume 7, http://www.jewishideas.org/min-hamuvhar/conversion-judaism-halakha-hashkafa-and-histori, http://www.hakirah.org/Vol%207%20Angel.pdf

Professor Zvi Zohar, "Halakhic conversion of non-religious candidates", http://www.jewishideas.org/responsa/halakhic-conversion-of-non-religious-candidates

Professor Zvi Zohar, "Retroactive Annulment of Giyyur (Conversion)?", http://www.jewishideas.org/articles/retroactive-annulment-giyyur-conversion

Rabbi Yehuda Herzl Henkin, "On the Psak Concerning Israeli Conversions", Hakira volume 7, http://www.hakirah.org/Vol%207%20Henkin.pdf (This URL contains but two pages of the whole five page article, but luckily, these two pages are the most crucial. The last three pages contain some less important tangents on conversion, plus some Hoshen Mishpat analysis of invalidating a sinful dayan, unrelated to conversion per se.)

Rabbi Dr. Isaac Sassoon, "Let No Ger Spend the Night Outdoors", http://www.jewishideas.org/articles/let-no-ger-spend-night-outdoors

Rabbi Dr. Marc D. Angel, "The responsa of Rabbi Uziel" [On conversion], http://www.jewishideas.org/responsa/responsa-of-rabbi-uziel

Rabbi Dr. Marc D. Angel, "Another Halakhic Approach to Conversions" (Concerning Rabbi Uziel. This is actually Rabbi Angel's first ever publication on a halakhic topic.),
(1) A for-fee download is available at http://www.traditiononline.org/news/article.cfm?id=103898,
(2) An abridged version is available for free at http://www.myjewishlearning.com/life/Life_Events/Conversion/Contemporary_Issues/Leniency_in_Orthodoxy.shtml?LFLE

Rabbi Dr. Marc D. Angel, Choosing to Be Jewish, http://www.jewishideas.org/store

Rabbi Dr. Marc D. Angel, Loving Truth and Peace: The Grand Religious Worldview of R. Benzion Uziel, http://www.jewishideas.org/store

Rabbi Dr. Marc D. Angel, The Rhythms of Jewish Living, http://www.amazon.com/Rhythms-Jewish-Living-Sephardic-Exploration/dp/0765799839/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1241014827&sr=8-1

Rabbi Dr. Marc D. Angel, "The Conversion Crisis and Challenge", http://www.jewishideas.org/min-hamuvhar/conversion-crisis

Rabbi Alan Yuter, "Conversions, Covenant and Conscience", http://www.jewishideas.org/articles/conversions-covenant-and-conscience

Rabbi Dr. Marc D. Angel, "The Conversion Crisis", http://www.jewishideas.org/minhamuvhar/conversion-crisis

Rabbi Dr. Marc D. Angel, "Slamming the Door on Converts", http://www.jewishideas.org/minhamuvhar/slamming-the-door-on-converts

Professor Marc B. Shapiro, "Responses to Comments and Elaborations of Previous Posts III", s.v. "6. I have been asked to say something about the current conversion controversy. ... There have been a number of people who have stated that the lenient approach often associated with R. Uziel is a singular opinion, or that this view was original to him. That this is mistaken can be seen by anyone who examines Avi Sagi's and Zvi Zohar's book Giyur u-Zehut Yehudit. In fact, throughout most of Jewish history a lenient approach to conversion was the mainstream approach." (Professor Shapiro proceeds to cite and quote a dazzling number of sources to corroborate that last sentence, that Rabbi Uziel's approach was the normative one.), http://seforim.traditiononline.org/index.cfm/2008/8/29/Responses-to-Comments-and-Elaborations-of-Previous-Posts-III

Rabbi Dr. Binyamin Lau, "Prophetic Morality as a Factor in R. Uziel’s Rulings on Conversion : A Case Study of Halakhic Decision-Making from a Zionist Perspective", http://yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/730116/Rabbi_Dr._Binyamin_Lau/Prophetic_Morality_as_a_Factor_in_R._Uziel’s_Rulings_on_Conversion_:_A_Case_Study_of_Halakhic_Decision-Making_from_a_Zionist_Perspective (I think I'd disagree slightly with Rabbi Lau's conclusion, and say that Rabbi Uziel was motivated as much by love and peace and mercy (as suggested by Rabbi Angel's works) as he was by Zionism and Geula (Rabbi Lau's thesis), but the gist remains the same; Rabbi Uziel was driven by meta-halakhic issues and "the spirit of the law".)

If I may humbly add what I have written on this subject:
Michael Makovi, "Vexing of Converts", http://michaelmakovi.blogspot.com/2009/04/vexing-of-converts.html

Tuesday, April 28, 2009

Vexing of Converts

I recently read Rabbi Yom Tov Schwarz's masterpiece, Eyes to See (Urim Publications: product page). Truly, this is a work of lofty grandeur; 502 pages long, it is already on page 17 that we read,
The distinctions that are found in the Talmud are between a Jew and an akum (heathen), whose societal standards, ethics and morality were so low as to be almost non-existent, and in no way has any bearing on the non-Jews our our time, as has already been noted by the Gedolei Ho'Ahcaronim (great halachic authorities of the recent past).
Imagine how much wealth is to be found in the almost 500 pages that follow this passage!

The recent giyur issue added additional poignancy to the following passage, found on pp. 271f. Discussing the greatness of kiddush hashem, especially when before a non-Jewish audience, Rabbi Schwarz says (square brackets are Rabbi Schwarz's; curly braces are mine),
...the Talmudic lesson in Yevamos (79a) concerning the public hanging of seven descendants of King Saul to avenge his "killing of the Givonites," as related in II Samuel, Chapter 21. Verse 10 states: "Ritzpah daughter of Aiah took a sackcloth and spread it for herself over a rock, from the beginning of the harvest until water fell down on [the corpses] from heaven; she did not allow the birds of the heaven to descend upon them by day, nor the beasts of the field by night." Commenting on this, the Gemara asks:
Is it not written (Deut. 21:23), "His body shall not remain for the night upon the tree"? {Footnote 14: When a person is administered the death penalty by hanging, the Torah commands that the body not remain exposed; it must be removed and buried before nightfall. However, the bodies of King Saul's descendants were left out for many months, because King David commanded that the bodies not be removed until the rains began to fall.} Rabbi Yochanan taught in the name of R. Shimon ben Y'hotzodok: It is preferable to uproot one letter (i.e. one commandment) of the Torah, so that G-d's name will be publicly sanctified. For the passerby would say, "What is the nature of these corpses?" "These are the sons of kings!" "But what did they do?" "They acted against self-declared converts." {Footnote 15: The Givonites sought to convert to Judaism after Joshua's victories in Israel. Because they did not do so out of religious conviction, they were not accepted as authentic converts. They just voluntarily began to live as Jews.} [The passerby] then said, "No other nation is as worthy of becoming attached to as this one. For if the sons of royalty are held liable in this manner [and there is no favoritism], then this is certainly true all the more so for ordinary people. And if self-declared converts [are avenged] in this manner, then how much more so is this true for the Jews themselves!" Immediately, 150,000 converts joined the ranks of Israel.


We may quibble with footnote 15. Now, surely the Givonites indeed were less than exemplary converts, given that they converted via subterfuge, deceiving Joshua and hiding their true identity. Nevertheless, as Rabbi Schwarz himself notes elsewhere in the same book, the Givonites, for their cruel demand that the sons of King Saul be executed (for King Saul's killing the priests of Nob and depriving the Givonites of their livelihood), rather than accepting King David's monetary compensation, were punished by King David's declaration that henceforth, no one may marry a Givonite, for their cruelty was unbecoming of a Jew. (As Rabbi Schwarz notes several times in the book, the Talmud questions the Abrahamic ancestry of a cruel or unkind Jew who lacks compassion, but never is the ancestry of a Jew who violates Shabbat or kashrut questioned. This has ramifications both for where Orthodox Jews ought to invest their efforts and energies, and also for how Orthodox Jews perceive and treat non-observant Jews.) Apparently, previously, one could marry a Givonite, meaning they were fully-fledged Jews, even though their conversion lacked acceptance of mitzvah observance, and was moreover entered into via shady means. This would be in keeping with what has been written by Rabbi Marc Angel (see articles all over http://www.jewishideas.org, Rabbi Yehuda Herzl Henkin (in Hakira vol. 7), Professor Zvi Zohar (at Jewish Ideas, ibid.), and others, following the Talmud and Rambam, that though conversion for non-religious reasons is surely less than ideal, such a conversion is still valid, as long as the convert satisfies kabbalat mitzvot (variously explained as acceptance of the beit din's authority to punish transgression, or acceptance of Jewish peoplehood, or some similar acceptance that falls far short of a declaration to actually be an observant law-abiding Jew; more or less, as long as the would-be-convert accepts his or her becoming a Jew qua Jew, the conversion is valid, even if one should not have performed the conversion in the first place).

On the other hand, I'm not learned in the history and halachot surrounding the Givonites; I'm only assuming they were valid converts, based on the articles I've read about contemporary converts. I'll admit that I'm not learned in why the Samaritans are considered invalid converts; how could their conversions be annulled? The Soncino Talmud, regarding the status of the Givonites, says,
[H] lit., 'dragged in'; proselytes who have not been admitted into the congregation, [or, 'self-made proselytes', a class of converts who Judaize in mass under the impulsion of fear. V. Moore, G. F. Judaism I, 337].
I've been meaning to acquire for myself a copy of Moore, which I have seen cited and quoted often by the authorities whom I follow (chiefly the British ones), but in the meantime, I've only yet gotten Schechter's Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology and Urbach's The Sages, so I regrettably cannot check Moore here for what he says. So I'm assuming the Givonites were valid converts, but I may be incorrect; I am not learned in this specific subject.

But be that as it may; whether the Givonites were true converts (albeit for less than ideal motives, and achieved by shady means), or only impostor and inauthentic converts (as per Rabbi Schwarz), either way, see how swift and uncompromising the punishment was of those who oppressed them! In fact, King Saul only indirectly hurt the Givonites, killing only those who employed them (viz. the priests of Nob); King Saul never actually laid a finger on the Givonites themselves. Moreover, it is not entirely clear what role King Saul's sons played in this entire series of events, and yet they were the ones executed. And as we have seen, the Givonites were not the best of converts, if they were converts at all. On top of all this, the Givonites were considered to be cruel and heartless people, for King David declared no one was permitted anymore to marry the Givonites, on account of their cruel and vindictive demand that King Saul's sons be executed, rather than accepting the generous monetary compensation offered by King David. But despite all this, witness the great punishment of those who were associated with vexing and troubling them: a Torah commandment (viz. not to let an executed criminal's body stay out overnight) was violated in order to vindicate them!

Now, those in Israel who recently invalidated conversions, they claim that the conversions they invalidated were never valid in the first place. Now, this claim is patently false according to the halachah, but let us suppose their claim is actually valid. Nevertheless, according to Rabbi Schwarz's opinion that legitimate and authentic converts must be practically observant (this opinion is shared by those who recently invalidated conversions, following the 19th century innovation of Rabbi Yitzhak Shmelkes, that conversion without observance is an invalid conversion), and that therefore the Givonites were not really Jewish at all, whatsoever, nevertheless, even so, the events in this Gemara occurred to those who caused pain and frustration and loss to them. So even if the rabbis who invalidated converts were halachically correct (viz., in their claim that a convert who is not observant is not really a convert at all), nevertheless, they'd fall under the aegis of this Gemara's implicit censure! Needless to say, given that the converts whose conversions were (supposedly) invalidated are actually true bona-fide converts according to the halachah, all the more are the rabbis who vexed them are subject to the Gemara's implicit censure.

Instructive indeed is this Gemara passage.

Sunday, April 26, 2009

Kol B'Ishah: A New Analysis - Update

In my Kol B'Ishah: A New Analysis, I discuss two articles that reach a lenient permissive conclusion regarding a man's listening to a woman sing.

At the end, I quote Rabbi Avraham Shamma that in his childhood (under Syrian Orthodox parents), he was never told to refrain from listening to women sing, and that moreover, he had heard from others that Egyptian Orthodoxy Jewry similarly did not refrain from listening to women sing.

Today, I saw an apposite statement in Rabbi Dr. Marc D. Angel's Foundations of Sephardic Spirituality: The Inner Life of Jews of the Ottoman Empire. There, on page 125, discussing the singing of Ladino (Judeo-Spanish) romances, with their often emotional if not downright sensual lyrics, Rabbi Angel says, inter alia,
Although there were religious pietists who objected to singing love songs, the romances were very popular throughtout all strata of Sephardic society. Men and women often sang these songs together. It was not unusual for women to sing solo parts in the presence of men. [Emphasis mine.] People participated in the singing and enjoyed the songs in a natural, easygoing way.
This quote deserves a few remarks. That the men and women sang these songs (viz. romances) together is already remarkable in itself. Even the German Orthodox, whose mixed-sex singing of Shabbat zemirot (religious songs) was considered liberal in the Orthodox community, never extended this leniency beyond zemirot; Rabbi Yehiel Yaakov Weinberg justified the practice based on the Sdei Hemed, who said that there is no sexual pleasure derived from a woman's singing either zemirot or funeral dirges - but romances are obviously very different from these! The fact that the women would then sing romances solo(!!!) even can only be seen as even more fantastically remarkable then.

We then turn to footnote 6, marked at the end of this paragraph, and found on page 186; I quote this in full:
I [Rabbi Angel] was raised in the Sephardic community of Seattle, Washington, and well remember our many family gatherings where romances were sung. Jews of great piety sang right along with with those of lesser piety. I do not remember anyone ever objecting to the singing of love songs by men and women. In the early 1980s, Haham [the Sephardic term for rabbi] Dr. Solomon Gaon, himself a Judeo-Spanish-speaking rabbi, taught classes in Sephardic folklore at my Congregation Shearith Israel in New York City. I well remember him singing love songs, enthusiastically and nostalgically. Both of us participated in a program of Sephardic culture sponsored by the Hebrew College of Boston. A female soloist sang a selection of romances, after which Haham Gaon not only applauded loudly but rose to speak in praise of the singer for her beautiful rendition of the songs. [Emphasis mine.] Haham Gaon, who served as chief rabbi of the Spanish and Portuguese Congregations of England and as head of the Sephardic Studies Program of Yeshiva University in New York, was a very prominent Orthodox Sephardic rabbi and a man of impeccable piety.


When I told my rabbi that Egyptian and Syrian Jewry had apparently not objected to listening to women sing (according to Rabbi Avraham Shamma), my rabbi suggested that perhaps the rabbis there had simply seen it prudent to not vocally object, even if they had (hypothetically) opposed it. I believe this passage from Rabbi Angel refutes such a supposition.

Speaking of Rabbi Angel's Foundations of Sephardic Spirituality: The Inner Life of the Jews of the Ottoman Empire, I'll soon be receiving in the mail a copy of Rabbi Angel's The Jews of Rhodes: The History of a Sephardic Community. Stay tuned for anything I may have to say on this book.

Friday, April 24, 2009

What if Susan Boyle Had Stunk?

Jew in the City (Ms. Allison Josephs), in her What if Susan Boyle Had Stunk? makes the point that for Susan Boyle,
Her voice was as beautiful as it was surprising. Seeing her triumph over the critics was exhilarating. But in the middle of her performance I started to wonder what would have happened if Susan Boyle had been mediocre or even downright awful?

She would have been jeered and booed by the live audience and probably laughed at by many viewers watching from home. Most of us would have never heard her name, unless of course she shtank so badly that the video of her singing went viral for the sole purpose of ridiculing her.

So why was she spared from the meanness? Why was she an inspiration instead of a humiliation? Because she had been granted a beautiful voice. I'm sure she worked on it and honed that voice over the years, but a lovely voice, just like beauty, intelligence, and wit are all God-given.
I will comment later on this, in disagreement, but first Josephs notes further, in what could easily be taken straight out of Messilat Yesharim (a classic 18th century Jewish work of ethics), and with which I agree completely, that
When we are complimented for possessing qualities such as these, society tells us to say "thank you," but in truth, we should say "thank God". (We are so trained to take credit for such attributes, can you imagine how obnoxious a woman would sound if upon being told she was beautiful she responded with "thank God"?!)

Susan Boyle's inner qualities - honesty, generosity, compassion are unknown to us and have no real value when it comes to reality television. But for our own realities, we should consider two things: if we call ourselves Susan Boyle champions would we have taken perverse pleasure had she failed? We must also be sure to differentiate which of our own attributes are mere gifts and which are the ones we are responsible for improving.

Being awed by beauty that God put in the world is a wonderful thing, but actively working to create a beauty within yourself is nothing short of Godly.


In this latter quote, I think two distinct points are made by Ms. Josephs, and I think both are completely true, and bear repeating:
1) Every trait we are blessed with, we should be thanking G-d for; we cannot take pride in them, any more than a bird can take pride in the fact that it can fly (as Messilat Yesharim notes);
2) Honesty, integrity, and an ethical character are the true things to take pride in. As Jeremiah said (9:22f; courtesy of Mechon Mamre),
Thus saith the LORD: Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches; But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth, and knoweth Me, that I am the LORD who exercise mercy, justice, and righteousness, in the earth; for in these things I delight, saith the LORD.
I once saw Rabbi Joseph Telushkin make the crucial point that whereas we praise and congratulate and reward our children for good grades in school, and the opposite the poor academic performance, really, a parent ought to praise, congratulate, and reward for good character. As Rabbi Telushkin continues, most of us acknowledge that we'd rather have moral and upstanding children who don't perform well academically, than we'd have immoral children who do well. The problem, however, he says, is that in practice, we don't show our children these values when we heap praise or rebuke on them.

Dr. Benjamin Carson, in his autobiography Gifted Hands, presents, inter alia, the most profound example of humility ever written, I believe. Everything Messilat Yesharim says on this, he lives, and more. He crucially notes that whereas we certainly cannot take pride in our natural gifts, since we played no role in being born with them, nevertheless, he says, we are obligated to use these gifts and perfect them as much as possible. He says he knows he's great; he has fantastic surgical skills that few others have. However, he says, G-d gave all this to him as a responsibility; were he to not use his skill to its fully extent, he'd be shirking his responsibility.

Thus, says Dr. Carson, he can take no glory over his secretary or his garbage-man; without them, he'd never be able to perform his surgery. Everyone, he says, was created by G-d for some purpose, with some abilities to that end, and no one may take any glory. If you do everything you can, you are merely fulfilling your responsibility the way you were expected to. Who can take on airs for this? If the Talmud hadn't said it, Dr. Carson would have: (Berachot 17a, according to the Soncino translation; courtesy of Come and Hear):
A favourite saying of the Rabbis of Jabneh was: I [viz. the Torah scholar, the great rabbi] am God's creature and my fellow [the lowly farmer] is God's creature. My work is in the town and his work is in the country. I rise early for my work and he rises early for his work. Just as he does not presume to do my work, so I do not presume to do his work. Will you say, I do much and he does little? We have learnt: One may do much or one may do little; it is all one, provided he directs his heart to heaven.


But with point Josephs's first point, I wish to argue. Her argument seems to be that while Boyle was vindicated from judgment of her appearance, her vindication was only due to her singing voice; had she not been blessed with a singing voice, the scathing and cruel criticism of her appearance would have remained. However, we must realize, this *was* a singing contest; vindication by her singing voice is not so morally scathing. As the critics have noted, this initial judgment by appearance was entirely improper; this was a singing contest, not a beauty one.

On the other hand, all the people who go on singing contests and do horribly, to some extent, they do deserve ridicule. What does one expect to receive from the judges, other than ridicule?

Do not misunderstand me; I am not saying it is moral to ridicule others; certainly this is a moral vice arising from defects within one's own personal character, to take any joy in another's failings. But to some extent, if a person has a horrible singing voice, and he or she enters a singing contest, much of the ridicule is almost self-inflicted. I for example have a horrible singing voice, and I also don't know anything about art or physics. So if I entered an art-knowledge or physics competition, what should I expect but ridicule?

So while she is correct that we should be judging based primarily on honesty and integrity, and that we shouldn't grant overmuch consideration to G-d-given traits which we cannot claim to have earned by dint of personal effort, nevertheless, I will say that to some extent, to judge a person's singing voice at a singing competition is fine.

The problem then, here, was really the judging her appearance. This was entirely unwarranted. She shouldn't have been judged at all by her appearance. But after the fact, for her to be vindicated by her voice is entirely warranted, I believe. Similarly, if a person entered a physics competition and was ridiculed for her appearance, but then her physics contribution was brilliant, should not this serve to completely vindicate her from the criticism she ought not have received in the first place? But if her contribution is a disaster, then she will properly receive criticism for this, but again, she should not receive any criticism whatsoever for her appearance.

Tuesday, April 21, 2009

Why I Follow Rabbis Glasner and Berkovits

Someone asked me why I follow Rabbis Glasner and Berkovits, particularly given that they are supposedly heretical. My explanation, which should be read in conjunction with my The Necessity for Academic Talmud Study:

We have two separate subjects.

First is Rabbi Glasner's and Dr. Berkovits's general view of the Oral Law being human-dependent for its development. As Rabbi Glasner says,
Thus, whoever has due regard for the truth will conclude that the reason the [proper] interpretation of the Torah was transmitted orally and forbidden to be written down28 was not to make [the Torah] unchanging and not to tie the hands of the sages of every generation from interpreting Scripture according to their understanding. Only in this way can the eternity of Torah be understood [properly], for the changes in the generations and their opinions, situation and material and moral condition requires changes in their laws, decrees and improvements.29 Rather, the truth is that this [issues from] the wonderful wisdom [and] profound insight of the Torah, [which teaches] that the interpretation of Torah [must be] given over to the sages of each generation in order that the Torah remain a living force with the nation, developing with it, and that indeed is its eternity.
This, in general, leads to a radically different view of what the Talmud is. The student realizes the Talmud was composed by humans; these humans were the fathers of our tradition, and the masters of our mesorah, but humans nevertheless. What this means is that the student will not be so hung-up over the Talmud, because he won't try to square the circle, to view it all as the output of some omniscient mastermind beyond human logic. They'll expect the Talmud to make sense; they'll expect it to conform to human logic as they understand it. And if something in the Talmud seems outdated, they won't be afraid to admit that the thought is according to 6th century CE modes of thought, and they won't be afraid to update the thought, to say the same thing but in 21st century mode. One realizes that not everything in the Oral Law is sacrosanct; if Hazal said that this medicine will cure this disease, or that women are best kept indoors, we won't automatically assume this is Sinaitic. Moreover, as Rabbi Hayman writes, we'll realize that the Talmud ought to conform to human logic, and that its logic is not inscrutable. Rabbi Hayman says, as I quote at The Necessity for Academic Talmud Study,
Beyond these didactic issues, more basic problems present themselves in the realm of the faith positions and religious attitudes resulting from the prevalent approaches. According to the ideological program of religious education, a religious person is expected to relate to sacred texts as ultimate sources of authority which define one’s lifestyle, one’s values, one’s priorities and even one’s innermost thoughts. However, these same texts are seen to be beyond comprehension and logic, let alone independent textual inquiry. In a certain post-secondary institution, a student asked the Talmud teacher about the logical implications of the text under study. To this question, a second student retorted: “What? You expect the Talmud to be logical?” In such a situation, a student may come to the obviously threatening conclusion that there is not supposed to be any orderly connection between spirituality and intelligence, between religiosity and cognition, and that human awareness, sensitivity and reasoning has nothing to do with God-centered life and behavior. Once this dubious concoction has been internalized by the despairing pupil, what will be the reactions to the faith positions of others, to their logical challenges to his/her own dogmatic positions? How is a person to be expected to resolve loyalty to God with rejection of his/her own mind, under pressure of a general society which values empiricism and the reign of reason? The historic differentiation between Judaism as a spiritual national-legal system on the one hand, and dogmatic-charismatic spiritual systems such as paganism and Christianity on the other hand, becomes obscured, even eliminated, giving support to the secular position that spirituality as a whole is merely a vestige of the primitive, pre-enlightenment, pre-empirical darkness. ... It would appear, therefore, that the prevalent didactics for Oral Tradition studies in general, and Talmud in specific, create a contradiction between learning and life. Teachers of sacred texts claim that their fare is the deepest, most meaningful on earth, yet simple logic and normal cognition render them detached, even ridiculous. The intelligent student has no escape, and the choice is clear: if he/she accepts the texts and lifestyle being dictated by teachers, the result is potential rejection of one’s own mind, heart, and experience. Acceptance of oneself may lead to rejection of religious texts and, with them, religion itself. Learning leads to passive acceptance of the incomprehensible, life leads to active formulation of the necessary. Learning leads to submission to authority, life leads to the acceptance of responsibility. Learning leads to the precedents of the past, life leads to the needs of the present and the future. ... As a result [of the alternative pedagogic method, proposed by Rabbi Hayman and Revadim], the components of the Talmud text receive context: as one progresses through the discussion, one is called upon to pay attention to the prevailing circumstances surrounding each remark, each step in the evolution of the halakhah, and to relate to the religious, philosophical, social, economic, political, educational or communal motivations for halakhic change. Jewish observance becomes a prism through which the student can see religiosity as interplay between eternal values and temporal conditions, and Talmudics and halakhah become the map by which one charts the course leading to one’s own day - and beyond. Halakhah becomes a national-legal process which takes its rightful place alongside and among the dynamic historical and national processes which fill modern life, and Jewish values can justly claim once more to lead, not follow, human development.
We'll also realize that our rabbis are not beyond reproach or criticism, because we'll realize that they are humans as well, albeit wise humans with authority. Obviously, we cannot blithely overwrite areas of the Torah, but we must ask the question: is this sacrosanct, or not? According to the Talmud, yafet toar is not; according to Rav Kook, milhemet reshut is not; according to Dr. Berkovits, many laws of women are not. We must have the courage to ask what is time-bound and what is eternal.

As for Dr. Berkovits's own supposedly heretical view of moral values being determinative in deciding halacha, this is merely an exegetical issue. I say one should investigate Dr. Berkovits's proofs, and see if they stand up to scrutiny. But either way, I cannot see why they are heretical. Perhaps they are even completely wrong in every detail, but G-d forbid that we make error and heresy synonymous; as Professor Marc Shapiro has remarked, if Judaism includes only those authorities who are factually correct, an awful lot of heretofore traditional Judaism will be excluded from the tent. Rav Kook says we should first determine whether something is heretical or not, so that if it is not heretical, we can dispassionately investigate its factuality; Rav Kook concludes that evolution is not heretical, and so he dispassionately discusses whether he believes evolution is true or not, and Rav Hirsch seems to follow a similar approach. I cannot figure out what is heretical about Dr. Berkovits's proposal. In any case, given that Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits in Tradition uses Berkovits-ian logic in discussing saving a gentile on Shabbat, we should realize who else's Orthodox credentials are at stake alongside Dr. Berkovits's. (I covered up Rabbi Jakobovits's name, and asked my rabbi to read it, and he thought Dr. Berkovits wrote it. Rabbi Jakobovits argues that really, according to halakhic logic, we shouldn't save a gentile on Shabbat, but that since this is "immoral", darkhei shalom overrides it, as the Torah's internal ethical ethos and override, overriding any law which is logical but immoral. Actually, Dr. Berkovits is preceded by Rabbi Glasner, who argues that one should eat pork over human flesh, and wear women's clothing rather than be naked, even though there is no prohibition of cannibalism or nakedness; Rabbi Glasner says this is simply immoral, with or without a Torah prohibition, and that it overrides the Torah command. I might note that Rabbi Yehuda Amital enthusiastically endorses this position of Rabbi Glasner's; realize who else we risk declaring to be heretical.) I might add that this area of Dr. Berkovits's thought is not particularly critical for me; I do not know enough Talmud to judge whether he is correct here or not, so I have simply stashed this thought of his in my mind for later consideration, alongside the other shitot of other rabbis in a variety of areas. It is the first area of Dr. Berkovits's thought, in the first paragraph of this email, which truly concerns me.

Monday, April 20, 2009

The Necessity for Academic Talmud Study

Quoting what I wrote at http://www.jewcy.com/post/hedgehog_fox_and_talmud#comment-31180:

This approach is I think exactly what such figures as Rabbi Pinhas Hayman (Revadim, Professor at Bar-Ilan) and Rabbi David Bigman (Yeshivat Maale Gilboa) are aiming at.

Both are seeking to put the findings of academic Talmud study into the yeshivot. In brief: the Aramaic portions (Stama d'Talmuda) of the Talmud are the Savoraic editorial glosses, while the Hebrew portions are actual memrot of the Amoraim themselves. When one realizes this, he realizes that the Gemara is a text not written by one hand, but rather, by multiple hands over generations, with additional material being added, sedimentarily, over time.

Once the student realizes this, he'll realize the Talmud was composed by humans. These humans were the fathers of our tradition, and the masters of our mesorah, but humans nevertheless. What this means is that the student will not be so hung-up over the Talmud, because he won't try to square the circle, to view it all as the output of some omniscient mastermind beyond human logic. They'll expect the Talmud to make sense; they'll expect it to conform to human logic as they understand it. And if something in the Talmud seems outdated, they won't be afraid to admit that the thought is according to 6th century CE modes of thought, and they won't be afraid to update the thought, to say the same thing but in 21st century mode.

See Rabbi David Bigman, "Finding a Home for Critical Talmud Study".

Rabbi Dr. Pinchas Hayman of Bar-Ilan University, is also a central figure in this. See the material on the Revadim website: http://www.talmud-revadim.co.il/textlist.php

Rabbi Dr. Yaakov Elman of YU is quite useful here as well. He has an article in Modern Scholarship in the Study of Torah bearing on our topic. I was talking to Rabbi Elman about this, and I mentioned Rabbi Dr. Eliezer Berkovits's historical theory of the Oral Law, and he parried with Rabbi Berkovits's teacher's father, viz. Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner - see the website devoted to Rabbi Glasner, and see especially the abridged translation of Rabbi Glasner's hakdama [introduction] to his Dor Revi'i.

I have found Rabbis Glasner and Berkovits as being especially helpful. If Rav Hirsch reconciled Graetz to the Talmud, then Rabbis Glasner and Berkovits did the same for me. According to Rabbis Glasner and Berkovits, the Oral Law was originally oral precisely in order to make it flexible, and able to develop and evolve over time. The obvious implication is that the Tannaim and Amoraim are thus no longer fallible. To be sure, the Talmud is halachically binding. But if something in the Talmud doesn't quite sit well with one logically, one is able to admit that he disagrees, and articulate why he disagrees, without being a heretic. The Talmud is sealed, and we cannot change it, but you can admit that were you alive at the time of the Talmud, you'd have disagreed with a given Tanna or Amora. The Talmud is once again made human; tremendously wise and authoritative humans, but humans nevertheless. Like a human court today, the binding and authoritative nature of the court's ruling doesn't mean you're a heretic for disagreeing with it. And see Tosafot Yom Tov to Nazir 5:5, as pointed out to me by Rabbi Elman.

See also the following articles of Rabbi Hayman's, which very clearly set forth the difference it makes to students, even psychologically, when the Talmud is taught as having a history:
http://www.lookstein.org/articles/implications.htm
http://www.lookstein.org/articles/haymanp1.htm
http://www.lookstein.org/articles/revadim.htm
http://www.lookstein.org/retrieve.php?ID=-3227870

Note the following quotations as examples. I would say that his hypothetical example of what the student will feel and think, very nearly matches my own experience before learning Rabbis Glasner and Berkovits.
Beyond these didactic issues, more basic problems present themselves in the realm of the faith positions and religious attitudes resulting from the prevalent approaches. According to the ideological program of religious education, a religious person is expected to relate to sacred texts as ultimate sources of authority which define one’s lifestyle, one’s values, one’s priorities and even one’s innermost thoughts. However, these same texts are seen to be beyond comprehension and logic, let alone independent textual inquiry. In a certain post-secondary institution, a student asked the Talmud teacher about the logical implications of the text under study. To this question, a second student retorted: “What? You expect the Talmud to be logical?” In such a situation, a student may come to the obviously threatening conclusion that there is not supposed to be any orderly connection between spirituality and intelligence, between religiosity and cognition, and that human awareness, sensitivity and reasoning has nothing to do with God-centered life and behavior. Once this dubious concoction has been internalized by the despairing pupil, what will be the reactions to the faith positions of others, to their logical challenges to his/her own dogmatic positions? How is a person to be expected to resolve loyalty to God with rejection of his/her own mind, under pressure of a general society which values empiricism and the reign of reason? The historic differentiation between Judaism as a spiritual national-legal system on the one hand, and dogmatic-charismatic spiritual systems such as paganism and Christianity on the other hand, becomes obscured, even eliminated, giving support to the secular position that spirituality as a whole is merely a vestige of the primitive, pre-enlightenment, pre-empirical darkness. ... It would appear, therefore, that the prevalent didactics for Oral Tradition studies in general, and Talmud in specific, create a contradiction between learning and life. Teachers of sacred texts claim that their fare is the deepest, most meaningful on earth, yet simple logic and normal cognition render them detached, even ridiculous. The intelligent student has no escape, and the choice is clear: if he/she accepts the texts and lifestyle being dictated by teachers, the result is potential rejection of one’s own mind, heart, and experience. Acceptance of oneself may lead to rejection of religious texts and, with them, religion itself. Learning leads to passive acceptance of the incomprehensible, life leads to active formulation of the necessary. Learning leads to submission to authority, life leads to the acceptance of responsibility. Learning leads to the precedents of the past, life leads to the needs of the present and the future. ... As a result [of the alternative pedagogic method, proposed by Rabbi Hayman and Revadim], the components of the Talmud text receive context: as one progresses through the discussion, one is called upon to pay attention to the prevailing circumstances surrounding each remark, each step in the evolution of the halakhah, and to relate to the religious, philosophical, social, economic, political, educational or communal motivations for halakhic change. Jewish observance becomes a prism through which the student can see religiosity as interplay between eternal values and temporal conditions, and Talmudics and halakhah become the map by which one charts the course leading to one’s own day - and beyond. Halakhah becomes a national-legal process which takes its rightful place alongside and among the dynamic historical and national processes which fill modern life, and Jewish values can justly claim once more to lead, not follow, human development.


In this, we can understand Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner's words:
Thus, whoever has due regard for the truth will conclude that the reason the [proper] interpretation of the Torah was transmitted orally and forbidden to be written down28 was not to make [the Torah] unchanging and not to tie the hands of the sages of every generation from interpreting Scripture according to their understanding. Only in this way can the eternity of Torah be understood [properly], for the changes in the generations and their opinions, situation and material and moral condition requires changes in their laws, decrees and improvements.29 Rather, the truth is that this [issues from] the wonderful wisdom [and] profound insight of the Torah, [which teaches] that the interpretation of Torah [must be] given over to the sages of each generation in order that the Torah remain a living force with the nation, developing with it, and that indeed is its eternity.

Sunday, April 19, 2009

The Term "Orthodox" Judaism

Based on the remarks of a friend I chatted with on Shabbat:

We shouldn't refer to Orthodox Judaism as "Orthodox", because it implies there's such a thing as legitimate non-Orthodox Judaism. Instead, we should refer to Orthodox Judaism as just plain "observant Judaism". Orthodox Judaism is "Judaism", and non-Orthodox Judaism is simply a collection of errant individuals.

My friend's point was that the observant/Orthodox community should not be afraid to insist that Torah observance befits every Jew. We don't have to be ashamed to admit that the sine qua non of being Jewish is observing the Torah. In our tolerance, we need not compromise our principles; we believe that being Torah observant is the proper thing for every Jew, and that non-Torah-observance is less than proper, and we need not bend over backwards to compromise our principles in order to accommodate others.

Now, this doesn't mean looking down on non-observant Jews, any more than we must look down on abused wives or abused children. But just as the ordinary and healthy state of a woman and a child is to be not-abused, the ordinary and healthy state of a Jew is to be Torah observant. We don't look down on non-observant Jews, just as we don't look down on handicapped individuals, but just as we recognize that handicaps are unhealthy and abnormal (and thus, we try to cure them), we recognize that non-Torah-observance is a disorder.

So don't get me wrong; I love every Jew, and I don't self-righteously criticize their non-observance (at least, I hope I don't; see my On G-d's Fatherhood and Religious Fundamentalism), but nevertheless, I shouldn't be afraid or ashamed or abashed to admit that nevertheless, I do think that being Torah observant is the proper form of Jewish practice.

-----

Update (duplicated from the comments below): The problem I have with the left is that they confuse tolerance with forfeiture of one's own beliefs. Tolerating others' beliefs shouldn't require the abandonment of one's own, but many in the left seem to think precisely this is required.

If Orthodoxy must forfeit its belief that observance of the Torah is the sine qua non of Judaism, then Orthodoxy forfeits its very existence. If Orthodoxy is to have a relationship with the non-Orthodox, then such a notion, on the part of the non-Orthodox, is nothing short of abuse.

It was in this spirit that Rav Soloveitchik said in "Confrontation" that dialog between Judaism and Christianity must avoid either side making theological demands of the other. If Christianity is to respect Judaism's eschatology, then Judaism must respect Christianity's. For this reason, I am continually incensed by Jews who demand that Christians cease proselytization; if the Christians freely choose to adopt a covenant theology that Jews are still G-d's chosen, that is their prerogative, but we have no authority to demand they drop replacement theology. Our demands to this effect are tantamount to a demand that they rewrite their eschatology, and this is nothing short of abuse. It's not that I like proselytization; I belief the State of Israel should have a far firmer and stronger stance on missionaries in Israel. But all the same, I respect the theological prerogative of Christian missionaries to engage in their activities, even as I demand that Israel take every step to practically thwart these efforts.

We can discuss the practical wisdom of Orthodoxy's stance in refusing to legitimize the non-Orthodox movements, but I find it highly arrogant to say that this attitude of Orthodoxy's was inherently intolerant. If it was unwise, practically speaking, so be it, but if it was intolerant, then apparently, holding any beliefs at all is intolerant. Apparently, to be tolerant, one must be neutral on everything.

For if one takes umbrage at the belief that one must observe the Torah to be a full Jew, then one is simply intolerant himself. Would you rather the observant simply find another way to express their convictions, or would you rather the observant abandon their convictions altogether, in the pursuit of tolerance?

Somehow, the observant movement must respect the non-observant movement's choice to not observe the Torah, but the non-observant feel no need to respect the observants' belief that Torah observance is a commandment. One must indeed wonder why the left does not find a need to be tolerant of the right's beliefs. For some reason, the right is required to be tolerant and accepting of everything the left says, but somehow, I don't hear many leftists preaching tolerance and acceptance of the right's positions. If you ask me, few are more intolerant or closeminded than those on the left.
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